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Acts of pardon, marriage, and divorce, made in one country,
are received and binding in all countries.
-Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (1788)1
The Full Faith and Credit Clause has been left seriously underenforced
as a constitutional constraint on state choice of law. Despite its vigorous
implementation in requiring recognition of the judgments of sibling states, the
Clause has been applied to require very little deference to the laws of sibling
states, even though the term "public Acts" appears right alongside "judicial
Proceedings" in the text of the provision.2 As applied by the Supreme Court
today, the Clause allows a forum state to disregard the conflicting law of any
sibling state as long as the forum has some colorable stake in applying its own
law. Respect for even a weighty interest of a sibling state is left almost entirely
to the voluntaristic vagaries of comity, usually impelled by mere forum
altruism or enlightened self-interest but only rarely by constitutional mandate.
The Court is reluctant to enforce the Clause more fully in the choice-
of-law context because of past struggles in doing so. The Court fears it lacks
sufficient, objective guidance from which to derive enforcement criteria. At the
same time, however, the Court has acknowledged that the Framers understood
the Clause to place meaningful constraints on state choice of law and has even
indicated a methodology for identifying this "original content" of the Clause.3
The missing element is an effort to use that methodology to identify this
original content with sufficient certainty to give the Court adequate guidance to
enforce the Clause more fully. Beginning to fill that gap is what I propose to
undertake here.
Examining choice-of-law disputes as to the validity of marriages, I
attempt to employ the methodology endorsed by the Court itself in an effort to
establish that the original content of the Clause can be identified sufficiently for
judicial use in resolving at least some conflicts questions. Marriage conflicts
seemed a good prospect for testing the possibilities. Obviously, they have been
the subject of much recent interest amid the debates over same-sex marriages.
But it is not the controversy that necessarily makes marriage conflicts a good
prospect for studying the originalist methodology. They are a good candidate
because they were among the first subjects that English courts addressed when
they began to develop conflicts principles. There is also a sense that jurists had
reached some degree of consensus on the resolution of marriage conflicts
I Millar v. Hall, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 229, 232 (Pa. 1788).
2 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 724 n.l (1988).
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around the time the Constitution was adopted. Marriage conflicts also provide a
good test because they often present genuinely hard questions as to whether
choice-of-law primacy should go to the place where a marriage was celebrated
or the community to which a bride or groom belongs.
The methodology endorsed by the Court for discerning the original
content of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is challenging. It requires
examination of early modem sources from around Europe. It is not for the faint
of heart. But as I will endeavor to demonstrate, real, useful results may be out
there for the uncovering. My inquiry here will show that it is possible, with a
high degree of confidence, to articulate at least some principles that likely
formed the original content of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The principles
that emerge in this instance call for a forum state to apply the marriage-
validating law of the sibling state where the nuptials at issue were celebrated,
unless (1) the ostensible marriage is a type that is almost universally
disallowed, or (2) at least one of the parties to the ostensible marriage hails
from the forum and celebrated the marriage out-of-state in deliberate evasion of
an invalidating restriction of the forum's marriage law.
The remainder of this article has five parts. Part II examines the
possibility of an originalist approach to choice-of-law constraints under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. Part III clarifies the choice-of-law question presented
by marriage conflicts. Part IV examines early modern Continental sources in an
effort to identify their approach to marriage conflicts. Part V surveys Anglo-
American sources to see if any consensus existed when the Clause was
adopted. Part VI sums up the results of the historical inquiry and considers
what they mean for developing full-faith-and-credit constraints on state choice
of law in the context of marriage conflicts.
II. THE CONCEPT OF "ORIGINAL CONTENT"
An originalist approach to the Full Faith and Credit Clause as it relates
to state choice of law centers on the concept of the Clause having an "original
content." This concept refers to the idea that the Clause absorbed and imposed
on an interstate basis the rules of international conflicts law as they existed
when the Constitution was adopted in the late 1780s. In Sun Oil Co. v.
Wortman,4 the Supreme Court itself articulated this idea and even provided
cues as to the proper methodology for identifying this original content in
particular situations. The methodology entails the use of early modern
European and American sources to identify pre-existing conflicts principles.
4 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
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A. The Clause as a Constraint
The constitutional command to give "Full Faith and Credit" to the
"public Acts" of sibling states might bear any of three meanings. It might
always require a forum state to apply the conflicting law of a sibling state, it
might never require it, or it might sometimes require it. The last reading, the
situational one, is the prevailing view.
The first alternative is absurd. An absolutist command would always
require either state in a two-state conflict to eschew its own law and apply the
law of the other state.s This total ban on ever choosing the forum's own law
would blindly subordinate the forum's own policy to that of the other state in
every instance of conflict. It also would always make a choice of law depend
arbitrarily on the happenstance of forum, which would produce systemic
incoherence and enable forum-shopping by rendering uniformity in choice of
law constitutionally forbidden. This anti-forum reading cannot be correct. The
Clause cannot always require subordination to the law of another state.
The second alternative, though more arguable, has not prevailed. It is
true that, without ever mandating a choice of law, faith and credit could mean
only that true copies of sibling laws must be received into evidence as
conclusive proof of the existence of the laws they purport to represent. Despite
some respectable academic support for this view,6 it has never gained
prevalence.
Instead, the third alternative, the situational one, has commanded the
greatest support. The Court's view has always been that the Clause sometimes
does require a forum to apply sibling law.7 This interpretation has also
commanded the greater scholarly support.
5 See Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939). In a
conflict involving more than two states, this interpretation would require the articulation of rules
for deciding which sibling state's law a forum would have to choose. In those instances, the
interpretation would not even have the merit of simplicity.
6 Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law: Full Faith and
Credit, 12 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 3 (1981); cf Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to
Judgments and Public Acts: A Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L. REv. 33, 79-80
(1957) (arguing that the command never requires choice of sibling law in cases of "real
conflict").
7 See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494-95 (2003); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985); Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 516 (1953);
Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 156 (1932); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S.
243, 260-61 (1912); Chi. & A.R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615, 622 (1887).
8 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 541, 550, 563 (1953); William F. Baxter, Choice ofLaw and the
Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 39-42 (1963); Harold W. Horowitz, Toward a Federal
Common Law of Choice ofLaw, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1191, 1200-05 (1967); Douglas Laycock,
Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of
Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 289-310 (1992); Max Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of
5512015]
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It also seems the most consistent with the expectation of the Framers,
who seemingly did set out to constrain state choice of law. The 1787
Convention rejected a draft of the Clause that would have left states with the
same discretion in interstate matters that nations have in international matters to
disregard conflicts rules and ignore the laws of other sovereigns.9 Amendments
to the draft empowered Congress to impose federal constraintso and made the
Clause self-executing instead of hortatory." The latter change seemingly
obliged courts to develop constraints on state choice of law when Congress
fails to act,12 as it mostly has.
Rather than re-litigate this basic question, I accept the prevailing view
here and proceed from the premise that the Clause sometimes requires a forum
state to choose the law of a sibling state.
B. Judicial Reluctance
Despite the general ascendancy of this view, the challenge has been to
develop criteria for deciding when a forum has to apply sibling law. Although
the Framers seemingly understood the need,13 they omitted the criteria-
apparently content to leave the matter to existing conflicts law or congressional
regulation. Because Congress has not generally acted,14 the task of applying the
Clause to state choice of law has fallen to the Court, but the problem of
developing criteria has vexed the Court to the point of near abdication.
Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 787-88 (1955). See generally James D. Sumner, Jr., The
Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause-Its History and Purpose, 34 OR. L. REv. 224 (1955) (assessing
the intended application of the Clause to multistate transactions and occurrences).
9 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 488 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter FARRAND] ("Mr. Wilson remarked, that if the Legislature were not allowed to
declare the effect[,] the provision would amount to nothing more than what now takes place
among all Independent Nations.").
1o See id. at 489 (Morris amendment).
II See id. ("On motion of Mr. Madison, 'ought to' was struck out, and 'shall' inserted ....
12 See Laycock, supra note 8, at 301. But see Nadelmann, supra note 6, at 73 (arguing that
"the view that the clause was designed to convey ... to the courts of one state a constitutional
command that they apply, whatever their own law, the legislative acts of another state, finds no
support in the intentions of the drafters, including Morris").
13 2 FARRAND, supra note 9, at 448 (quoting a proposal to make sibling law "binding in
every other State, in all cases to which it may relate, and which are within the cognizance and
jurisdiction of' the sibling state).
14 But see Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(h) (2013)
(child support orders); Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2013) (same-
sex marriages). The latter provision was arguably unconstitutional, even before the Court
recognized in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), that same-sex couples have a
fundamental right to marry. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693-94 (2013)
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After the issue lay dormant for more than a century, the Court began to
develop significant full-faith-and-credit constraints on state choice of law in the
early 20th century. It required a forum to apply the law of the state of
incorporation in determining the liability of stockholders of an insolvent
company" and then in determining the rights and duties of members of a
fraternal benefit society.'6 Though technically citing due process, the Court also
began to restrict the ability of a forum to override the law of the sibling state
where a contract was made or was to be performed.17 Commentators wondered
whether these lines of authority presaged the emergence of general
constitutional constraints on state choice of law.'8
It did not. When the Court tried to extend constraints to state choice of
law in workers' compensation, the process ran aground. The Court's first effort,
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper,19 resulted in only a fact-specific
balancing of the competing interests of the states implicated in the conflict.20 A
second effort, Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission,2 1
weakened even that balancing approach by adding a strong presumption that a
forum state's choice to disregard sibling law and apply its own law is
constitutional.22 Finally, in Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial
Accident Commission,23 the 1939 turning point, the Court abandoned the
balancing method altogether. Instead, the Court held that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not "compel[] a state to substitute the statutes of other states
for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is
competent to legislate."24 In other words, as long as the forum state had a
colorable basis for choosing its own law, the fact that a sibling state might have
had a greater stake in the matter became constitutionally irrelevant. The sole
15 See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643-44 (1935); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S.
243, 261 (1912).
16 See Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66, 75 (1938);
Modem Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551 (1925); Supreme Council of the Royal
Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531, 541-44 (1915); see also Order of United Commercial
Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) (adhering to rule).
17 See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 149-50
(1934); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389, 399 (1924); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge,
246 U.S. 357 (1918); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 160-61 (1914).
1 See, e.g., Oliver P. Field, Judicial Notice of Public Acts Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, 12 MrNN. L. REV. 439, 451 & n.33 (1928); Hessel E. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and
the Conflict ofLaws, 37 YALE L.J. 468, 481-83 (1928).
19 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
20 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 495 (2003).
21 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
22 Id. at 547-48.
23 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
24 Id. at 501.
2015] 553
7
Clark: Conflicts Originalism: The "Original Content" of the Full Faith a
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2015
WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW
question going forward was whether a forum state that had applied its own law
had legislative "competence"-that is, jurisdiction-over the issue in conflict.
What ultimately emerged was a feeble test for establishing such
competence. Not fully articulated until the Court's 1981 decision in Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hague,2 5 this test allows a forum state to apply its own law as
long as the forum has "a significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary
nor fundamentally unfair." 26 This test allows a forum to ignore sibling law in
all but the extreme circumstances in which a forum tries to apply its own law to
a dispute having no meaningful contact with the forum.27 The result is close to
the very outcome that the Framers rejected: sweeping discretion to ignore
sibling law in interstate matters.
Although this test almost certainly leaves the Clause seriously
underenforced, the Court has been reluctant to develop more vigorous
constraints on state choice of law. In its most recent decision, Franchise Tax
Board v. Hyatt,2 8 the Court reaffirmed its retreat, describing the older balancing
approach as having "quickly proved unsatisfactory."29 Emphasizing the lack of
"guiding standards of a legal character,"3 0 the Court was unwilling to resume
the process of balancing state interests "[w]ithout a rudder to steer" it."1 As if to
emphasize the reluctance, Hyatt even involved a forum's disregard of a sibling
state's doctrine of sovereign immunity, something this Court has otherwise
protected rather aggressively.32
25 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
26 Id. at 312-13 (plurality opinion).
27 See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936); see also Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (using Due
Process Clause).
28 538 U.S. 488 (2003).
29 Id. at 495.
30 Id. at 496 (quoting Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the
Constitution, 45 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 16 (1945)).
31 Id. at 499.
32 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). Indeed, the reluctance is so great-and the
current test so weak-that one could almost characterize the Court as treating full-faith-and-
credit constraints on state choice of law as a non-justiciable "political question." See Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (noting a "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards" as a basis for invoking the political question doctrine). Compare also id. at 217
("textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department"), with U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (granting Congress power to legislate the "Effect" of
giving full faith and credit).
554 [Vol. 118
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Despite the Court's reluctance, it has not closed the door entirely to
stronger full-faith-and-credit constraints on state choice of law. It rejected the
constraint proposed in Hyatt on its individual merits" without foreclosing
entirely the possibility of additional constraints beyond the Allstate minimum.
It may be, however, that only an originalist theory could satisfy the Court.
The desire expressed in Hyatt for "guiding standards"34 echoed
language from the Court's previous encounter with the subject. In Sun Oil Co.
v. Wortman,35 the Court had similarly resisted choice-of-law constraints that
would leave judges "with no compass to guide us beyond our own perceptions
of what seems desirable."3 A proposed constraint seemingly must give judges
the desired "rudder"37 or "compass",38 in deciding that a forum has
unconstitutionally refused to choose the law of a sibling state.
Wortman suggests that an originalist theory may be the only
possibility. There, a majority refused to accept another proposed constitutional
constraint on state choice of law, but it nevertheless hinted that the principles of
international conflicts law that existed when the Constitution was adopted
might provide the foundation for developing workable constraints.39 The
Clause, in the majority's view, "made conflicts principles enforceable as a
matter of constitutional command rather than leaving enforcement to the
vagaries of the forum's view of comity."40 In that way, conflicts principles of
the era constitute the "original content" of the Clause.4 1 As such, they might
supply the desired "rudder"42 or "compass"43 for enforcing the Clause more
vigorously as a constraint on state choice of law. The basic question in a
particular case, however, would be what conflicts rule prevailed as to the
relevant issue when the Constitution was adopted in 1788.
3 Hyatt, 538 U.S. at 498.
34 Id. at 496.
3 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
36 Id at 728.
37 Hyatt, 538 U.S. at 499.
38 Wortman, 486 U.S. at 728.
3 See id at 723.
40 Id at 723 n.l (citing Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948)).
41 Id. at 724 n.1.
42 Hyatt, 538 U.S. at 499.
43 Wortman, 486 U.S. at 728.
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D. Originalist Methodology
A methodology for identifying that original content is also inferable
from Wortman. The Court cited Justice Story's circuit opinion in Le Roy v.
Crowninshieldu as "indisputably correct" in its identification of framing-era
conflicts principles relevant to the Wortman decision itself.45 Le Roy thus
presents an approved methodology.
There, Story relied on a variety of authorities. He cited early American
court decisions, English court decisions, influential Dutch conflicts thinkers,
Scottish commentators, and Continental specialists in commercial law.46
Observing that civilian jurists were divided on the specific issue he was
investigating, Story chose to rely on what he regarded as "the ablest of foreign
jurists and courts."47 He gave particular weight to two Dutch conflicts thinkers
and to English jurists.48 Significantly, Story said that he thought their rule was
less preferable than an alternative that he favored but that he felt bound by their
conclusion.49 He saw himself as discovering conflicts law as it existed, not
formulating it as he preferred it to be.
The reach beyond American sources was a product of necessity.
Although there are some pre-Constitutional decisions by American courts on
choice of law,o they fall far short of establishing a comprehensive body of law.
The same is true of English courts. Notwithstanding some notable pre-1787
decisions,"' the development of English conflicts law largely occurred after
1790,52 after the U.S. Constitution was adopted. Instead, early modem
principles of conflicts law derive primarily from the works of Continental
jurists, whom scholars conventionally classify as belonging to one of three
chronological schools of so-called statutist thought: Italian, French, and
Dutch.53 The Dutch school proved to have the greatest influence on English
4 15 F. Cas. 362 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (No. 8269) (Story, J.) (collecting U.S. cases and
analyzing foreign authorities).
45 Wortman, 486 U.S. at 723.
46 Le Roy, 15 F. Cas. at 365.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 371.
49 Id.
5o Laycock, supra note 8, at 307 n.340 (collecting cases).
51 See Holman v. Johnson (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B.); 1 Cowp. 341; Robinson v.
Bland (1760) 96 Eng. Rep. 141 (K.B.); I Black. W. 256; Scrimshire v. Scrimshire (1752) 161
Eng. Rep. 782 (Cons.); 2 Hag. Cons. 395.
52 A.E. Anton, The Introduction into English Practice of Continental Theories on the
Conflict ofLaws, 5 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 534, 539-40 (1956).
53 See FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 11-21 (spec. ed.
2005). See generally 1 ARMAND LAINE, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt
[INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW] (Paris, F. Pichon 1888),
556 [Vol. 118
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conflicts law, partly by way of its prior influence on Scottish conflicts law and
through the specific intermediation of Lord Mansfield, a Scotsman who served
as Lord Chief Justice from 1756 to 1788.54
In Wortman, the Court itself bolstered that methodology by examining
American decisions during the early national period. Those decisions "looked
without hesitation" to international conflicts law and that they "uniformly"
reached the same conclusion on the precise issue as Story did in Le Roy."s The
Court also noted the treatise of Chancellor Kent,56 which first appeared in the
1820s,57 but stopped short of treating Story's own 1834 conflicts treatise as an
originalist source.
This guidance provides a sketch of the proper methodology for use in
identifying the original content of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. This
methodology should likewise govern the present search for the original content
of the Clause as it may constrain state choice of law in determining the validity
of marriages.
III. MARRIAGE RECOGNITION AS A CHOICE-OF-LAW QUESTION
If the Full Faith and Credit Clause sometimes mandates state choices of
law as a matter of its original content, then it might sometimes require a forum
state to "recognize" a marriage that was ostensibly formed in a sibling state.
Despite a popular misconception to the contrary, this kind of marriage
recognition arises as a choice-of-law question. Before seeking to identify any
constitutional duties that the original content of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
may place on a forum state in recognizing an out-of-state marriage, it will be
useful to clarify how marriage recognition arises as a choice-of-law question in
the first place. What kind of full-faith-and-credit issues would an original
content need to address in the context of nuptial conflicts?
A. Understanding the Choice-of-Law Question
A civil marriage is a legal relation. Whether a forum state regards it as
validly existing depends on the application of law to facts. But when the nuptial
https://goo.gl/VERLp2; 2 LAINt, supra, (1892), https://goo.gl/220ml5; Max Gutzwiller, Le
Diveloppement Historique de Droit International Privd, 29 RECUEIL DES COURS 287 (1929); E.-
M. Meijers, L'Histoire des Principes Fondamentaux du Droit International Privd a Partir du
Moyen Age, Spicialement dans l'Europe Occidentale, 49 RECUEIL DES COURs 543 (1934).
54 See generally Anton, supra note 52; D.J. Llewelyn Davies, The Influence of Huber's De
Conflictu Legum on English Private International Law, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49 (1937).
5s Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 724 (1988).
56 Id. at 726.
5 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1826).
5 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834).
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facts have contacts with more than one state, it may make a difference which
state's law applies to the facts in determining their legal effect. Determining
whether a valid marriage has arisen from a set of nuptial facts may require a
choice of law-specifically, a choice between the marriage laws of the states
having contacts with the nuptials.
A set of nuptial facts comprises a number of factual elements. Most
obviously, there are the people who have ostensibly wed. Connubiants they
may be called, as calling them spouses would presuppose a legal conclusion as
to the validity of their nuptials. An additional factual element is that the
connubiants will have concluded their nuptials in some manner. The nuptials
may have been formal, involving a license and a solemnization performed by
an officiant before witnesses, or the nuptials may have been informal, entailing
only an unlicensed exchange of vows by the connubiants themselves. Other
factual elements include the connubiants' knowledge or intent at the time of the
nuptials as well as their behavior afterwards, such as living together or holding
themselves out publicly as spouses. Any of these factual elements and still
others could be relevant in determining whether the nuptials resulted in a
legally valid marriage under the law of a particular state.
A multistate problem may arise because a set of nuptial facts may have
meaningful contacts with more than one state. The locus contact is one. It refers
to the occurrence of a significant event, such as the exchange of vows, in a
particular place. What I call the domus contact is another meaningful one.59 It
refers to the fact that a relevant party, such as a connubiant, belongs to a
particular polity, usually identified by domicile in Anglo-American conflicts
law. A third type of contact is the situs contact. It refers to the location of a
thing, including a relationship,o in a particular state. Here, the situs would be
the state where the connubiants' post-nuptial relationship is centered,
sometimes called the "matrimonial domicil[e]."6 1 A final contact is the forum
contact. It refers to the adjudication of a dispute, such as the validity of an
ostensible marriage, in a particular state's court, including a federal court.62
59 I use the generic Latin term domus to remain agnostic as to whether this contact is defined
by domicile, residence, citizenship, or some other connecting factor. In this regard, I note that the
drafters of the forthcoming Third Restatement have proposed to substitute habitual residence for
domicile. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD: CONFLICTS § 2.01 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.,
Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2015).
60 Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2)(d) (AM. LAW. INST. 1971)
(providing that the contacts to be taken into account in tort conflicts include "the place where the
relationship . . . between the parties [in a tort case] is centered"); id. § 188(2)(d) (providing that
the contacts to be taken into account in contract conflicts include "the location of the subject
matter of [a] contract").
61 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 571 (1906).
62 A federal court must generally apply the conflicts law of the state in which it sits. Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (extending the rule of Erie R.R. v.
Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), to conflict of laws).
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Here, the forum is the state where the court that is called upon to determine the
validity of an ostensible marriage sits. When these contacts are arrayed among
more than one state, the nuptials present a multistate fact pattern.
Determining the legal validity of such multistate nuptials may require a
choice among the marriage laws of the states having contacts with them. The
marriage laws of those states may diverge in meaningful respects. The nuptials
might have been too informal for validity under the law of one state but
sufficiently formal under the law of another.63 The connubiants might have
been ineligible to wed under the law of one state but perfectly eligible under the
law of another.64 If the divergence would be outcome-determinative-that is,
lead to different legal conclusions as to whether the nuptials produced a valid
marriage-a meaningful conflict of laws exists. Determining the validity of the
nuptials will require a choice among the marriage laws of the implicated states.
When called upon to adjudicate the question as a forum, each state
must make that choice of law for itself. Conflicts law is forum law. The courts
of each forum must follow the conflicts law of the state in which they sit,65
including its principles for resolving interstate conflicts as to the validity of an
ostensible marriage. Unless the parties are bound by claim or issue preclusion,
the fact that a court of one state has made a particular choice of law does not
bind the courts of other states to make the same choice of law in determining
the validity of the same set of multistate nuptials. Without the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to place some limit on state choice of law, each forum makes the
choice-of-law decision and the determination of validity anew and
independently.
This decentralized process enables the peculiar problem of the
"limping marriage."66 Because each state must make its own choice of law,
different states may make different choices as to the same connubiants and the
same set of nuptials. States making one choice and applying one state's law
may conclude that the nuptials resulted in a valid marriage, while states making
a different choice and applying a different state's law may conclude that the
same nuptials were legal nullities that produced no valid marriage. The result is
a severe systemic dysfunction, in which the same connubiants are
63 The principal example of this divergence among the states is the continued authorization
of "common law" marriage-that is, the formation of a marriage by the personal exchange of
vows without a license or solemnization-in about ten states. Common Law Marriage by State,
NCSL (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/common-law-marriage.aspx
[hereinafter Common Law Marriage].
6 Notable examples of this divergence include differences in the degree of kinship necessary
for voiding a marriage and varying ages of consent for marriage. 1 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 2.9, at 156-59, § 2.10, at 171-73 (2d ed.
1987) (discussing degrees of kinship and ages of consent).
65 Klaxon, 313 U.S at 496.
66 Torben Svenn6 Schmidt, The Incidental Question in Private International Law, 1992-II
RECUEIL DES COURs 305, 319.
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simultaneously understood as validly married in the view of some states but as
not validly married in the view of other states. The marital status of such
connubiants may literally switch on and off as they cross from one state into
another from the perspective of each state. Indeed, a person deemed married in
one state but single in another may lawfully marry another spouse in the eyes of
the latter state, resulting in a kind of "progressive polygamy" in which the
person is simultaneously married to different people and has different legal
families in different states. As long as different states have different marriage
laws, the only way to avoid "limping marriages" and the systemic dysfunctions
that accompany them is by ensuring that every state make the same choice of
law in determining the validity of the same set of multistate nuptials. Because
conflicts law is state law, however, achieving that kind of uniformity in the
resolution of the same nuptial conflict can be elusive. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause could perform a useful function in mandating at least some conflicts
uniformity in this area of the law.
The popular misconception about so-called marriage recognition is that
no choice of law is necessary. The mistaken assumption is that the law of the
locus where the nuptials took place automatically determines their legal effect
and that the only question for other states is whether to "recognize" a marriage
that has been validly formed in the locus.6 8 Not so. Although a wedding
officiant may rhetorically invoke the "power vested in me" by the locus state,
no actual choice of law is usually made at the time of the nuptials, at least in the
United States. In fact, licensing agents typically have no authority to perform
any conflicts analysis so as to deny a marriage license based a determination
that the proposed marriage would be invalid under the "proper law" that should
govern its validity. In the American system, the choice of law is almost
67 STORY, supra note 58, § 124, at 117.
68 For an example of even an outstanding lawyer formerly harboring this misconception, see
Memorandum from Evan Wolfson, Dir., Marriage Project, Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. Fund,
Inc., Winning and Keeping Equal Marriage Rights: What Will Follow Victory in Baehr v.
Lewin?: A Summary of Legal Issues (Mar. 20, 1996), reprinted in Defense of Marriage Act:
Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 14 (1996). There, the author incorrectly argued that
what is at issue [in so-called marriage recognition] is not whose law should
govern, but rather what respect must be accorded a res, a marital status, that
the couples now possess and embody. . . . The status has been created . . . and
rights established-no question of what legal regime may be invoked is
pertinent.
Id. at 21-22. To determine the legal effect of nuptials under another state's law, Wolfson
erroneously supposed, would be "to displace an accomplished act." Id. at 23. But the act is not
"accomplished" as a valid legal act until some state's law is applied to it, which cannot be done
until one determines which state's law should be applied.
69 But see Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 632-34 (Mass. 2006)
(describing former effort by Massachusetts to have its licensing agents deny marriage licenses to
same-sex applicants who were from states that did not allow them to marry).
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always made "indirectly"--that is, after the fact-if the validity of the nuptials
ever subsequently arises in court.70 The mere fact that nuptials happened-even
if licensed, solemnized, and recorded by the locus-does not mean that any
proper authority has determined that the law of the locus should determine the
legal effect of the nuptials or has affirmed their legal validity under it.71 The
issue is not about "recognizing" a thing that already conclusively exists; the
issue is about determining whether the thing, a legally valid marriage, has
arisen from the nuptial facts by deciding what law applies to those facts.
The indirect process of making the choice of law may be disquieting. It
means that an ostensible marriage resting on multistate nuptials that present a
conflict of laws may go years or even decades without a determination of
validity, if the validity is ever actually determined at all. If the issue of such a
marriage's validity does arise in litigation, only then will the choice of law be
made. It will be made, moreover, by a court of whatever state happens to be the
forum for the litigation and according to whatever conflicts rules that state has
adopted. So-called marriage recognition is a matter of answering a choice-of-
law question that has remained open since the nuptials and has been deferred,
potentially for decades. Lying next to each other in the nation's cemeteries, in
fact, is an untold number of ostensible spouses whose multistate nuptials were
invalid under the proper choice of law but were never tested in court.
B. Making the Choice ofLaw
Part of clarifying how so-called marriage recognition is a choice-of-law
question involves identifying how the choice tends to be made. States have
different stakes in having their laws chosen, and the choice presents a forum
with certain dilemmas and implicates other policy considerations. There
nevertheless is some consensus among American forums about how to
approach nuptial conflicts. Knowing how forums tend to deal with nuptial
conflicts helps to elaborate the kind of full-faith-and-credit challenges that
might arise under an original-content theory.
The different states that have contacts with a multistate set of nuptials
will have different stakes in having their marriage law chosen and used to
assess the validity of the nuptials. Being the locus, the place where the nuptials
take place, generally gives a state a stake in regulating the formalities of the
70 LENNART PALSSON, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS:
GENERAL PART, SPECIAL PART § 265, at 169-70 (1974) [hereinafter PALSSON, FORMALITIES]
(describing the difference between "direct" and "indirect" approaches); LENNART PALSsON,
MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE CONFLICT OF LAWS: SUBSTANTIVE CONDITIONS § 2, at 3 (1981)
[hereinafter PALSSON, SUBSTANTIVE CONDITIONS] (same).
n Even if the locus itself made a choice of law in favor of its own law, conflicts law is forum
law, so other forums, unless compelled by claim or issue preclusion, need not defer to that choice
of law made by the locus.
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nuptials-that is, how a legal act within its borders should be done.7 2 A
example is whether the locus permits "common law" marriage or strictly
requires a license and solemnization." In contrast, being the domus, the polity
to which the connubiants belong, generally gives a state a stake in regulating
the material conditions for a valid marriage-that is, whether the connubiants
are eligible to marry.74 Examples would include the extent to which the domus
permits consanguineous or teenage marriages. Being the situs, the location of
the marital relationship, generally also gives a state a similar stake as the
domus, as the marriage will be "lived out" there.76 Lastly, being the forum-
that is, the state whose courts are adjudicating the question of validity-
generally gives a state a stake only in having its procedural rules applied to the
conduct of the litigation. A forum is nevertheless likely to have a stronger stake
for another reason: It is likely to be the place where a dispute has arisen and
thus the state whose law is being summoned to bestow some marital right,
benefit, or duty-an incident of marriage-upon the connubiants. That could
conceivably give the forum77 a stake in having its marriage-formation law
applied to determine the validity of the nuptials themselves. These competing
stakes obviously bear on the choice of law.
As these distinctions intimate, the need to make a choice among
marriage laws triggers a fundamental dilemma in conflicts law, a dilemma
between territorialism and tribalism.78  Territorialism gives primacy to
geography and favors choosing locus law because it is the law of the place
within whose borders certain acts transpired.79 Tribalism, in contrast, gives
primacy to community and favors choosing domus law because it is the law of
the people to whom parties belong.80 The question is which has a greater stake
in determining the validity a couple's nuptials: the place where the formative
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 cmt. c, f (AM. LAW INST. 1971). I
use the word "stake" as a deliberately looser concept than a "governmental interest" under
interest analysis.
73 See generally Common Law Marriage, supra note 63.
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 cmt. c.
7 See CLARK, supra note 64, § 2.9, at 156-59, § 2.10, at 171-73.
76 Because the situs of the relationship is defined by the post-nuptial domus of the
connubiants, we may simplify the analysis and focus exclusively on the domus. This
simplification omits the cases in which connubiants from one state establish their matrimonial
domicile in a different state immediately following their nuptials.
n Technically, this would not be the forum state but the causa state-that is, the state whose
law has been chosen as the one to regulate whatever legal incident of marriage is at issue. That
state will often also be the forum. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 284.
78 See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.1.3, at 19 (2d ed. 1995) (identifying the
dilemma between privileging personal and territorial contacts as endemic to choice of law).
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acts were done or the polity to which the couple belongs and to which their
marriage contributes or from which it detracts.
Distinctions among state laws and policies also lead to a second
dilemma, one between parochialism and cosmopolitanism. The basic issue is a
forum's willingness to displace its own law in order to accommodate the
diverse laws and policies of sibling states. When a sibling state has a greater
stake in regulating certain nuptials or a certain aspect of them, a forum might
nevertheless cling parochially to its own marriage law, a disposition that is
likely to exacerbate such systemic dysfunctions as limping marriages.
Alternatively, a forum could be more cosmopolitan in its outlook and less
fixated on its own policies. It could make the choice of law with a greater
willingness to accommodate the diverse laws and policies of its sibling states,
particularly those having greater stakes in the matter than the forum does. As
the locus or domus typically has a greater stake in regulating the nuptials
themselves than the forum does, the forum's insistence upon applying its own
law often reflects a parochial disregard for the stronger claim of a sibling state
to have its law applied. At the same time, a forum may have profound
objections -to a sibling state's policy, so the forum could legitimately feel that
accommodating a sibling policy would be asking too much and intruding too
deeply into the forum's own sovereign prerogatives.8 1
Conflicts factors other than policy distinctions and state concerns are
also potentially relevant in making the choice of law, and they tend toward
the choice of locus law. The private interests of the connubiants may be
especially weighty. The connubiants may have expected the validity of their
nuptials to be determined by the law of the locus, or they may at least have
expected that the nuptials would be deemed valid. The latter expectation can be
fulfilled in most cases by choosing locus law, for a licensing agent will have at
least preliminarily tested their eligibility to marry under that law at the time of
the nuptials. They also will usually have complied with whatever formalities
the locus required, so the nuptials should at least be formally valid, even if
problems of materiality exist. Choosing locus law also likely serves an interest
in judicial efficiency, for it is likely, on average, to be easier to identify the
locus where the nuptials took place than the domus to which a connubiant
belonged, especially if domicile is the test. Perhaps for some of the same
reasons, there has also been a sense that choosing locus law is more likely to
achieve interstate uniformity in the resolution of a nuptial conflict and thus
minimize the problem of limping marriages.83 Courts may also make the choice
81 See Linda J. Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii Bind the World? A Comment on Same-
Sex Marriage and Federalism Values, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 191, 196-203 (1996).
82 For other relevant factors, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2).
83 This is true as an interstate matter because American forums tend to choose locus law, but
achieving international uniformity would require American forums to confront the reality that
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of law with an eye toward the substantive value of affirming the validity of an
ostensible marriage, if feasible, and choosing locus law seems, on average,
most likely to advance that goal of substantive justice.
In much of the world, this mixture of considerations produces two
different conflicts rules for making a choice among marriage laws. Most
foreign forums distinguish between nuptial conflicts involving material
conditions and those involving mere formalities. When the conflict involves
some material impediment to marriage, many foreign forums choose domus
law and allow the views of a connubiant's polity to prevail in deeming the
nuptials valid or invalid. Community prevails over geography, even with the
additional conflicts policies that weigh in favor of locus law. Only when a
conflict involves mere formalities do most foreign forums clearly choose locus
law and give primacy to geography over community.84 The general result is
tribalism for material conditions but territorialism for formalities.
American forums, in contrast, have a more territorialist bent. At least as
a general rule, American forums tend to choose locus law regardless whether a
conflict involves material conditions or mere formalities.8 5 In his landmark
conflicts treatise, for example, Justice Story declared the "general principle" to
be that the validity of a "marriage is to be decided by the law of the place,
where it is celebrated."86 Whether that choice resulted in affirming the validity
of the nuptials or rejecting it was irrelevant: "If valid there, [a marriage] is valid
every where.. . . If invalid there, it is equally invalid every where."87 In Story's
articulation, the rule called simply for choosing locus law in marriage conflicts
and treating marriage laws as territorial, regardless whether the conflict
involved material conditions or mere formalities and regardless whether the
rule led to validation or invalidation.
But the latter distinction-the substantive outcome-has sometimes
proved relevant to American courts and commentators. There is less American
consensus as to the soundness of the locus rule when it would lead to the
invalidation of an ostensible marriage because the nuptials contradicted the law
of the locus where they transpired. One of the most widely used formulations of
the American rule is actually an outcome-specific half-rule: "[A] marriage valid
where celebrated is valid everywhere .... It may be more accurate to
most of the world's jurisdictions choose domus law in resolving conflicts as to the material
validity of marriages. See infra text accompanying note 84.
84 See PALSSON, SUBSTANTIVE CONDITIONS, supra note 70, § 3, at 4; PALSSON, FORMALITIES,
supra note 70, §§ 8-50, at 5-25 (formalities).
8 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(1).
86 STORY, supra note 58, § 113, at 103-04; see also In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 6
(N.Y. 1953).
8 STORY, supra note 58, § 113, at 104.
Dunham v. Dunham, 44 N.E. 841, 848 (Ill. 1896) (emphasis added); accord CAL. FAM.
CODE § 308 (amended 2014); CAL. CIV. CODE § 63 (1872) (repealed 1992); Cote-Whitacre v.
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describe the rule as not simply a locus rule but, in such outcome-specific terms,
as a locus-validation rule.8 Support has been weaker for its converse, a locus-
invalidation rule, under which locus law would be applied to invalidate nuptials
even though they were consistent with the law of the domus. A serious full-
faith-and-credit question might be whether either of these rules, particularly the
locus-validation one, is constitutionally required. Is a forum constitutionally
forbidden to adopt a domus rule, even when conflicts involve material
conditions? After all, much of the world today would use the domus rule in
resolving conflicts as to material conditions.
Even though usually applied in American forums, moreover, this locus-
validation rule is not absolute. Rather, it is subject to a public policy exception
that may also prompt a forum to disregard the law of a sibling locus. This
exception can be conceptualized in two different ways. On one view, the
exception overrides locus law in favor of forum law and thus accommodates a
forum's objection to a marriage.90 On the other view, the exception overrides
locus law in favor of domus law and thus accommodates a strong objection of a
connubiant's home state to his or her marriage.9 ' The Second Restatement
essentially endorses only this second version.92 It functions as a kind of limited
renvoi, in which the forum defers to the refusal of the home state to accept the
Dep't of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 654 (Mass. 2006) (Marshall, C.J., concurring) (same-sex
marriage); Bucca v. State, 128 A.2d 506, 508 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1957) (uncle-niece
marriage); Osoinach v. Watkins, 180 So. 577, 579 (Ala. 1938) (nephew's marriage to uncle's
widow); Leefeld v. Leefeld, 166 P. 953, 954 (Or. 1917) (first-cousin marriage); Pennegar v.
State, 10 S.W. 305, 306 (Tenn. 1889) (post-divorce marriage); Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va.
858, 868 (1878) (interracial marriage); Boyer v. Dively, 58 Mo. 510, 511 (1875) (customary
marriage among Indians); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 121 (AM. LAW INST. 1934).
89 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (endorsing use of the locus-
validation rule "unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage"); see also
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF Laws § 121 ("[A] marriage is valid everywhere if the
requirements of the marriage law of the state where the contract of marriage takes place are
complied with."); JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE § 125, at 97 (1852) ("[A] marriage valid by the local law where it is celebrated. .. is
good everywhere."); 2 KENT, supra note 57, at 78 (1827) ("[A] marriage valid by the law of the
place where it is made, is valid every where.").
90 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 463 (1873).
91 See, e.g., In re Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 630 (1898).
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (endorsing use of locus-
validation rule "unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage"); see also
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 (stating that "a marriage which is against the
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validity of the nuptials under the locus law.93 The first version, in favor of the
forum, is simply a privileging of parochialism. In either case, a second major
full-faith-and-credit question is whether a forum is constitutionally prohibited
from invoking either version of this public policy exception.
To a significant extent, the two full-faith-and-credit questions that
American practice is most likely to present in the context of nuptial conflicts
converge into one overarching inquiry: Under what circumstances, if any, does
the original content of the Full Faith and Credit Clause support a constitutional
mandate that would require a forum state to choose the marriage law of a
sibling state that was the locus of the nuptials or the domus of the connubiants?
C. Conflicts Patterns
A full-faith-and-credit question would be most likely to arise in either
of two types of nuptial fact patterns. The existence of a locus contact, a domus
contact for each connubiant, and a forum contact make for a variety of
permutations in the possible distribution of contacts among two or more states.
But two types of distributions stand out as the most likely to give rise to nuptial
conflicts. To simplify the inquiry, other possibilities may be set aside.
The first of these conflict patterns is the evasion scenario.94 It is the
most common pattern found in nuptial conflicts in American decisions. In its
simplest form, the evasion scenario arises in a two-state conflict, in which one
state is the forum and the domus of both connubiants, while the sibling state is
the locus where the nuptials took place. The law of the first state disallows the
type of marriage, while the locus permits it. Under this scenario, the
connubiants, who are not allowed to marry in their home state, travel to the
locus and have their nuptials there before immediately returning home.
Sometimes, the home state, which is also the forum, will choose the law of the
locus and affirm the validity of the evasive marriage. Sometimes, however, it
will not. The question is whether the original content of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause would ever support a constitutional mandate to choose the law of
the sibling locus and stop the home-state forum from choosing its own law to
deem the nuptials void. A less common variation on the evasion scenario is
what might be called the outrange scenario, in which connubiants could have
validly married under the law of the domus but travel elsewhere and have their
nuptials in a locus under whose laws the nuptials are not actually valid. This is
the scenario that has raised the question whether the simple locus rule applies
in cases of locus-invalidation of the nuptials.
93 Hans W. Baade, Marriage and Divorce in American Conflicts Law: Governmental-
Interests Analysis and the Restatement (Second), 72 COLUM. L. REv. 329, 355 (1972).
94 The classification scheme adopted here is a modification of one developed during the
debates of same-sex marriages. See Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex
Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2143, 2144-46 (2005).
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The second of the conflict patterns is the chauvinism scenario. In its
simplest form, this scenario also arises in a two-state conflict, in which one
state is the forum, while the sibling state is the domus and locus. The type of
marriage is permitted in the sibling state, where the connubiants live and where
their nuptials took place. The forum, however, does not permit the type of
marriage and refuses to choose the law of the sibling state and affirm the
marriage's validity-hence, the "chauvinism" label. This type of case can arise
in a range of situations, but they all involve the connubiants coming into
contact with the forum in some way and ending up in litigation there. The
strongest situation in the forum's defense is one in which the connubiants
actually move to the forum sometime after their nuptials. This migratory
situation involves a post-nuptial change in the domus contact, which shifts to
the forum after the fact of the nuptials. A second situation would be one in
which the connubiants merely visit or pass through the forum and somehow
become embroiled in litigation there. This visitor situation does not involve any
post-nuptial change in any of the contacts; rather, it involves the additional
transient contact with the forum. A final situation would be one in which the
connubiants had no physical presence in the forum but nevertheless became
embroiled in litigation there as a result of some additional contact, such as
inheriting land that is situated in the forum. In this extraterritorial situation, as
with the visitor one, there is no post-nuptial change in any of the nuptial
contacts. The question is whether, in any of these situations, the original
content of the Full Faith and Credit Clause would ever support a constitutional
mandate to choose the marriage law of the sibling state and stop the forum from
choosing its own law (or invoking its own public policy) to deem the nuptials
void.
Although these scenarios are defined by the particular distribution of
contacts, that is not likely to be the only relevant consideration. It may be
highly relevant, for example, whether the nuptial conflict involves a material
condition or mere formalities. It may also be relevant whether the particular
case presents a question of pure status or is one in which a connubiant is
seeking an incident of marriage, one likely to be derived from forum law. It
may be relevant whether the choice of law would affirm or reject the validity of
the nuptials. The other conflicts factors, such as the private interests of the
parties, judicial efficiency, or the avoidance of systemic dysfunctions, may bear
on the inquiry as well.95 The historical sources may not be sufficient to provide
complete guidance as to the original content of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
with respect to all of these variables, and that possibility will bear on the
feasibility of an original-content theory. These variables are nevertheless the
ones most likely to be present in the kind of nuptial conflicts to which the
theory would have to apply.
9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2).
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IV. CONTINENTAL COMMENTARY ON MARRIAGE CONFLICTS
Identifying the original content of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as it
relates to the choice of marriage law is traceable to early modem Continental
commentary on conflicts law. The methodology endorsed by the Court in its
Wortman decision included the conflicts thinkers in the Dutch school as well as
Continental specialists in the relevant substantive area of law. The same
methodology works for marriage conflicts, but it requires a deeper historical
reach.
Although the same Dutch conflicts thinkers are also key figures in the
marriage inquiry, the consideration of Continental specialists in the field of
marriage also implicates the first of the three early modem schools of conflicts
thought: the Italian school. Because regulation of marriage was often
committed to ecclesiastical authorities, the dominant specialist in the early
modem period was a Jesuit canonist, Tomdis Sanchez (1550-1610), whose 1602
treatise on marriage included a highly influential essay on marriage conflicts.9 7
Although a Spaniard, Sanchez's conflicts analysis derived from the Italian
school. His essay is particularly relevant, as it demonstrably influenced English
ecclesiastical courts,98 which drew upon the Italian school more generally as
well. Both the Italian and the Dutch schools are potentially relevant to the
identification of the original content of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as to
marriage conflicts.99 In examining these sources, I turn first to the Italian
school, including the work of Sanchez, and then review the two leading
conflicts thinkers of the Dutch school, before offering a closing note on
Scottish conflicts thought.
A. The Italian School
The Italian approach to conflicts emerged among the city-states in
medieval northern Italy. Having gained a measure of autonomy from the Holy
Roman Empire, these states adopted local laws that supplanted the underlying
body of Roman law.o00 The Italian approach developed as a way of resolving
the conflicts that resulted from these divergent local laws. It came to dominate
conflicts thinking into at least the 17th century. The leading figure of the Italian
96 See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
97 1 THOMAS [TOMAS] SANCHEZ, DISPUTATIONUM DE SANCTO MATRIMONII SACRAMENTO [OF
DISPUTATIONS ON THE SACRED SACRAMENT OF MARRIAGE] lib. 3, disp. 18, at 263-70 (Venice,
Juntae 1625) (1602), https://goo.gl/NZO6aU.
98 See Scrimshire v. Scrimshire (1752) 161 Eng. Rep. 782, 788-89 (Cons.); 2 Hag. Con. 395,
412-13 (placing principal reliance on Sanchez).
9 The second of the three early modem schools, the French one, had little direct impact on
the Anglo-American law of marriage conflicts.
1oo See 1 LAINI, supra note 53, at 98, 101.
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school is Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1314-1357). His work synthetized and
elaborated the opinions of predecessors into a highly influential conflicts
regime.101 Although neither Bartolus nor other prominent members of the
Italian school discussed marriage conflicts, their framework influenced
Sanchez and others who did.
1. The Foundational Views of Bartolus
Although Bartolus did not address marriage conflicts, it is possible to
extrapolate general support for the choice of locus law in resolving them. The
extrapolation is all but indisputable in the case of nuptial formalities. As to
material conditions, it is less certain but still sound. In addition, nothing in
Bartolus's approach supported the idea of exceptions to the choice of locus law,
although that lack of support owed partly to the nature of his approach. In any
event, Bartolus gave the locus solution a strong foundation in Continental
conflicts thought.
Bartolus proceeded from a premise that local laws have only an insular
scope such that they do not apply to multistate disputes. If a dispute had a
significant non-local component-such as a party from a foreign domus, an act
done in a foreign locus, or a thing located in a foreign situs-Bartolus
presumed that the local laws of none of the foreign states applied.102 Applying
the law of one would prejudice the legislative power of any other state having a
significant contact with the dispute.10 3 The result was a presumptive lacuna,
excluding the application of all local laws, and that lacuna would be filled by
applying the underlying Roman law as a body of general law that transcended
the individual states.
The choice-of-law question was whether a particular legal issue came
within an exception to this presumption of insularity. The analysis comprised
two types of inquiries. First, Bartolus considered whether a local law might
apply to outsiders as well as locals, thus giving it a territorial scope in that it
would apply to anyone doing acts inside the enacting state.10 4 Second, Bartolus
considered whether a local law might have extraterritorial force or effect.05 In
101 BARTOLUS, De Summa Trinitate [On the Supreme Trinity] ¶¶ 13-51, in COMMENTARIA IN
PRIMAM CODICIS PARTEM [COMMENTARIES CONCERNING THE FIRST PART OF THE CODE] fols. 5-9
(Lyon 1552) (1471), https://goo.gl/eckPzQ, translated in J.A. Clarence Smith, Bartolo on the
Conflict of Laws (pts. 1 & 2), 14 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 157, 247 (1970) [hereinafter BARTOLUS, in
Smith]; see also BARTOLUS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Joseph Henry Beale trans., 1914).
102 1 LAINA, supra note 53, at 102.
103 See BARTOLUS, in Smith, supra note 101, ¶ 41, at 254-55.
104 Id. $ 13, at 174 ("This is a good place to consider two matters, first whether local
legislation extends to non-subjects .... ).
105 Id. ("This is a good place to consider two matters, ... secondly whether the effect of such
legislation extends beyond the legislators' territory.").
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particular, a law of a person's domus might apply to its people when doing acts
in a foreign locus, thus giving the law a tribal scope.106 Either possibility would
amount to an exception to the presumption of pure insularity and would allow a
local law to apply to at least some multistate disputes.
Although Bartolus never discussed marriage conflicts, he articulated a
number of conflicts principles in other contexts that might bear on the
resolution of marriage conflicts. They merit a quick overview.
Formalities. One of the clearest and simplest conflicts principles that
Bartolus adopted concerned the formalities necessary for a legal act. In
discussing contractual as well as testamentary formalities, he said simply that
one "must always look to the place of acting." 0 7 A locus law regulating
formalities should apply to all acts done in the locus, whether done by outsiders
or locals,08 and a formalities law of an actor's domus should not apply
elsewhere.'09 Acts validly done according to the law of the locus, moreover,
should have effect everywhere.1 o Laws regulating formalities were an
exception to Bartolus's concern that one state not prejudice the legislative
power of another state by regulating people or things in the other state.
Formalities, he explained, were merely about how an act is done, not whether it
may be done."' The same act could have been done in the other state, so long
as the actor complied with local formalities.' 12 The result was that Bartolus
endorsed and largely settled debate about the classical rule known as locus regit
actum, the locus regulates (the formal aspects of) an act.
Contractual Materiality. Bartolus adopted a similar rule as to the
regulation of the material aspects of contracts. With respect to what he called
"the enforcement of the rights arising out of the contract," Bartolus opined that
the applicable law should be the law of the locus where the contract was
made."' This locus rule applied as long as the issue concerned not a matter of
performance but "a matter arising from the nature of the contract" or, in other
words, a claim "for relief from prejudice arising out of the contract itself at the
time of the contract."ll4 Notably, this rule applied even to contracts transferring
title to land, even though the actual transfer might have to be done at the situs
106 Id
107 Id 32(2), at 181.
108 Id ¶ 14, at 174, 175, ¶ 24(3), at 179.
109 Id ¶32(2), at 181, 136, at 248.
110 Id ¶37, at 249-50.
"' Id. 41,at254-55.
112 Id
" Id. 13, at 174, ¶ 16, at 174-75.
I14 Id TI 13-19, at 174-77.
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of the land.'15 Bartolus did not explain how he squared this principle with his
concern about one state not prejudicing the legislative power of another.
Testamentary Capacity. In discussing contracts, Bartolus oddly did not
specifically address capacity to contract, but he did discuss testamentary
capacity when he turned to wills. Bartolus was clear and definitive in saying
that a locus law should not apply to the capacity of an outsider doing acts
there.'16 Trying to grant capacity to a person from another state would prejudice
the legislative power of the person's domus.'17 On the other hand, the person's
domus, while capable of granting him additional capacity at home, could not
expand his capacity beyond the general law with respect to acts done outside
the domus."'8 Otherwise, the domus would be prejudicing the legislative power
of the locus. The result was that no state, by local laws, could expand a
person's capacity in making a will outside his home state beyond the capacity
granted by the general Roman law.119 A different principle, however, applied to
restrictions on capacity. If a person's domus used a local law to restrict his
capacity below what he possessed under the general law, that restriction had
force outside the domus if it was "benevolent" but not if it was "malignant."l 20
Benevolent restrictions were those seeking to protect a person from himself,
while malignant restrictions subordinated a person's interests in order to
advantage someone else.12 1 It is not clear why restricting the capacity of one's
people to do acts in other states did not trigger Bartolus's concern that the
domus would be prejudicing the legislative power of the locus.
Change of Personal Status. Bartolus briefly touched on conflicts
concerning a change of personal status. He opined that a parent could
emancipate a minor under the law of the locus where the act was done, even if
that law was more lenient than the law of the family's domus.122 The reason,
however, was because Bartolus characterized emancipation as a matter of mere
formalities.123 The personal status of minority and the concept of emancipation
themselves derived from the underlying general law. If a state were actually
creating new material rules for status changes-or, presumably, creating a
novel personal status-its local law would not apply to outsiders, nor would the
status have force or effect elsewhere. 124
1" See id. T 16, at 174-75.




120 Id ¶33, at 182-83.
121 Compare id ¶ 33(1), at 181, with id. 33(3), at 182-83.
122 Id T 35, at 248.
123 Id 135, at 248, T 41, at 254-55.
124 See id.T41, at 255.
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Forum Override. Bartolus did not appear to contemplate any notion of
a forum state overriding the otherwise applicable law of another state based on
some public policy objection. There were certain issues that he opined should
be determined by forum law, specifically court procedure and contractual
remedies when parties failed to specify a single place of performance. 125 But he
did not hint at the possibility of a forum resorting to its own public policy as an
override with respect to issues not within the province of forum law.
Although neither Bartolus nor other secular conflicts theorists in the
Italian school discussed marriage conflicts, one or more of these conflicts
principles developed in another legal context could be extended or adapted to
marriage conflicts. An obvious candidate is the locus regit actum principle for
resolving conflicts as to the formalities necessary for a legal act. It could be
extended to nuptial acts. The challenge, however, was deciding which, if any,
of these principles might provide a basis for resolving conflicts involving
material conditions on marriage. An obvious candidate, the rule for resolving
contracts conflicts, would also favor the choice of locus law. But extrapolating,
instead, from Bartolus's rules for testamentary capacity would complicate
matters because of the distinction between benevolent and malignant
restrictions on capacity.
2. The Spanish Canonists
The earliest significant commentary on marriage conflicts appeared in
Spain at the end of the 16th century. The impetus was a 1563 decree of the
Council of Trent, which resulted in divergent restrictions on informal marriages
in Western Europe. Tomds Sanchez attempted to synthesize these views with
the conflicts principles of Bartolus. This 1602 fusion would influence the
resolution of marriage conflicts for the rest of the early modern period,
including in the ecclesiastical courts of England.
i. The Tridentine Decree
The main reason why Bartolus and others had not already commented
on marriage conflicts is that there was not much opportunity for such conflicts
to arise. Centuries earlier, the Catholic Church had acquiesced in the view that,
as a matter of divine law, a valid marriage arises from the mere exchange of
vows by connubiants-however informally or secretly and whether done with
or without the intermediation of a priest.126 These marriages were subject to
church discipline, but they were not invalid.1 2 7 Local variation in nuptial
125 Id. $ 15, at 174, 175, $ 18, at 175.
126 R.B. OUTHWAITE, CLANDESTINE MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1500-1850, at 3-5 (1995).
127 Id. at 4-6.
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regulations, then, could not give rise to conflicts as to the actual validity of an
ostensible marriage.2 1
The absence of conflicts changed following the 1563 decree of the
Council of Trent. Seeking to crack down on clandestine marriages-a concept
that included elements of secrecy, elopement, exploitation of minors, and
denial of clerical authority-the Council resolved to go beyond mere church
discipline and declare such marriages void. Its decree declared marriages
invalid if they were not formally celebrated in the presence of the parish priest
and at least two witnesses. 12 In an apparent effort to skirt the settled
proposition that, as a matter of divine law, the mere exchange of vows
established a valid marriage, the Council approached the issue of validity
obliquely by purporting to deny connubiants themselves the capacity to
exchange vows informally.130 The idea seemed to be to render the connubiants'
consent ineffectual without directly challenging the assertedly divine
proposition that informal marriages are valid.
While none of these propositions would have given rise to marriage
conflicts, a final provision of the decree did. It declared the decree itself
effective only on a parish-by-parish basis following its publication in each
parish.3 1 As it turned out, entire regions of Catholic Europe simply refused to
publish the decree, thus denying it effectiveness there.'32 The restrictions on
informal marriages took effect in some places but not in others.'3 3 Conflicts
problems involving itinerant connubiants were a result.
The principal concern was the legal effect of informal nuptials
concluded in places where the decree was not in effect by connubiants from
places where it was. Could those connubiants effectively evade the decree's
restrictions by concluding their nuptials in a locus where the restrictions had
not been received? That was the primary question that Spanish canonists,
including Sanchez, addressed.
ii. Initial Responses to the Question
The initial responses of Spanish canonists to the conflicts generated by
the Tritentine decree against clandestine marriages were less than impressive.
These canonists did not explicitly rely on Bartolus or other members of the
128 David E. Engdahl, The Canonical and Metaphysical Background of the Classic Dutch
Marriage Conflicts Rule, 15 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 42, 42-48 (1968).
129 THE CANONS AND DECREES OF THE SACRED AND OECUMENICAL COUNCIL OF TRENT 197 (J.
Waterworth ed. & trans., 1848), https://goo.gl/fvu40C.
130 Id.
131 Id at 199.
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Italian school. They seemed to rely mainly on the text of the decree itself and a
trite analogy to fasting on religious holidays.
One canonist adopted a domus rule for resolving these conflicts. In an
analysis comprising only a couple of sentences, Enrique Henriquez (1536-
1608) reasoned that the decree bound connubiants everywhere on Earth the
moment it was published at their domus because it attached to them
personally.134 They could avoid the restrictions only by actually changing their
domus before their nuptials to a polity that had not published the decree.135
Otherwise, the restrictions applied to connubiants even if they were completely
unaware of the publication of the decree at their domus because they had been
"taken captive by infidels in triremes."l3 6
Another Spanish canonist, Pedro de Ledesma (1544-1616),137
disagreed with Henriquez. He gave the issue a slightly less superficial treatment
and leaned far more heavily toward the law of the locus than the domus.
Although his analysis was more extensive, it was still not explicitly grounded
in conflicts commentary.
Ledesma regarded a couple of propositions as certain. A valid marriage
would arise if connubiants from a place without the Tridentine restrictions
concluded their nuptials informally in that place or in another place without the
restrictions,'3 8 but not if they tried to conclude their nuptials in a place with the
Tridentine restrictions.'3 9 This latter situation was the outrange scenario, in
which connubiants have their nuptials beyond the range of their permissive
134 HENRICUS HENRIQUEZ [ENRIQUE HENRiQUEZ], ALTERA PARS SUMMAE THEOLOGIAE
MORALIS [A FURTHER PART OF THE SUM OF MORAL THEOLOGY] lib. 11, cap. 3, § 8, at 964
(Salamanca, Joannis Ferdinandez 1593), https://goo.gl/6aoBUv (opining that the decree bound
individuals "principaliter ratione personarum" and referring to domicile).
135 Id. (opining that "migrants into a region or parish, where that decree of the Council of
Trent was never promulgated (as regarding captives, in lands of infidels where they have the
intent of remaining, and they acquire a domicile) are able to contract marriage without a priest"
(author's trans. of the sentence beginning, "At migrantes in regionem")).
136 Id. (author's trans.).
1 PETRUS [PEDRO] DE LEDESMA, TRACTATUS DE MAGNO MATRIMONII SACRAMENTO
[TREATISE ON THE GREAT SACRAMENT OF MARRIAGE] q. 45, art. 5 fine, at 197-99 (Salamanca,
Joannes & Andreas Renaut 1592) (1590), http://goo.gl/1kmqgX (beginning with the paragraph
that opens, "Est ultimum dubium").
138 Id. at 197 ("The first certainty is that a marriage celebrated by those [people] who dwell in
those provinces and regions is valid even if it should take place without a priest and witnesses, if
that marriage is celebrated in those places." (author's trans. of the sentence beginning, "Primum
certum est")).
13 Id. ("I said in conclusion, 'if it is celebrated in those provinces and places,' however,
because if it is celebrated in other provinces and regions, in which the Council of Trent and
especially that decree is promulgated and accepted, the marriage will be null, if it should take
-place without a priest and witnesses, because that decree ought to be observed in those places."
(author's trans. of the sentence beginning, "Dixi autem in conclusione")).
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domus law in a locus that does not allow their type of marriage. 140In
Ledesma's view, if the connubiants' domus did not impose the Tridentine
restrictions, a simple locus rule applied: An informal marriage would be valid
everywhere if formed in a locus without the restrictions but invalid everywhere
if formed in a locus with the restrictions.141 He would adopt both the locus-
validation and locus-invalidation versions of the locus rule.
The opposite fact pattern, however, was the real focus of Ledesma's
inquiry. What was the result when connubiants from a place that imposed the
Tridentine restrictions concluded their nuptials informally in a place that did
not impose the restrictions? It was this evasion scenario that drew his
attention.142 For Ledesma, one thing about that scenario was certain: The
evasive, informal nuptials would never qualify as a valid marriage back in the
connubiants' home state or in any other state that had adopted the Tridentine
restrictions,143 a condition which profoundly limited the validation of marriages
under his approach. Because of this condition, his narrow question was only
whether the nuptials might be regarded as valid in states that did not bar
informal marriages. The possible answers were that such nuptials would be
either invalid everywhere or valid only in the locus and in other places allowing
informal marriages. Ledesma immediately ruled out the possibility of universal
validity, so evasive informal nuptials could produce, at most, only a limping
marriage.'"
Ledesma ultimately did not even go that far in conceding validity to
such nuptials. In general, he did accept that informal nuptials concluded in a
locus without the Tridentine restrictions by connubiants from a place with the
restrictions would be regarded as valid in places without those restrictions.14 5
140 See supra Part III.C.
141 See LEDESMA, supra note 137, at 197.
142 Id. (beginning with the paragraph that opens, "Tota autem difficultas est").
143 Ledesma dismissed this possibility of validity by explaining that
[t]he doubt is whether [such connubiants] are able to contract a marriage
without a priest and witnesses, so that that marriage is valid in those places in
which the Council is not promulgated or accepted. This [qualifier] is added,
in view of the fact that it is a certainty that where the Council is accepted
and promulgated, that marriage is in no respect valid.
Id. (emphases added) (author's trans. of the passage beginning, "Dubium est, an possint
contrahere matrimonium").
1" Id. For a discussion of the problem of the limping marriage see supra text accompanying
note 66.
145 Ledesma articulated this principle in a two-step process. First, he concluded that
connubiants who linger in a place without the Tridentine restrictions, but who have no intent to
change their domcile, could validly conclude informal nuptials in that place, notwithstanding the
law of their home state. In his words,
If some [people] from other provinces might visit those [provinces] in which
the Council of Trent is not promulgated, while they may dwell in those
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Because the nuptials would not be regarded as valid in the domus of the
connubiants, however, a limping marriage would arise. But Ledesma
recognized an important exception that significantly narrowed the scope of this
validation of such nuptials: No valid marriage would arise in the view of any
state at all if the connubiants had sought out the lenient locus in order to evade
the formalities required by their home state. In that case, their nuptials would
be infraudem legis and void everywhere.146 In sum, only informal nuptials that
were unintentionally evasive would give rise to a valid marriage in states that
allowed informal marriages, but even in that case, the marriage would be a
limping one deemed valid only in places that had not received the Tridentine
restrictions.
Ledesma's justifications for his scheme were thin. He rested the
general rule in favor of limping validity on two grounds. The first was simply
the old adage, "When in Rome, do as the Romans do."'4 7 Although this idea of
adhering to the law of the locus was equivalent to the locus regit actum rule of
the Italian school, Ledesma cited no conflicts thinker for it. The second ground
was a trite analogy to fasting on holy days. Ledesma cited another prominent
canonist, Martin de Azpilcueta Navarro (1491-1586), for the notion that a
person should comply with the fasting customs of the locus in which he found
himself at meal time, not the customs of his domus.148 As for the in fraudem
[places] and actually might be detained, a marriage celebrated by such
[people] without a priest and witnesses is valid.
Id. at 198 (author's trans. of the sentence following "Secunda conclusio"). Ledesma then further
concluded that even connubiants who visited such a place could validly conclude informal
nuptials there. Again, in his words,
If some [people] from other regions and provinces may go to those places, in
which the Council not be heeded and they be there as if guests, and if without
fraud and deceit they make it and may enter into a marriage without a priest
and witnesses, the marriage will be valid.
Id. (author's trans. of the sentence following "Tertia conclusio"). In Ledesma's view, then,
whether the connubiants merely visit or linger in the locus, their informal nuptials concluded
there would be valid there, notwithstanding the restrictive law of their domus.
146 Ledesma concluded that if a connubiant from a place that had adopted the Tridentine
restrictions "might visit those parts or regions [in which it had not been adopted] in order that he
might enter into a marriage without a priest and witnesses infraudem legis ... , I opine that such
a marriage is null." Id. at 198 (author's trans. of the sentence following "In hujus expositionem
sit prima conclusio").
147 Id. ("Si fueris Romae, Romano vivito more.").
148 Id. (appearing in the paragraph beginning, "Secundo arguitur"); see MARTIN DE
AZPLLCUETA NAVARRO, ENCHIRIDION SIVE MANUALE CONFESSARIORUM ET POENITENTIUM
[HANDBOOK OR MANUAL OF CONFESSORS AND PENITENTS], cap. 23, § 120, at 581 (Antwerp,
Christophorus Plantinus 1575) (1566), http://goo.gl/PhSyvU. In the source that Ledesma cited,
Navarro had opined that a mortal offense would be committed by any person
[w]ho eats from meats, or from other prohibited foods in another region even
in that time, that it should be lawful for him to eat from them in his [region]:
just as, on the contrary, he does not commit a moral offense should he eat
from them in a region, which he transits, or in which he delays, although in
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legis exception, Ledesma merely said that marriage should be undertaken "only
in grace" and that "fraud and deceit should protect no one."l49
iii. Sanchez
Addressing himself to the same conflicts questions arising from the
Tridentine decree, Tomds Sanchez took the earlier commentary by Spanish
canonists and attempted to fuse it with his understanding of the theory of
Bartolus and the Italian school. It was this work that influenced the resolution
of marriage conflicts for the ensuing two centuries.
Sanchez began by identifying the usual two kinds of conflicts questions
that the Tridentine restrictions produced. The problem, he explained, was
whether nuptials were valid in either of two situations: (1) when connubiants
from a polity without the restrictions concluded their nuptials informally in a
place that had received the restrictions or (2) when connubiants from a polity
with the restrictions concluded their nuptials informally in a place that had not
received the restrictions.150 The first situation presented the outrange scenario,
and the second the evasion scenario. Sanchez observed at the outset that, in
either case, the answer depended on whether the connubiants were bound either
by the law of the locus in which they acted or by the law of the domus from
which they hailed. 15
His essay replicated the overall structure of Bartolus's conflicts
analysis in asking, first, whether the locus law applies to outsiders and, second,
his [region] it should not be lawful for him [to do so]. For instance, a
Navarrese and a Portuguese eating from the rear [i.e. intestines] of animals in
Castile on the Sabbath day, do not commit a moral offense, although in their
countries it be not lawful for them [to do so]. A Castillian, however, doing
the same in Portugal or Navarre, should commit a moral offense ....
Id. (author's trans.). Ledesma did not address the obvious difference between doing a one-time
act, such as eating, and entering into a lifelong legal relation affecting personal status, such as a
marnage.
149 LEDESMA, supra note 137, at 198 (author's trans. of phrases "solum gratia" and "fraus &
dolus nemini patrocinentur" in the paragraph beginning, "In hujus expositionem sit prima
conclusio").
150 Stating the questions in reverse order, Sanchez explained,
The problem . .. is-when inhabitants of places where the Tridentine decree
binds remove to places where it does not bind or, conversely, [when]
inhabitants of places where it does not bind remove to a place where it does
bind-whether they may be held to enter into a marriage in the presence of
the parish priest and witnesses.
SANCHEZ, supra note 97, lib. 3, disp. 18, ¶ 2, at 264 (author's trans.).
1 Id. (asking "whether foreigners be held by the laws of the place through which they transit
or of their domicile while they are absent" (author's trans.)).
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whether their domus law has extraterritorial force inside the locus.15 2 These
were the two grand divisions in Bartolus's essay.53
The first of the general questions was whether the law of the locus
where a person acts applies if the person is an outsider temporarily present in
the locus. Sanchez's answer was generally consistent with Bartolus's concern
about not prejudicing the legislative power of one state by applying another
state's law to a multistate fact pattern. Sanchez said the general rule was that
the locus law did not apply to an outsider when that law conflicted with the law
of the outsider's domus.154 Explicitly citing Bartolus's endorsement of the locus
regit actum rule with respect to contractual formalities, however, Sanchez
recognized an exception in the case of locus laws regulating contractual
formalities.155 He reasoned that an outsider is bound by those locus laws on the
theory "that every contract gains a forum in the place of the contract." 56
The other overarching question was whether the law of an outsider's
domus had extraterritorial force so that it might apply inside the borders of the
locus to an act done by the outsider there.157 The general answer was no.
Sanchez relied on the reasoning of Spanish canonists that a person was not
bound by the religious fasting rules of his domus when eating in a foreign
locus.58 He did not rely on Bartolus in reaching this conclusion, as Bartolus
had opined that a domus law benevolently restricting personal capacity did
have extraterritorial force.'59 With these general principles established, Sanchez
turned to marriage conflicts.
The first of the marriage conflicts-the outrange scenario-was by far
the less important of the two. The question was whether connubiants from a
152 In Sanchez's words, the questions were, first, "whether foreigners are held to the laws and
customs of the place through which they transit," and, second, "whether they are held to the laws
of their domicile, while they are absent from that [place]." Id. (author's trans.).
153 See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
154 See SANCHEZ, supra note 97, lib. 3, disp. 18, ¶ 6, at 265 ("[W]ayfaring and sojourning
foreigners [are] not to be bound by the laws and customs of the place through which they transit
or in which they are found by way of lodging . .. when those [laws and customs] do not bind at
their domicile." (author's trans.)). Sanchez recognized that if the laws of the locus and the domus
were the same, the common rule could be applied without concern for whether locus law was
being applied to a foreigner or domus law in a foreign locus. Id.
155 Id. ¶ 10, at 266 ("The first [exception] is the extent of the formalities of a contract, for all
sojourning and wayfaring foreigners are held to heed the formalities required in contract by the
laws and customs of the town in which [the contracts] are entered into . . . ." (author's trans.)).
156 Id. (author's trans.).
157 Id. 1 17, at 267 ("The second question [is] whether foreigners coming together in another
place by way of transit and lodging, be held, while absent from their own domicile, to heed the
laws and customs of their domicile, if in that place, in which [the foreigners] are found, [the laws
and customs] do not bind." (author's trans.)).
158 See id. ¶ 19, at 267.
159 See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
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polity that still allowed informal marriages could go to a locus that had adopted
the Tridentine restrictions and nevertheless validly enter into an informal
marriage there.16 0 Sanchez said no, as had Ledesma, whom he cited
approvingly.'6' Consistent with his overall regime, Sanchez reasoned that the
Tridentine restrictions of the locus applied to the connubiants and rendered the
attempt at an informal marriage there void. While a locus law that conflicts
with a domus law would not generally apply to an outsider doing an act in the
locus, locus laws regulating formalities were an exception.162 In reaching this
conclusion, Sanchez had implicitly characterized the Tridentine restrictions as
matters of mere formality, not materiality. At least to that extent, his conclusion
also amounted to adoption of a locus-invalidation rule.
The more significant scenario was the second one: the evasion
scenario. It is the far more common scenario, the one involving elopements to
evade a formal, public wedding. It was the scenario in which connubiants from
a polity that had adopted the Tridentine restrictions went to a locus that still
allowed informal marriages and concluded their nuptials informally there
before returning home.63 Sanchez resolved this type of conflict in a way that
affirmed the validity of these evasive nuptials,64 and he was even rather
aggressive in doing so. Sanchez applied his general conflicts principles but, in
this instance, reasoned in the alternative.
First, he applied the principle that had emerged from the second of his
overarching questions: The law of a person's domus has no extraterritorial
force and thus cannot bind that person when doing acts in a foreign locus. The
fact that the domus of a connubiant had received the Tridentine decree and
imposed its restrictions could have no extraterritorial effect on nuptials
concluded informally outside that state.165 On this view, it made no difference
160 SANCHEZ, supra note 97, lib. 3, disp. 18, ¶ 25, at 268 ("Whether if inhabitants of places, in
which the Tridentine decree voiding clandestine marriages, is not received, should remove to
other towns by way of transit, and of lodging, where the decree binds that town, be able to
validly to contract marriage without a parish priest, and witnesses, according to the laws of their
own domicile." (author's trans.)). The argument in support of validity, Sanchez noted, was that
foreigners are generally not bound by locus law and that such marriages would be valid under the
law of the foreigners' domus. Id.
161 Id. ¶ 26, at 268 ("What ought to be said, nevertheless, is, that marriage [is] to be void."
(author's trans.)).
162 Id. (invoking the exception to the inapplicability of locus law for laws prescribing
contractual formalities).
163 Id. 1 27, at 269 (asking "whether if inhabitants of places at which the Tridentine decree
binds, should they come together in that [place], where it does not bind, be able to enter into
marriage conformably to the law of that place, without the parish priest, and witnesses" (author's
trans.)).
164 Seeid. $28, at 269.
165 Id. ("Foreigners absent from the domicile [are] not to be held by laws of that domicile, if
contrary ones be in force in the place where they are found." (author's trans.)).
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whether the restrictions were characterized as formalities or as personal
incapacities. Either way, they were grounded in domus law, and domus law had
no force in a foreign locus.
But this strong version of the proposition that domus law had no
extraterritorial force was questionable. Sanchez undoubtedly realized that it
was in some tension with Bartolus and the Italian school. Indeed, Sanchez
expressly conceded the possibility that domus law might be held to apply in this
scenario."'6 Bartolus had opined that benevolent restrictions on personal
capacity, imposed by domus law, actually did follow a person into a foreign
locus and bind the person even there. 167 Declaring a person incapable of
eloping to conclude a private, informal marriage would quite arguably have fit
Bartolus's notion of a benevolent restriction on capacity-that is, a paternalistic
imposition designed to protect a person from himself by incapacitating him. On
that view, Henriquez might have been consistent with Bartolus if the Tridentine
restrictions could be characterized as matters of capacity and as benevolent.
Perhaps sensing that vulnerability, Sanchez offered a second,
alternative rationale for rejecting the domus theory of Henriquez. This
alternative rested on the principle that emerged from the first of Sanchez's
overarching questions: The law of the locus did not apply to an outsider doing
acts in the locus, unless the locus law is one that regulates formalities.16 8
Sanchez now more explicitly characterized the Tridentine restrictions as
matters of form, not capacity, and thus within the exception in favor of
applying locus law to outsiders. In the type of evasive marriage conflict
contemplated in this scenario, the law of the locus allows informal marriages,
and that law, Sanchez reasoned, should apply to connubiants who go into the
locus and conclude their nuptials informally there.169 While the Tridentine
decree itself described the restrictions as limitations on personal capacity, that
description seemed to be designed to allow the voiding of informal marriages
without disturbing the Church's previously accepted position that informal
marriages were valid as a matter of divine law.'70 It did not appear to have
anything to do with the resolution of multistate conflicts, which it is not clear
that the Council of Trent even contemplated. In substance, moreover, the
166 Id. ("We might have thought [foreigners] shall be bound by the laws of the domicile . . .
(author's trans.)).
167 See supra text accompanying note 120.
168 See supra text accompanying note 155.
169 SANCHEZ, supra note 97, lib. 3, disp. 18, S 28, at 269. He wrote,
[A]s to the formality to be used in contracts, only the laws of the place in
which a contract has been concluded are observed. The place, however,
where this marriage is formed, does not require that formality of a parish
priest and witnesses for the validity of a marriage, since the Tridentine decree
does not bind there.
Id. (author's trans.).
170 See LEDESMA, supra note 137, at 197.
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restrictions themselves were quite arguably formalities: requiring a priest-as
an officiant-and two witnesses. They were about how nuptials were to be
concluded, not whether the parties were eligible to marry. In support, Sanchez
relied on Ledesma to the extent he had concluded that locus law should apply
to nuptials that were not deliberately evasive.'7 '
Of course, Sanchez knew that Ledesma and other Spanish canonists
would have invalidated any nuptials that were deliberately evasive of domus
law,1 72 which could amount to most of the nuptials fitting the evasion scenario.
After noting a couple of their rationales, Sanchez rejected the infraudem legis
exception: "[T]his limitation displeases me, and I think it is lawful that
[connubiants] might visit that country [where the Tridentine decree has not
been adopted], so they might be able to contract marriage freely without a
parish priest and witnesses."73 He offered a series of reasons: (1) the exercise
of a right cannot be fraud; (2) bad intention does not impair the marriage itself;
and (3) marriage is beneficial, not wrongful.174 Implicit in these rationales was
something of a substantive policy favoring the validation of marriages
whenever feasible. On that basis, Sanchez rejected the in fraudem legis
exception.75
With the foregoing propositions and distinctions, Sanchez reasoned his
way to applying locus law to affirm the validity of even deliberately evasive
nuptials, but his reasoning contained some significant limitations. It fell far
short of establishing a simple locus-validation rule, such as "a marriage valid
where celebrated is valid everywhere." He regarded locus law as applicable to
nuptials only when the issue was one of formalities.17 6 He made clear his view
that the application of locus law in that instance was an exception to a general
principle against applying locus law to nuptials concluded by connubiants from
other states. As he articulated it, the exception in favor of locus law would not
17i Id.; see supra text accompanying note 145.
172 SANCHEZ, supra note 97, lib. 3, disp. 18, 1 29 (collecting authorities).
17 Id. (author's trans.) ("[D]isplicet mihi haec limitatio, & credo licet adirent eo fine, ut
possent liber[e] absque parocho, & testibus contrahere, esse ratum matrimonium.").
174 Id
17 See Steele v. Braddell (1838) Milw. Ecc. Rep. 1, 33-34 (Ir.) (describing rejection of in
fraudem legis exception by Sanchez). There has been some misunderstanding on this important
point. Professor David E. Engdahl seems to have misread what is admittedly a difficult text in
attributing the opposite view to Sanchez. Engdahl, supra note 128, at 52. The language that
Engdahl quotes as endorsing the in fraudem legis exception was actually a passage in which
Sanchez was summarizing the argument of Ledesma and others: "They somewhat limit this
opinion [that locus law applies to nuptial formalities] . . . ." SANCHEZ, supra note 97, lib. 3, disp.
18, ¶ 29 ("Limitant aliqui hanc sententiam. . . ."). Sanchez describes himself as displeased with
the exception and rejects it later in the same passage. Id. In some editions of his work, his
statement of repudiation begins a new paragraph, but in other editions, it is buried in the middle
of a very lengthy paragraph and is easily overlooked.
176 See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
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apply to conflicts involving material conditions on the validity of marriage.
Although Bartolus had also applied locus law to the materiality of contracts,
not just their formalities, Sanchez did not appear to embrace that proposition as
an analogy. His alternative rationale in favor of applying locus law to affirm the
validity of evasive informal marriages was that issues of formalities triggered
the special exception in favor of locus law.177
Indeed, lurking behind the essay was a complicated understanding of
the law applicable to issues of capacity. Sanchez distinguished between
different kinds of incapacities. "[W]hen an incapacity is established absolutely
and simply, it follows alongside the person wherever [he is] going; when it is
established by way of law... , it does not follow the person, except as long as
he is in a place, in which that law has binding force." 78 What exactly Sanchez
meant by the distinction between "absolute and simple" incapacities and
"legal" ones is unclear. It could be that he had in mind a distinction between
natural law and positive law. One can imagine that there were some
incapacities-such as certain consanguinity restrictions-that he was not
willing to risk undermining by way of a locus-validation rule.
An additional, significant limitation on Sanchez's reasoning was his
heavy reliance on the wording of the Tridentine decree in rejecting the
arguments against applying locus law to validate evasive nuptials. Sanchez
repeatedly noted that the decree declared itself inapplicable outside the places
that had received it.' 79 That basis would not be available for limiting the reach
of a domus law that lacked such a disclaimer and, if applied, would void
particular nuptials.
Lastly, a foundation of Sanchez's reasoning, sometimes only implicit,
was a substantive policy value in favor of affirming the validity of nuptials
whenever feasible. That value was most explicit in his justifications for
rejecting the in fraudem legis exception. Persuasiveness of his conclusions
depend in part on acceptance of that substantive value as a basis for resolving
marriage conflicts.
In the decades that followed publication of Sanchez's analysis, his
nuances and distinctions may have withered away. What apparently emerged in
this period, perhaps also influenced directly by Bartolus's broad locus rule for
resolving contracts conflicts, was a simple locus rule. Whether a conflict
involved material conditions or formalities seemed to lose relevance, along
with any distinction between locus-validation and locus-invalidation.'80 What
17 See supra text accompanying note 155.
178 SANCHEZ, supra note 97, lib. 3, disp. 18, $ 30 (author's trans.).
179 E.g., id. ¶ 27, at 269 (reaching this conclusion "because the Tridentine decree does not
bind" outside a place where it was published).
Iso Ellison Kahn, Appendix: Jurisdiction and Conflict of Laws in the South African Law of
Husband and Wife, in H.R. HAHLO, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE 529, 586-
87 (4th ed. 1975).
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endured, however, was the question whether an evasion exception should be
adopted.
B. The Dutch School
Marriage conflicts became a topic of significant debate again in the
Netherlands in the 17th century. The Dutch school of conflicts thought emerged
then among the provinces of the Netherlands. Although Dutch jurists had
initially inherited the Italian approach,"' the emergence of the concept of
sovereignty in international law produced a new school of conflicts thought. Its
primary exponents, Johannes Voet (1647-1713)182 and Ulrik Huber (1636-
1694),183 sought to harmonize the application of foreign law with the notion of
absolute territorial sovereignty. The mediating factor was the concept of
comity. Their work-particularly that of Huber-profoundly influenced Anglo-
American conflicts law. With respect to marriage conflicts, it generally carried
forward the emphasis on locus law.
1. Structural Premises
The Dutch approach to conflicts rested on three premises about state
power and laws. These premises-strict territorialism, absolute sovereignty,
and qualified comity-are defining features of the Dutch approach and
distinguish it from the Italian approach and others. Huber famously presented
the premises as three maxims.
Strict Territorialism. The first maxim was strict territorialism. In
Huber's words, "The laws of every sovereign authority have force within the
boundaries of its state, and bind all subject to it, but not beyond."1 84 In contrast
to the Italian approach, there would be no overarching inquiry into the
extraterritorial force of a law. The Dutch approach repudiated any notion of a
18 1 LAINf, supra note 53, at 396-97 (discussing Everard and Peckius). Before the
emergence of a distinctive Dutch school, Dutch conflicts thought came under the influence of the
French school. Id. at 395, 397-408.
182 1 JOHANNES VOET, THE SELECTIVE VOET bk. 1, tit. 3-4 app., at 97 (Percival Gane trans.,
1955) [hereinafter VOET, TRANSLATED COMMENTARY] (translating 1 JOHANNIS [JOHANNES] VOET,
COMMENTARIUS AD PANDECTAS [COMMENTARY ON THE PANDECTS] lib. 1, tit. 3-4 app., at 49 (A.
Maurice ed., Paris, Gauthier Fratres 1829) (1698) [hereinafter VOET, LATIN COMMENTARY],
https://goo.gl/SIlZOm).
183 ULRICUS HUBERUS [ULRIK HUBER], De Conflictu Legum [On the Conflict of Laws], in
PRAELECTIONES JURIS ROMANI ET HODIERNI, PARS II [PRELECTIONS ON ROMAN AND MODERN
LAW, PART 2] lib. 1, tit. 3 app., at 23 (Leipzig, Gleditschius 1707) (1689) (alternatively referred
to as PRAELECTIONUM JURIS CIVILIS, TOMI III), https://goo.gl/zMcBaL, translated in Davies, supra
note 54, at 64 [hereinafter HUBER, in Davies].
184 HUBER, in Davies, supra note 183, § 2, at 65 (emphasis added).
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state's law attaching to a person and, of its own force, binding him
everywhere.'
Absolute Sovereignty. The second maxim eliminated the other
overarching question in the Italian approach: whether a locus law applied to an
outsider. In the words of Huber's second maxim, "Those are held to be subject
to a sovereign authority who are found within its boundaries, whether they be
there permanently or temporarily."'86 There would be no need to determine
whether a locus law regulated formalities in order to determine whether it came
within an exception under which it applied to outsiders. All locus laws applied
to outsiders present in the locus.
Qualified Comity. Strictly territorial laws might be consistent with
sovereignty, but they would quickly make interstate commerce and other
endeavors impractical. The solution to that problem was comity-the key
concept which truly distinguished the Dutch approach. Huber captured the idea
in his third maxim: "Those who exercise sovereign authority so act from
comity that the laws of each nation[,] having been applied within its own
boundaries[,] should retain their effect everywhere so far as they do not
prejudice the power or rights of [the other] state or its subjects."'8 The laws of
other states do not have force within the boundaries of a sovereign, but the
sovereign may choose to let them have effect within its boundaries. Comity
harmonized choice of law with absolute territorial sovereignty.
To be sure, Huber and Voet disagreed about the operation of comity in
at least two respects. First, Huber regarded its use as required by customary
international law as a result of the tacit consent of nations, but Voet viewed it
as a policy tool, which was backed, at most, by practical necessity, equity, and
moral duty.18 8 This interesting disagreement is moot in the full-faith-and-credit
context. As the United States Supreme Court put it in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,
the Full Faith and Credit Clause "made conflicts principles enforceable as a
matter of constitutional command rather than leaving enforcement to the
vagaries of the forum's view of comity." 8 9
185 See id; 1 VOET, TRANSLATED COMMENTARY, supra note 182, bk. 1, tit. 3-4 app., § 5, at
100, §§ 7-8, at 101-07 (translating 1 VOET, LATIN COMMENTARY, supra note 182, lib. 1, tit. 3-4
app.).
186 HUBER, in Davies, supra note 183, § 2, at 65; accord 1 VOET, TRANSLATED COMMENTARY,
supra note 182, bk. 1, tit. 3-4 app., § 5, at 100 (translating 1 VOET, LATIN COMMENTARY, supra
note 182, lib. 1, tit. 3-4 app.).
1 HUBER, in Davies, supra note 183, § 2, at 65; accord 1 VOET, TRANSLATED COMMENTARY,
supra note 182, bk. 1, tit. 3-4 app., § 1, at 98, § 12, at 111 (translating I VOET, LATIN
COMMENTARY, supra note 182, lib. 1, tit. 3-4 app.).
188 See Hessel E. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REv. 9 (1966). Compare HUBER,
in Davies, supra note 183, § 2, at 65-66, with I VOET, TRANSLATED COMMENTARY, supra note
182, bk. 1, tit. 3-4 app., § 12, at 111, § 16, at 115 (translating 1 VOET, LATIN COMMENTARY,
supra note 182, lib. 1, tit. 3-4 app.).
189 486 U.S. 717, 723 n.1 (1988) (citing Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948)).
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They also disagreed about the soundness of reducing comity to a
formula. As Huber's third maxim indicates, he sought to articulate a single
standard for its use, whereas Voet resisted reducing its use to "fixed rules."190
That is not to say that Voet endorsed the use of comity on a purely ad hoc
basis; Voet just thought it more advisable to develop principles in a more
nuanced and contextualized manner.191
2. Voet
Voet's conflicts regime accepted the prevailing regime, which had
grown out of the Italian approach, of classifying statutes as real, personal, or
mixed. Real statutes were said to apply territorially and personal ones tribally,
while the applicable scope of mixed statutes remained in some dispute. This
distinction obviously had less salience in Voet's approach because he regarded
all statutes, "in strict law,"l 92 as being purely territorial and having no inherent
force outside their enacting states. But as a matter of comity, a forum might
choose to give the law of another state effect within its borders, and Voet
retained the tripartite classification scheme in discussing the role of comity.
Rather than articulate a general standard for regulating the operation of comity,
he left consideration of the issue to his discussion of particular legal topics
within the tripartite division193 and, sometimes, even to his analysis of specific
legal issues.
Real statutes, for Voet, were those that primarily regulated things, even
if they also happened to mention people.195 When the things were land or other
immovables, the fact that real statutes, like all statutes, had a strictly territorial
scope was fine in Voet's view. A forum would not use comity to allow
immovables in its territory to be regulated by the statute of another state.196
Personal statutes, for Voet, were those that primarily regulated people,
even if they also happened to mention things. In his view, these statutes "deal
mainly with the universal or almost universal status, condition, capacity or
incapacity of a person."'97 In keeping with the premises of the Dutch school,
190 1 VOET, TRANSLATED COMMENTARY, supra note 182, bk. 1, tit. 3-4 app., § 16, at 115
(translating 1 VOET, LATIN COMMENTARY, supra note 182, lib. 1, tit. 3-4 app.).
191 Id.
192 Id. § 5, at 100.
193 Id. § § 12-15, at 111-15.
194 See, e.g., 4 VOET, TRANSLATED COMMENTARY, supra note 182, bk. 28, tit. 1, § 44, at 652-
54 (translating 3 VOET, LATIN COMMENTARY, supra note 182, lib. 28, tit. 1, § 44, at 201,
https://goo.gl/FYyZGy) (discussing testamentary capacity).
19 1 VOET, TRANSLATED COMMENTARY, supra note 182, bk. 1, tit. 3-4 app., § 3, at 99
(translating 1 VOET, LATIN COMMENTARY, supra note 182, lib. 1, tit. 3-4 app.).
196 Id. § 6, at 100-)1, § 12, at 111.
19 Id. § 2, at 98-99.
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Voet rejected the longstanding view that personal statutes attached to people
and somehow had inherent force to bind people outside the enacting state. Like
any other statute, a personal statute was strictly territorial in force.198 Territorial
means, in this instance, that when a person's domus is also the forum, it can
apply its own personal statute to that person's acts, whether done inside the
state or elsewhere.199 When the person is an outsider with a domus elsewhere, a
forum might use comity to allow the law of his domus to regulate him in the
forum, but Voet declined to articulate any general rule for the application of
comity to personal statutes. Instead, he preferred to deal with the question on an
issue-specific basis.200
Mixed statutes, the final class, constituted a narrow set of statutes for
Voet. They were only those statutes that primarily prescribed "the shape,
manner, order and formalities of acts, either judicial or extra-judicial, which
have to be done by persons in and about things."20' Like the other kinds of
statutes, Voet viewed mixed statutes as having strictly territorial force, meaning
they applied, of their own force, only to acts done in the enacting state.202 But
when a forum is dealing with an act done in another state, Voet took the
position that the forum should use comity to give effect to the formalities
regulations of the locus where the act was done. In other words, the forum
should apply locus law.203 In this way, Voet harmonized the longstanding locus
regit actum rule, as applied to formalities, with the concept of absolute
territorial sovereignty.
At least with respect to mixed statutes, Voet added two nuances. First,
a forum need not, by comity, apply a locus regulation of formalities to an act if
a person deliberately evaded a formalities rule of his domicile. Comity should
not be used to facilitate an act done infraudem legis, at least not to the extent of
affecting things situated in the person's domus.2 Second, if a forum happens
to be the domus of a person doing an external act or the situs of a thing about
which an external act is done, the forum may refrain from extending comity to
an invalidating locus law and affirm the validity of the external act by applying
a validating forum law. 205
In using Voet's approach to resolve marriage conflicts, his version of
the tripartite scheme for classifying statutes requires a distinction between
marriage conflicts involving mere nuptial formalities and those involving
198 Id. § 7, at 101-03.
9 See id § 9, at 107.
200 Id. §16, at 115.
201 Id. § 4, at 99-100.
202 See id. § 10, at 108-09.
203 See id. § 13, at 112.
204 Id. § 14, at 113.
205 Id. § 15, at 114.
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material conditions on validity. The former clearly involve mixed statutes in his
regime, and the latter clearly do not.
In light of Voet's treatment of mixed statutes, a conflict involving
nuptial formalities would be resolved according to the locus regit actum rule,
unless one of Voet's exceptions applied. A forum generally should give comity
to the formalities rule of an external locus where the nuptials took place.2 06 If,
however, the nuptials involved the deliberate evasion of a connubiant's domus
law or if they avoided a statutory mandate of the forum as to extrastate nuptials,
the forum should not apply the validating law of the extrastate locus.
Invalidating the nuptials under forum law is appropriate. In fact, Voet reached
precisely that result on both grounds in a specific case. There, nuptials were
concluded outside Holland by a connubiant from Holland without first
publishing his banns-that is, a public notice of the impending nuptials-in
Holland. A decree of that state expressly required Hollanders to publish banns
at their domus.207 Voet did not regard the applicability of a validating locus law
as absolute even in the case of formalities. In light of his second nuance with
respect to mixed statutes, moreover, Voet presumably would have endorsed a
forum-domus's refusal to apply an invalidating locus law to extrastate nuptials
that were consistent with the law of the forum-domus.
How Voet would have resolved marriage conflicts involving material
conditions is less certain because he did not specifically address the issue. It
would be necessary to extrapolate conclusions as to a general rule as well as
any exceptions to it.
Which general conflicts solution Voet would choose is unclear for two
reasons. First, it is not entirely clear how Voet would have classified a law
regulating material conditions. Presumably, it would not be a mixed statute, as
it seemingly would not involve the "shape, manner, order [or] formalities" of
the nuptials.208 If such a law were characterized as regulating status or capacity,
it would probably come within the personal category; otherwise, it would be a
real statute, with the marriage itself as the thing being primarily regulated.209
Second, it is not clear what conflicts rule he would adopt under either
classification. Voet declined to articulate a conflicts rule for personal statutes.
206 4 VOET, TRANSLATED COMMENTARY, supra note 182, bk. 23, tit. 2, § 85, at 128
(translating 2 VOET, LATIN COMMENTARY, supra note 182, lib. 23, tit. 2, § 85, at 614,
https://goo.gl/jcSngC).
207 Id. § 4, at 37-38 (translating 2 VOET, LATIN COMMENTARY, supra note 182, lib. 23, tit. 2,
§ 4, at 569, https://goo.gl/kXnfbc).
208 1 VOET, TRANSLATED COMMENTARY, supra note 182, bk. 1, tit. 3-4 app., § 4, at 99-100
(translating I VOET, LATIN COMMENTARY, supra note 182, lib. 1, tit. 3-4 app.).
209 Cf 4 VOET, TRANSLATED COMMENTARY, supra note 182, bk. 28, tit. 1, § 44, at 652-53
(translating 3 VOET, LATIN COMMENTARY, supra note 182, lib. 28, tit. 1, § 44, at 201,
https://goo.gl/FYyZGy) (appearing to classify laws regulating testamentary capacity as real
statutes and applying the law of situs to capacity to devise immovables and the law of the domus
to capacity to bequeath movables).
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Although applying domus law might seem an obvious choice, Voet did not
foreclose the choice of locus law because he never addressed the issue.21 o Even
under a real classification, moreover, he might apply the law of the situs of the
thing-perhaps the matrimonial domicile as the situs of the marital
relationship-or the locus law.211 Voet's acceptance of the mobilia sequuntur
personam rule, a domus rule, for conflicts involving title to movable property
indicated some willingness to choose a law other than that of the situs in
resolving even conflicts involving real statutes.
The nature of any exceptions that Voet might adopt may be somewhat
clearer. Since he accepted an evasion exception even with respect to mere
formalities, Voet would surely approve of that exception in the case of evading
the law of the domus in order to avoid a material condition. The same would
presumably be true of a statutory conflicts mandate. For the same reasons that
Voet approved of forum validation of transactions concluded without
compliance with locus formalities, he might well be expected to approve the
same saving alternative in the case of material conditions on the validity of
marriage, at least when the forum is the domus or situs-that is, matrimonial
domicile. There is also a strong basis for inferring that Voet would withhold
comity from an extrastate law validating polygamous or consanguineous
nuptials within the Levitical degrees. In a purely intrastate case, he maintained
that, in contrast to marital restrictions grounded in civil law, a state could not
grant dispensations from restrictions grounded in divine law.2 12 It seems highly
unlikely that he would regard a state as having any greater power to use comity
to give effect to an extrastate law authorizing such marriages.
In the end, Voet provided only partial guidance in the resolution of
marriage conflicts. For those involving mere formalities, his solution was clear.
With respect to marriage conflicts involving material conditions, it also may be
reasonably possible to extrapolate what kind of exceptions he would endorse.
But on the critical question of a general rule for resolving conflicts involving
material conditions, Voet's conflicts regime offered too many alternative
possibilities for extrapolation of a general principle with certainty. The fact that
he discussed marriage conflicts but limited his analysis to formalities may
210 See CHRISTOPHER F. FORSYTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 263 n.18 (4th ed. 2003).
211 Cf 3 VOET, TRANSLATED COMMENTARY, supra note 182, bk. 22, tit. 1, § 6, at 701
(translating 2 VOET, LATIN COMMENTARY, supra note 182, lib. 22, tit. 1, § 6, at 499-500,
https://goo.gl/txUb8Z) (opining that usury is determined by the law of the locus of the contact,
including the intended locus of payment); 2 VOET, TRANSLATED COMMENTARY, supra note 182,
bk. 12, tit. 1, § 29, at 784 (translating 2 VOET, LATIN COMMENTARY, supra note 182, lib. 12, tit. 1,
§ 29, at 86-87, https://goo.gl/q5e2Bs) (opining that the right of the creditor to reclaim the
principal on a loan after receipt of interest payments is determined by the law of the locus of the
contract, including the intended locus of payment).
212 4 VOET, TRANSLATED COMMENTARY, supra note 182, bk. 23, tit. 2, §§ 37-38, at 72-73
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suggest that he was ambivalent as to the proper resolution of conflicts involving
material conditions. Although undoubtedly aware of the prevailing locus rule,
he avoided overthrowing it, even as he may have questioned its merits in the
case of material conditions.2 13
3. Huber
In contrast to Voet's partial guidance, Huber was the first Dutch
conflicts thinker to develop a near-complete regime for resolving marriage
conflicts. He developed a set of general principles from his three maxims about
state power and comity. From these principles and maxims he derived an
influential conflicts rule for resolving marriage conflicts as well as two
exceptions to that rule.
i. General Principles
Unlike Voet, Huber did not purport to use the tripartite classification of
statutes, but he did articulate different general principles corresponding roughly
to that division. Although the prevailing conflicts regimes tended to prioritize
the "real" category and marginalize the "mixed" category, which focused on
acts as the subject of regulation,214 Huber, in contrast, gave primacy to a focus
on acts and minimized the "real" concept. His general principles for resolving
conflicts involving the regulation of acts had broad application in his regime,2 I
while his general principles relating to persons as well as things occupied a
more marginal position.2 6 Whereas prevailing regimes were thing-centered and
tended to elevate the law of the situs where things were located, Huber's
regime was act-centered and emphasized the law of the locus where acts were
done.
For resolving conflicts characterized as involving the regulation of acts,
Huber articulated a general principle and an exception, both derived from his
three maxims.217 The principle had two parts. The first part was a locus-
validation rule: "[A]ll transactions and acts, both in Court and out of Court,
213 It would not be until after the adoption of the United States Constitution that a Dutch
conflicts commentator, Dionysius van der Keessel (1738-1816), would clearly repudiate the
prevailing locus rule as to material conditions by endorsing the choice of domus law for
determining the capacity of a connubiant to marry. Kahn, supra note 180, at 587.
214 See 1 LAiNI, supra note 53, at 323-37 (describing the approach of the founder of the
prevailing French school as assimilating "mixed" statutes to "real" ones and drastically limiting
the class of "personal" statutes).
215 HUBER, in Davies, supra note 183, §§ 3-11, at 66-74 (articulating various conflicts rules
emphasizing the locus of acts).
216 Id. §§ 12-15, at 74-78 (articulating a few rules relating to "personal qualities" and the
situs of land).
217 See supra text accompanying notes 184-87.
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whether mortis causa or inter vivos, properly executed according to the law of a
particular place are valid even where a different law prevails, and where if done
in like manner, they would not be valid."218 The second part was merely the
symmetrical opposite of the first. It was a locus-invalidation rule: "transactions
and acts executed in any place contrary to the law of that place, as they are in
their origin invalid, cannot be valid anywhere."219 Taken together, these two
propositions stated a simple conflicts rule: The validity of an act should be
determined by the lex loci actus, the law of the place of the act. It made no
difference, Huber added, whether the actor was domiciled at the locus or was
an outsider "delayed in that very place for a while." 22 0 Either way, the law of a
locus was to control the validity of an act done in its borders.
The exception to this locus principle was established by Huber's third
maxim, which generally articulated the limit of comity. As he restated it in
connection with the locus rule, the exception provided that "if the rulers of
another people would suffer a serious inconvenience [as a result of applying
locus law], they would not be bound to give [use and] effect to such acts and
transactions, in accordance with the limitation of the third maxim." 2 21 The
analogous phrase in the third maxim itself was that the laws of a locus should
be given effect "so far as they do not prejudice the power or rights of [the
other] state or its subjects."222 At least as stated in this context, however, the
exception was not stated symmetrically. It contemplated overriding a validating
application of locus law, not an invalidating one. The exception did not appear
to contemplate, as Voet had, the possibility of setting aside locus law in order
to affirm the validity of an act that would be deemed invalid under locus law.2 2 3
It may be that Huber simply thought there was no possibility of inconvenience
or prejudice to the forum if the law of the locus deemed a foreign act void. But
he seemed to have had a deeper objection to using non-locus law to validate an
act that the locus law would invalidate, given his observation that acts done in
such a locus "are in their origin invalid" and thus "cannot be valid
anywhere."2 24
In the rest of his essay, Huber gave a number of examples of the
prejudice exception. These examples indicate that the exception was primarily
concerned with the prevention of evasion, which Huber even once called "the
218 HUBER, in Davies, supra note 183, § 3, at 66.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 66-67.
221 Id. at 67.
222 Id. § 2, at 65.
223 Id. § 4, at 67 (opining that a will made without complying with locus formalities is invalid
everywhere, including in the forum where the property was situated, even though it complied
with forum formalities); id at 68 (opining that a contract for the sale of goods prohibited in the
locus is unenforceable anywhere, although an action for unjust enrichment may lie).
224 Id. § 3, at 66.
590 [Vol. 118
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basis of the exception to the third maxim."225 Comity, which Huber regarded as
mandatory under customary international law, did not require a forum to give
effect to an act done elsewhere in evasion of its law. The exception could be
triggered either by a person from the forum doing an act in another state in
evasion of the law of the forum-domu2 26 or by doing an act in another state so
as to evade a forum law that was applicable to a related act done in the forum-
locus. 2 27 Merely being the forum alone was not enough to trigger the prejudice
exception.22 8 Rather, the forum was to assert the exception only when the
forum's own law was evaded, not merely when the law of some other
jurisdiction was evaded. The exception existed to allow the forum to protect
only itself from evasion. Huber specifically observed that an evasive act will be
deemed valid at the locus and everywhere else but the forum, even if it would
not be valid under forum law.229 In other words, a forum was not to invoke the
prejudice exception in order to avoid facilitating the evasion of another state's
law. Huber did suggest, however, that a locus might have a kind of reverse-
comity obligation to prevent an outsider from concluding an act under its laws
in evasion of his domus law.230
ii. Marriage Conflicts
Huber expressly grounded his resolution of marriage conflicts in his
maxims as well as his general principles for conflicts concerning the validity of
acts.2 3 1 He articulated a conflicts rule applicable to most marriage conflicts,
identified exceptions to it, and provided useful illustrations.
The conflicts rule itself was a familiar application of his general lex
loci actus principle. In Huber's words, the rule for resolving conflicts as to the
validity of a marriage was "[i]f it is lawful in the place where it is contracted
225 Id §6, at 69.
226 Id. § 8, at 71-72 (giving two examples of evasive nuptials which would not be recognized
at the forum-domus); id. § 13, at 75-76 (discussing evasion of forum restriction on capacity by
unemancipated minor of forum).
227 Id. § 6, at 69 (discussing evasion of forum criminal process by defendant who committed
crime there but fled and obtained acquittal elsewhere); id. § 5, at 68 (stating that a contract for the
sale of goods made in a locus where the goods are legal, but for delivery in a forum where the
goods are not, will trigger the exception such that the forum will refuse to enforce the contract as
contrary to its law and convenience); id. § 11, at 73-74 (stating that when a contract made in one
state is incompatible with one made in the forum, the forum will enforce the one made in the
forum).
228 Id. § 11, at 74.
229 Id. § 13, at 75-76.
230 Id. § 8, at 72.
231 Id. at 71-72.
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and celebrated, it will be valid and effectual everywhere."232 In short, if the
nuptials satisfied locus law, they would result in a valid marriage everywhere.
Several features of Huber's rule merit attention. It was not
symmetrical. It did not address outrange conflicts in which nuptials are invalid
under locus law, only those in which they are valid. Nor did Huber supplement
it with a rule for addressing those conflicts. The omission was curious because
Huber's general lex loci actus principle was symmetrical, providing that if an
act was invalid under locus law, it was invalid everywhere.233 With respect to
contracts and wills, moreover, Huber rejected the saving alternative of applying
the law of the domus or situs to validate an act that was not valid under locus
law.234 Why Huber omitted the negative case in this context is unclear; it was
not an unknown conflict pattern, as Sanchez had addressed it.235 Perhaps Huber
was unprepared to reject outright the possibility of a saving alternative to locus
law in the context of marriage, but because he did reject that possibility with
respect to contracts and wills, the better view may be that he simply did not
view the outrange scenario worth addressing. The evasion scenario was far
more practically significant.
Another feature of Huber's marriage rule was that it drew no
distinction between mere formalities and material conditions. That distinction
had been significant to both Sanchez and Voet. Huber, however, had explicitly
rejected that distinction in applying his general lex loci actus principle to
contracts,2 3 6 and he adhered to that position with respect to marriages.2 The
extension of the rule to material conditions was clearly intentional, as only one
of Huber's marriage illustrations involved a formalities conflict.23 8 It was a
consequence of Huber's shift to an act-focused regime and away from one, like
Voet's, which relegated formalities to a narrow class of "mixed statutes."
Huber's rule applied to the nuptial act, whether the conflict involved formalities
or material conditions.
Huber provided a couple of examples to illustrate the operation of his
locus-validation rule in non-evasive, chauvinism scenarios. One example
involved connubiants from Huber's home province, Friesland, who concluded
their nuptials informally there, in compliance with locus law. 239 Even though
the nearby province of Holland no longer permitted informal marriages, Huber
concluded that, "without question," Holland would deem the Frieslanders
232 Id. at 72.
233 See supra text accompanying note 219.
234 HUBER, in Davies, supra note 183, §§ 4-5, at 67-68.
235 See supra text accompanying note 161.
236 HUBER, in Davies, supra note 183, § 5, at 68,
237 Id § 8, at 71.
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validly married and eligible to assert spousal property rights from their
Friesland home.24 0 This illustration appeared to involve the extraterritorial
version of a chauvinism scenario.241
Huber's second example was similar, even though it presented the
tougher case of the migratory version of that scenario242 and a conflict as to
material conditions. In that example, Huber postulated connubiants from the
Duchy of Brabant validly celebrating a consanguineous, avuncular marriage
there under a papal dispensation and then migrating to Friesland, which
prohibited such marriages.243 Again, he opined that Friesland would deem the
marriage valid, even though Friesland had subsequently become the new domus
of the spouses.244 The locus law of Brabant had no force in Friesland, not even
by virtue of Brabant's status as the domus of the connubiants at the time of the
nuptials. But Friesland would extend comity to Brabant's law.245 It did not
matter that the avuncular marriage violated Friesland law, as long as it did not
involve evasion or some other prejudice to Friesland.24 6
Huber offered two other examples to illustrate the operation of the
prejudice exception to comity. Both examples involved deliberate evasion of
domus law. First, he modified his consanguinity example by having a man from
Friesland take his niece to Brabant, celebrate evasive nuptials there under the
same papal dispensation, and then immediately return home.247 As the forum as
well as the domus of the connubiants, Friesland would invoke the prejudice
exception to comity, refuse to give effect to the locus law of Brabant, and deem
the evasive avuncular marriage void.24 8 Huber's other example was similar, but
it involved underage connubiants from Friesland, who eloped to the German
province of Eastern Friesland, which did not require the consent of their
guardians for a valid marriage.2 49 Upon their return home to Friesland, which
did require guardian consent, their nuptials would likewise be deemed void for
250
evasion.
One element of Huber's analysis was unique in that it had no analog or
foundation in the rest of his conflicts essay. This element was his articulation of
another exception. His locus-validation rule for marriage conflicts would apply
240 Id.
241 See supra Part III.C.
242 See supra Part III.C.
243 HUBER, in Davies, supra note 183, § 8, at 71.
244 Id
245 See id.
246 See id. at 71-72.
247 Idat71.
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"unless [the type of marriage] is too revolting."251 Huber's example was a
marriage that is consanguineous in the second degree-that is, a sibling
marriage-if it ever happened to be permitted anywhere.252 He clearly
distinguished this "abhorrence" exception from the prejudice exception to
comity, leaving the basis for this exception somewhat unclear. Two hints may
have been his references to such a marriage being incestuous by the law of
nations and being unlikely to be permitted anywhere.253 The intimation was that
this exception derived independently from customary international law,
alongside what he regarded as the duty of comity.254 Reflecting the influence of
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), the influential Dutch pioneer of public
international law, Huber understood the law of nations as "that law which has
acquired binding force through being observed by the whole human race or the
greater part of it." 25 5 If comity derived from the law of nations, as Huber
believed, then it presumably would not require a forum to recognize a kind of
marriage that itself contravened the law of nations. A crude test would be
whether it was a type of marriage that few, if any, nations allowed. The
exception was manifestly narrow, for Huber did not invoke it in his own
examples involving avuncular marriages, which are one degree of kinship
beyond sibling marriages.
Taken together, the two Dutch thinkers were significantly consistent
with the focus on locus law that had emerged from the work of Sanchez and
Bartolus. Although Voet did not address conflicts involving material
conditions, and Huber did not address the outrange scenario, neither offered
any affirmative hint of straying from a simple locus rule. In other words, Voet
did not advocate a domus rule for conflicts involving material conditions, and
Huber did not repudiate the locus-invalidation rule in the outrange scenario.
What both thinkers significantly did do, however, was endorse the use of an
evasion exception to deny validity to nuptials had in evasion of a restriction of




254 Id. at 71-72.
255 1 ULRIK HUBER, HEEDENSDAEGSE RECHTSGELEERTHEYT [JURISPRUDENCE OF MY TIME], bk.
1, ch. 2, § 22 (Amsterdam, Gerrit de Groot en Zoon en Petrus Schouten, 5th ed. 1768) (1686),
https://goo.gl/fPuqll, translated in 1 ULRIC HUBER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MY TIME 5-6
(Percival Gane trans. 1939); see 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLI AC PACIS: LIBRI TRES [ON THE
LAW OF WAR AND PEACE: THREE BOOKS] 44 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1925)
(1625) (defining the law of nations as "the law which has received its obligatory force from the
will of all nations, or of many nations").
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Before turning to Anglo-American law, a brief postscript on Scottish
law is in order. In Le Roy,25 6 Justice Story had regarded two Scottish jurists as
persuasive sources on early modern conflicts principles: Lord Henry Home
Kames (1696-1782)257 and John Erskine (1695-1768).258 With respect to
marriage conflicts, however, neither provided useful guidance. Erskine does not
appear to have addressed the topic at all. Although Kames briefly mentioned
marriage conflicts as to formalities, his equity solution would not be compatible
with the Full Faith and Credit Clause in any event. His view was that the forum
should not apply the law of any state259 but should apply "the law of nature ,,260
which in his view required only the informal exchange of consents between the
parties. In other words, Kames proposed adopting a substantive rule of
marriage law instead of choosing the specific law of any of the implicated
states. Complying with the formalities law of the locus would evidence the
requisite consent, but failure to comply with it or any other law would not
establish that the nuptials were void. "[J]ustice requires," he concluded, "that a
marriage be held good [in the forum], though not formal according to the law
of the country where it was made, provided the will and purpose of the parties
to unite in marriage clearly appear."261 Story himself seemed to recognize that
neither Kames nor Erskine provided useful guidance on marriage conflicts. He
ignored them in his 1834 treatise and relied, instead, on the 19th-century
decision of a Scottish court.262 In the absence of useful guidance from early
modern Scottish commentators, the most relevant Continental sources remain
Sanchez, Voet, and Huber.
V. EARLY MODERN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
The final stage of the originalist review involves early modern Anglo-
American conflicts law. Although the sources are not extensive, they do shed
considerable light on the understanding of marriage conflicts on both sides of
the Atlantic at the time the Constitution was adopted. These sources also tend
to converge on the locus rule and the evasion exception.
256 Le Roy v. Crowninshield, 15 F. Cas. 362, 364 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (No. 8269).
257 See generally LORD HENRY HOME KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY bk. 3, ch. 8 (2d ed.
1767).
258 See generally JOHN ERSKINE, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND (2d ed. 1785); JOHN
ERSKINE, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND (6th ed. 1783).
259 KAMES, supra note 257, at 546.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 STORY, supra note 58, §§ 109-12.
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A. England
Although English courts were barely beginning to develop conflicts
law by 1788, one of the first topics they took up was marriage conflicts.
Ultimately driven by a statutory effort to discourage clandestine marriages,263
an effort similar the Tridentine decree on the Continent, English courts drew
upon both the Italian and Dutch schools in seeking solutions to marriage
conflicts. A close reading of sources discloses significantly more guidance than
might first seem possible.
1. Late Emergence of English Conflicts Law
England was quite late in developing a body of conflicts law.m With a
unitary system of government, it lacked significant internal conflicts.265 Law
courts also initially declined jurisdiction over cases with foreign elements
because jurors were supposed to bring their personal knowledge of the local
dispute to bear. 266 Instead of developing a body of conflicts law, England
developed separate institutions to deal with multistate cases. Admiralty courts
administered maritime law, which was regarded as transnational and thus free
of conflicts.2 67 Equity courts or special commissions administered the law
merchant and public international law as other transnational bodies of law.268
Ecclesiastical courts had primary jurisdiction over the validity of marriages269
and, through English civilians (as opposed to common lawyers), administered
the king's ecclesiastical law. 2 70 That law was transnational at least in the sense
of having derived from Continental canon law. 271 The law courts left multistate
cases to these courts or to foreign courts,272 and each English court
263 See generally OUTHWAITE, supra note 126.
264 See generally Alexander N. Sack, Conflicts ofLaws in the History of the English Law, in 3
LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1835-1935, at 342 (Alison Reppy ed., 1937); AALS, SELECTED
READINGS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS I (Maurice S. Culp ed., 1956) (reprinting an edited version
of Sack's article).
265 Sack, supra note 264, at 343-44.
266 Id. at 344-46.
267 Id. at 353-56.
268 Id. at 349-52, 356-57.
269 See Ilderton v. Ilderton (1793) 126 Eng. Rep. 476, 481 (C.P.); 2 H. Bl. 145, 155.
270 1 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 363, 364-65 (1903).
271 Before the English Reformation, the ecclesiastical courts administered canon law as a
common law of the Catholic Church throughout Europe. Id. at 354, 355, 358. After the English
Reformation, the canon law became the ecclesiastical law of the Church of England, id. at 360,
and it retained most of the doctrines of the Catholic Church, id. at 363.
272 Sack, supra note 264, at 343-56.
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administered its own body of substantive law, whether national or
transnational, without a body of conflicts law.273
During the 17th century, the law courts assumed jurisdiction over some
cases having foreign elements, but they still applied English common law.
Having decided that jurors could find facts based on evidence instead of
personal knowledge,2 74 the law courts assumed jurisdiction over some cases
having foreign elements, but they still applied English common law. During the
same time, the common law absorbed the law merchant and public international
law, both of which retained their transnational conceptions.275 By the end the
century, the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts had also been limited to
disputes arising on the high seas or to those of a truly maritime nature.276 Into
the mid-18th century, the law courts nevertheless still declined jurisdiction over
purely foreign cases and those with insufficient English contacts to justify
application of the common law.277 English courts did, however, develop a
practice of recognizing the judgments of those courts as a matter of comity.
Then, in the decades before the American Revolution, English courts,
spiritual as well as temporal, finally began making isolated forays into conflicts
law. English courts only engaged fully in developing a body of English
conflicts law after 1790, which obviously post-dated the adoption of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause in the United States. Two 18th-century periods,
immediately preceding the adoption of the United States Constitution, are
relevant to the full-faith-and-credit inquiry. The first is defined by Lord
Hardwicke's tenure as Lord Chief Justice from 1733 to 1737 and then as Lord
Chancellor from 1737 to 1756.279 The second period is defined by Lord
Mansfield's tenure as Lord Chief Justice from 1756 to 1788.280
2. Hardwicke Period (1733-1756)
The Hardwicke period saw two major developments in marriage
conflicts. The first was the 1752 decision of an ecclesiastical court in a case
called Scrimshire v. Scrimshire,281 in which the judge, Sir Edward Simpson,
273 Id. at 356-57.
274 Id. at 347.
275 Id. at 375-77.
276 Id. at 385.
277 Id. at 358-66.
278 Id. at 379-85.
279 See JOSEPH HAYDN, THE BOOK OF DIGNITIES 357 (Horace Ockerby ed., London, W.H.
Allen & Co., 3d ed. 1894).
280 Id. at 370.
281 (1752) 161 Eng. Rep. 782 (Cons.); 2 Hag. Cons. 395.
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reputedly consulted Hardwicke,282 and which Hardwicke at least ratified after
the fact.283 The second was the enactment of a law, at Hardwicke's urging, to
restrict clandestine marriages in England. It set the stage for decades of
marriage conflicts in the succeeding Mansfield period and beyond.
i. The Scrimshire Decision
Scrimshire was an action between two English connubiants who had
concluded their nuptials irregularly in France. The bride sued for restitution of
conjugal rights, essentially seeking to have the ostensible marriage adjudged
valid. The nuptials had been clandestine in almost every way. The connubiants
were underage and proceeded without parental consent. Although the wedding
was witnessed, it was held in private and was performed by an unauthorized
284priest. When the mother of the groom learned of the nuptials, she sought an
annulment in France.2 85 It was eventually granted by the Parlement of Paris,28 6
the country's highest court at the time.2 8 A couple of months before the French
judgment, the bride had filed this action in the ecclesiastical court of London.288
Under French law, the ostensible marriage was void, while under English law,
it was irregular, but arguably valid.289 The English court nevertheless applied
the law of France, as the locus, and ruled the ostensible marriage void.290 In
doing so, it was one of the first English courts to conduct a significant choice-
of-law analysis and apply foreign law.29 '
Hardwicke himself had maintained for a while that an English court
had the power to make a choice of law and apply foreign law. Indeed, as early
282 See Middleton v. Janverin (1802) 161 Eng. Rep. 797, 800 (Arches); 2 Hag. Cons. 437,
446.
283 Butler v. Freeman (1756) 27 Eng. Rep. 204, 205 (Ch.); Amb. 301, 303. Although the
reporter attributes the decision to the Court of Delegates instead of the Consistory Court, the
reference was undoubtedly to Scrimshire. See also Middleton, 161 Eng. Rep. at 801; 2 Hag.
Cons. at 446 (same supposition).
284 Scrimshire, 161 Eng. Rep. at 783, 785-86; 2 Hag. Cons. at 396, 403-04.
285 Id. at 787; 2 Hag. Cons. at 409.
286 Id at 788; 2 Hag. Cons. at 410.
287 The court refused to give preclusive effect to the French court's invalidation of the
marriage, id. at 783; 2 Hag. Cons. at 396-98, perhaps because the invalidity was not established
by an ecclesiastical court, see Roach v. Garvan (1748) 27 Eng. Rep. 954, 955 (Ch.); 1 Ves. Sen.
157, 159 (holding that the validity of a marriage established directly by a judgment of a foreign
ecclesiastical court would be deemed preclusive on English courts but not validity that was
established only incidentally by the judgment of a foreign temporal court).
288 Scrimshire, 161 Eng. Rep. at 788; 2 Hag. Cons. at 410.
289 Id. at 786; 2 Hag. Cons. at 404-05.
290 Id. at 792; 2 Hag. Cons. at 421-22.
291 See Anton, supra note 52, at 540-41.
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as 1744, he had already articulated a locus rule for resolving marriage conflicts.
In Omichund v. Barker,2 92 he used it as an analogy in justifying the
admissibility of depositions given by Hindu witnesses in India under oaths
sworn to non-Christian gods. Although the opinion was reported inconsistently,
he articulated either an unqualified locus-validation rule for marriage
conflicts 29 3 or a formalities-specific locus rule.2 94 Either way, he had sufficient
confidence in some form of the locus rule to rely on it as a premise for reaching
a more controversial conclusion on a different topic.
Scrimshire would provide a vehicle for establishing that principle as an
actual holding of an English court with the requisite jurisdiction, but it has at
least one significant limitation as a precedent. It was not an evasion case; it was
an outrange case. The nuptials were invalid under the law of the locus where
they took place. Scrimshire involved an effort to adopt the saving alternative of
domus law in lieu of the invalidating law of the locus. The question was
whether the English forum should apply English law, as the domus law, in
order to affirm the validity of the French nuptials.295 Simpson (and Hardwicke)
nevertheless provided a thorough analysis that provides some guidance beyond
the outrange scenario.
Counsel for the ostensible bride pressed a domicile rule in arguing that
French law did not apply.29 6 He contended that French law would not apply
unless the connubiants were domiciled in France, and he insisted that neither of
them was.297 Applying a locus rule, he warned, would mean that the rights of
English domiciliaries, including rights over land in England, would be
governed by France, "which is not to be endured."29 8 Both connubiants were
English nationals and domiciliaries by birth, and there were strong arguments
that neither had established a domicile of choice in France at the time of the
nuptials.299
Simpson rejected the theory and adopted a strong locus rule, applying
even when the result was to invalidate the nuptials. The validity of foreign
marriages, he reasoned, was to be determined "according to the laws of the
292 There are three distinct reports of this decision. Omichund v. Barker (1744) 125 Eng. Rep.
1310 (Ch.); Willes 538; Omichund v. Barker (1744) 22 Eng. Rep. 339 (Ch.); 2 Eq. Cas. Abr.
397; Omychund v. Barker (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch.); I Atk. 22.
293 Omichund, 22 Eng. Rep. at 349; 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. at 411 ("So Marriages good in their own
Countries, are good all over the World; and what is good Evidence of them there, is allowed
here.").
294 Omychund, 26 Eng. Rep. at 33; 1 Atk. at 50 ("So in matrimonial cases, they are to be
determined according to the ceremonies of marriage in the country where it was solemnized.").
295 Scrimshire, 161 Eng. Rep. at 784; 2 Hag. Cons. at 399.
296 Id. at 786; 2 Hag. Cons. at 406.
297 Id at 786; 2 Hag. Cons. at 405.
298 Id at 787; 2 Hag. Cons. at 407.
299 Id at 786; 2 Hag. Cons. at 405-07.
2015] 599
53
Clark: Conflicts Originalism: The "Original Content" of the Full Faith a
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2015
WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW
country in which they are formed."0 0 The basis of his rule is perhaps more
notable than the rule itself. Although it was something of a hybrid, it was
ultimately grounded more in the Italian school than in the Dutch school of
conflicts thought.
The clearest element of Dutch-inflected reasoning nevertheless came at
the outset of Simpson's analysis. He dismissed the objection that applying
locus law would somehow involve France in governing English people or
land.3 01 "[U]ndoubtedly," he emphasized, "no law or statute in France can bind
subjects of England who are not under its authority."3 0 2 In applying the law of
France, as the locus, "the rights of English subjects cannot be said to be
determined by the laws of France, but by those of their own country, which
sanction and adopt this rule of decision."3 03 French law had no extraterritorial
force, but it could be given effect in England at England's option. Simpson was
espousing Dutch premises about absolute territorial sovereignty, and although
he did not use the word comity, his emphasis on the forum choosing to apply
foreign law clearly echoed Huber and Voet.304 From that point forward,
however, Simpson's analysis drew almost exclusively from the Italian school.
He retreated almost immediately from the strong statement of absolute
territorial sovereignty. First, Simpson felt compelled to justify France's
application of its marriage law to nuptials concluded within its territory. For
Huber and Voet, the answer was absolute territorial sovereignty, but not for
Simpson. Instead, he quoted German conflicts thinker Andreas Gaill for two
propositions: (1) that a formalities regulation of the locus "binds even non-
subjects" and (2) that a party "gains a forum in the place of the contract.
Both were Italian-school justifications for the formalities exception to the
principle that locus law does not bind outsiders unless they intended to become
domiciliaries of the locus. Gaill cited Bartolus and other Italian statutists for the
306 tes
first proposition, and the second one is exactly how Sanchez had justified the
formalities exception.30 7 Indeed, Gaill has been classified as a member of the
Italian school.308 Simpson ended the passage by explaining that France could
300 Id. at 787; 2 Hag. Cons. at 407-08.
301 Id; 2 Hag. Cons. at 407.
302 Id.
303 Id.; 2 Hag. Cons. at 408.
3 Id. at 790; 2 Hag. Cons. at 416 (grounding decision in part on "the practice of nations").
305 Id at 787; 2 Hag. Cons, at 408.
3o6 ANDREAS GAILL, PRACTICARUM OBSERVATIONUM [PRACTICAL OBSERVATIONS] lib. 2, obs.
123, at 548-49 (Colonia Agrippina (Cologne), Joannes Gymnicus 1592) (citing Bartolus, Baldus,
and Salicet, among others), http://goo.gl/RN7pK7.
307 SANCHEz, supra note 97, lib. 3, disp. 18, ¶ 10 ("[E]very contract gains a forum in the place
of the contract.").
308 1 LAINt, supra note 53, at 409-10.
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exercise judicial jurisdiction over the nuptials and apply French law to them
only so long as the connubiants continued to "reside" in France.309 So much for
absolute territorial sovereignty.
When Simpson turned to resolution of the actual marriage conflict, the
reliance on the Italian approach was even clearer. The principal authority on
whom he relied was Sanchez,310 and he seemed to adopt Sanchez's general
Italian approach. Quoting Sanchez, Simpson explained that outsiders are not
bound by the law of the locus in which they act, except for laws regulating
formalities.31 He then quoted Sanchez's resolution of the outrange scenario:
that the nuptials are invalid because locus law applies under the formalities
exception.312 In dicta, he even endorsed Sanchez's resolution of the evasion
scenario, on the theory that domus law never applies in the locus. 3 13 Simpson
did not even mention the evasion exception,314 which Voet and Huber
endorsed, but Sanchez rejected.
Although Simpson included two quotations from Voet's work,315
neither was meaningful. Each merely articulated a locus rule for marriage
conflicts involving formalities-the same locus regit actum rule that everyone
from Bartolus to Huber endorsed. Notably, however, Simpson declined to
follow Voet in resolving the very conflict at issue in Scrimshire. In outrange
cases, like Scrimshire itself, Voet had endorsed the saving alternative: applying
domus or situs law to validate an act that had not complied with the formalities
law of the locus. 16 Actually using Voet's conflicts regime would have led
Simpson to apply English marriage law and affirm the validity of the
Scrimshire nuptials. Not only did Simpson not follow Voet's solution, but he
even quoted an additional commentator, Joachim Mynsinger, for the explicit
repudiation of the saving theory.1 Indeed, Voet had quoted that very same
passage from Mynsinger and explicitly disagreed with it." 8 Mynsinger,
incidentally, was a German contemporary of Gaill and has also been classified
309 Scrimshire, 161 Eng. Rep. at 787; 2 Hag. Cons. at 412-14.
310 Id. at 788-89; 2 Hag. Cons. at 412-13.
311 Id
312 Id. at 789; 2 Hag. Cons. at 413.
313 Id. at 789; 2 Hag. Cons at 413-14.
314 Id. at 789-90; 2 Hag. Cons. at 413-16.
315 Id. at 789; 2 Hag. Cons. at 414-15.
316 1 VOET, TRANSLATED COMMENTARY, supra note 182, bk. 1, tit. 3-4 app., § 15, at 114
(translating 1 VOET, LATIN COMMENTARY, supra note 182, lib. 1, tit. 3-4 app.).
3 Scrimshire, 161 Eng. Rep. at 789, 789 n.t; 2 Hag. Cons. at 414, 414 n.t.
318 VOET, TRANSLATED COMMENTARY, supra note 182, bk. 1, tit. 3-4 app., § 15, at 114
(translating 1 VOET, LATIN COMMENTARY, supra note 182, lib. 1, tit. 3-4 app.).
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to the Italian school.3 19 The quotations of Voet appear to be little more than a
Dutch veneer over an Italian analysis.
Indeed, the Dutch veneer was quite flimsy, as Simpson did not even
mention Huber.320 One explanation for the omission of Huber might be
straightforward. In formulating his rule for resolving marriage conflicts, Huber
did not address the outrange scenario, which was at issue in Scrimshire. That
explanation is not fully satisfying, however, because Huber's marriage rule
simply derived from his maxims and general principles for resolving conflicts
involving the regulation of acts. One of Huber's two general principles had
been that an act invalid under locus law is invalid everywhere.32 ' That principle
would have supported Simpson's holding in Scrimshire. Even though Huber
himself did not apply the principle to the outrange marriage scenario,322 nothing
would have prevented Simpson from doing so. Huber's principles actually
came closer to supporting Simpson's result than Voet's did, as Voet
specifically disapproved of the result Simpson reached in the outrange scenario.
Simpson seemed to be affirmatively avoiding Huber, despite opening with
starting premises that echoed Huber's maxims.
In any event, Simpson may have been less persuaded by any of these
conflicts thinkers and more by the final rationale that he himself offered.
Simpson's most original contribution to the analysis of marriage conflicts was
his closing rationale in favor of his strong locus rule. It was a policy rationale
that relied on no Dutch or Italian jurist. It was simply that choosing locus law
avoids the grave systemic dysfunction of limping marriages, including the
possibility of progressive polygamy.323 Simpson emphasized the "infinite
mischief and confusion" that would accompany a system in which the same
person was deemed married in one state but single in another or, worse,
married to one person in one state but married to a different person in another
state, with children of each relationship.324 Avoiding that systemic dysfunction
made it imperative that "there should be one rule of determining in all nations"
whether a couple's ostensible marriage is valid.325 Simpson believed the locus
rule was capable of achieving that systemic uniformity. This policy rationale,
more than conflicts commentary, may have been the true basis of his decision.
3 1 LAINt, supra note 53, at 409.
320 Scrimshire, 161 Eng. Rep. at 789; 2 Hag. Cons. at 413-15.
321 HUBER in Davies, supra note 183, § 3, at 66.
322 Id. § 8, at 71.
323 Scrimshire, 161 Eng. Rep. at 790-91; 2 Hag. Cons. at 416-19. For a discussion of limping
marriages and progressive polygamy, see supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
324 Scrimshire, 161 Eng. Rep. at 790-91; 2 Hag. Cons. at 416-19.
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ii. "His" Marriage Act
Hardwicke's second contribution to marriage conflicts was more
inadvertent. By securing the enactment of an eponymous law to invalidate
clandestine marriages in England,327 he prompted a surge of evasive
elopements to Scotland3 28 or across the English Channel. Dubbed "Gretna
Green marriages" for the Scottish border town that became a notorious locus
for them, they created marriage conflicts that kept English courts busy for
decades.329 In his last year as Lord Chancellor, Hardwicke even confronted the
problem himself.
Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act of 1753,330 aS the law was commonly
known, was an English analog to the Tridentine decree. It required weddings to
be witnessed331 and made it a felony to solemnize nuptials outside a church or
without either a license or publication of banns.3  It allowed parents to
invalidate banns after publication33 3 and required their consent for a license.3 34
Noncompliant nuptials were declared "null and void to all intents and purposes
whatsoever."3 35 Like the Tridentine decree, however, a geographical limitation
produced marriage conflicts. The Act expressly exempted nuptials
"solemnized" in "Scotland" or "beyond the seas,"3 6 So it applied only when
England or Wales was the locus. It thus created a nice question whether
nuptials concluded in evasion of it were nevertheless valid.
A sub-issue was how the restrictions should be characterized for
conflicts purposes. In contrast to the Tridentine decree, the Act did not
expressly mention capacity or purport to bind English connubiants elsewhere,
but the restrictions were not clearly limited to formalities. The requirement of
parental consent for a license arguably addressed whether, not how, nuptials
were to be celebrated, perhaps rendering parental consent a material
327 OUTHWAITE, supra note 126, at 75-97.
328 EDWARD COKE, FRANcIs HARGRAVE & CHARLES BUTLER, THE FIRST PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: OR, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON *79b n.1 (1788)
(cited in court opinions of the era as "Co. Litt. 79b").
329 OUTHWAITE, supra note 126, at 132-35.
330 26 Geo. 2 c. 33.
3' Id. § 15.
332 Id.§8.
333 Id. § 3 (banns rendered "absolutely void" by parental objection).
334 Id § 11 (declaring a licensed marriage without parental consent "absolutely null and void
to all intents and purposes whatsoever").
33 Id.§ 8.
336 Id. § 18.
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condition.337 The reported conflicts cases tended to involve underage
elopements.
Although lacking the ecclesiastical courts' primary jurisdiction over the
validity of marriage, Hardwicke still took a hard line against nuptials
concluded in evasion of the Act. In Butler v. Freeman,139 he entertained a
contempt petition against a connubiant and her "accomplice" for whisking a
young heir to Antwerp. for evasive nuptials with him. His estate was under a
protective equity decree in England.3 40 Hardwicke endorsed the locus rule of
Scrimshire in opining that, as in that case, the nuptials might have been invalid
for failing to satisfy even the formalities rules of the locus. 34 1 But that question
was not within his jurisdiction; it was rightly pending before an ecclesiastical
court on a nullity petition.342 Before Hardwicke was the contempt petition.
Despite acknowledging that the nuptials were not within the scope of the Act
because of "a door open in the statute,"343 he twice referred to them as the first
instance of an "offence" under the Act.34 As such, he insisted, they "required a
severe punishment to prevent a second."3 45 He kept the connubiant in jail for
contempt for seven months in an effort to coerce her to appear in the
ecclesiastical proceeding, which she was declining to do.346 Although
Hardwicke was a judge of equity, not law, his disregard of the statutory
exemption was aggressive. One interpretation could be that he thought an
English forum should apply an evasion override and decline to apply the locus
law. Still, he did not articulate that theory or even mention the word
"evasion."34 7 Neither had Scrimshire, and its heavy reliance on Sanchez implied
a rejection of the evasion exception.348
337 Most forums characterize it that way. PALSSON, FORMALITIES, supra note 70, § 409.
3 See Roach v. Garvan (1748) 27 Eng. Rep. 954, 955 (Ch.); I Ves. Sen. 156, 159.
339 (1756) 27 Eng. Rep. 204, 205 (Ch.); Amb. 301, 303.
340 Id. at 204; Amb. at 301.
341 Id. at 206; Amb. at 303. The evidence conflicted as to whether the Antwerp nuptials had
followed Anglican or Dutch rites.
342 Id.; Amb. at 304; see also Herbert v. Herbert (1819) 161 Eng. Rep. 737, 737 (Cons.); 2
Hag. Cons. 263, 263 (citing 1756 ecclesiastical case called Buller v. Dolben). Dolben had been
the maiden name of the connubiant before Hardwicke in Butler. Butler, 27 Eng. Rep. at 204;
Amb. at 302.
343 Butler, 27 Eng. Rep. at 204; Amb. at 302.
344 Id. at 204, 205; Amb. at 302, 304.
345 Id. at 205; Amb. at 304.
346 The issue became moot when the young man came of age and the parties got married
(again). Id.; see also Robinson v. Bland (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 717, 719 (K.B.); 2 Burr. 1078,
1080.
347 Butler, 27 Eng. Rep. at 205; Amb. at 304.
348 See supra text accompanying notes 310-14.
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3. Mansfield Period (1756-1788)
As Hardwicke stepped down as Lord Chancellor, Lord Mansfield
coincidentally assumed the office of Lord Chief Justice of King's Bench.
During his three decades of service, Mansfield laid a thin foundation for the
subsequent development of conflicts law in the law courts. He lacked the
jurisdiction, however, to do more than opine on one of the era's greatest
conflicts questions, the validity of the Gretna Green marriages that Lord
Hardwicke's Marriage Act had unleashed.34 9 Eventually, the highest
ecclesiastical court answered that question, accepting the marriages as valid.
But it did so without opinion. Efforts to explicate that decision garnered
recurrent attention throughout the remainder of the Mansfield period-and
beyond.
i. Mansfield's Dictum
The conflicts foundation of Mansfield may have been thin, but it was
clearly Dutch and, specifically, Huberian. The starting point was Mansfield's
1760 decision in Robinson v. Bland.350 There, he adopted Huber and Voet's
solution to a contracts conflict"5 and described the result as "established ex
comitate et jure gentium."35 2 Fifteen years later, as the American Revolution
was breaking out, Mansfield decided another contracts case and adopted
another of Huber's propositions.3 53 A process had begun, but conflicts law in
the law courts still remained rudimentary.354
It was in Robinson that Mansfield nevertheless reached out to opine on
the Gretna Green problem. His law courts had no greater jurisdiction over
marriage conflicts than Hardwicke's equity courts did, 5 but the issue came up
349 Ruding v. Smith (1821) 161 Eng. Rep. 774, 776 n.t (Cons.); 2 Hag. Cons. 371, 376 n.f
("It appears . . . that soon after the Marriage Act many instances had occurred of persons going
into Scotland to evade the restrictions of that Act.").
350 There are two distinct reports of this decision. Robinson v. Bland (1760) 96 Eng. Rep. 141
(K.B.); 1 Black. W. 256; Robinson v. Bland (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 717 (K.B.); 2 Burr. 1077.
3 Robinson, 96 Eng. Rep. at 141; 1 Black. W. at 258-59; accord Robinson, 97 Eng. Rep. at
718; 2 Burr. at 1078-79.
352 Robinson, 96 Eng. Rep. at 141; 1 Black. W. at 258 ("established by comity and the law of
nations").
353 Holman v. Johnson (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B.); I Cowp. 341; see also Walker v.
Witter (1778) 99 Eng. Rep. 1 (K.B.); 1 Dougl. 1 (dealing with recognition ofjudgments); Mostyn
v. Fabrigas (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B.); 1 Cowp. 161 (dealing with tort conflict).
354 Rafael v. Verelst (1776) 96 Eng. Rep. 621, 622-23 (C.P.); 2 Black. W. 1055, 1058 (Lord
de Grey, CJ) ("Crimes are in their nature local, and the jursidiction of crimes is local. And so as
to the rights of real property, the subject being fixed and immoveable. But personal injuries are of
a transitory nature, and sequuntur forum rei.").
3 See Ilderton v. Ilderton (1793) 126 Eng. Rep. 476, 481 (C.P.); 2 H. Bl. 145, 155.
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incidentally. Although Robinson was about the validity in England of gambling
debts undertaken in France, counsel for the creditor invoked the validity of
Gretna Green marriages as an analogy.3 6 Mansfield took the opportunity to
comment on the question in a notable digression. He agreed that, in general, "a
marriage in a foreign country must be governed by the law of that country
where the marriage was had,"357 but he cautioned about relying on that locus
rule in the case of Gretna Green marriages. "They may come under a very
different consideration,"358 he warned; "Huber puts a parallel case, and
determines expressly against it." 3 59 Mansfield disclaimed giving an opinion but
said, "I only mention it, to hinder by-standers from taking those arguments for
granted."360 He noted Hardwicke's opinion in Butler.
Mansfield was correct about Huber's example but perhaps not about its
application to Gretna Green marriages. Huber had indeed cited the elopement
of minors without parental consent to illustrate his marriage rule. He said that
the connubiants' domus would invoke the evasion exception to comity and treat
the nuptials as void, even though other states, including the locus, would treat
the nuptials as valid. 3 6 1 The fact pattern was the same as the Gretna Green
problem, but only in the subset of cases involving minors and the lack of
parental consent. In a Gretna Green case involving adults, where the conflict
involved only formalities, Huber's guidance was less clear. He had given an
example of a conflict involving an informal marriage and said other states
should treat it as valid, but it also was not evasive. Perhaps more to the point,
Huber's illustration involving eloping minors had not involved a domus statute
that, like Lord Hardwicke's Act, expressly exempted nuptials concluded
outside the domus. Nor, for that matter, had Voet's example. The statutory
exemption made the Gretna Green problem tougher than the illustrations used
by Huber and Voet. Still, Huber and Voet were dead Dutchmen, and the very
living Lord Chief Justice of England had just waved a caution flag about any
assumption that Gretna Green marriages were valid in England.
Even apart from the substance of Mansfield's digression, the exchange
itself was telling in another respect. The assertion by counsel of an analogy to
marriage recognition in an ordinary contracts case indicated the strength with
which the locus rule was assumed to apply to marriage conflicts. That assertion
was consistent with other indications to the same effect, including Lord
Hardwicke's similar invocation of marriage validation as an analogy in
356 Robinson, 96 Eng. Rep. at 142; 1 Black. W. at 259.
357 Robinson, 97 Eng. Rep. at 718; 2 Burr. at 1079-80.
3ss Id. at 719; 2 Burr. at 1080.
359 Robinson, 96 Eng. Rep. at 142; 1 Black. W. at 259.
360 Id.
361 See supra text accompanying notes 249-50.
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Omichund.36 2 When, in 18th-century England, one wanted to bolster an
argument that an English court should apply locus law-whether for the
enforceability of a gambling debt or the admissibility of a Hindu oath-a go-to
analogy was the validation of foreign nuptials using the locus rule.
ii. Compton v. Bearcroft
In 1769, the validity of Gretna Green marriages finally reached the
court with the jurisdiction to give a definitive answer. The High Court of
Delegates, which was the highest ecclesiastical court short of the monarch,
affirmed the validity of one of the marriages in Compton v. Bearcroft.3 63 The
decision gave a definitive answer-yes-but it did not clarify the controlling
conflicts principles because the rationale remained unknown.
The court itself was a monstrosity. Concocted as a substitute for
appeals to the Pope at the time of the English Reformation,364 it was an ad hoc
creature assembled anew for each case. It usuall comprised three junior
common law judges and three civilian practitioners.b6 Quality was a problem:
"The Judges in each case being different, the uniformity of decision is not so
well preserved; and it not being the practice of the Court to deliver or explain
the grounds of its judgment, the principles on which they are founded are not
362 See supra text accompanying notes 292-94.
363 Compton v. Bearcroft (1768) (Del.), reported in FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT Nisi PRIuS 114 (London, W. Strahan & W. Woodfall, 4th ed.
1785) (1772) [hereinafter BULL. N.P.], https://goo.gl/7YdPdV. American courts or reporters
during the early national period tended simply to cite this source as "Bull. N.P." or equivalent
without recognizing that the pagination differed slightly from edition to edition. Compare, e.g.,
Inhabitants of Medway v. Inhabitants of Needham, 16 Mass. (15 Tyng) 157, 159 n.4 (1819)
(citing "Bull. N.P. 114" in court opinion), with Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns. 424, 428 n.1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1806) (citing "Buller's N.P. 113" in argument of counsel). In the English reports,
Compton is also discussed, albeit somewhat inconsistently, in Harford v. Morris (1776) 161 Eng.
Rep. 792, 795 (Cons.); 2 Hag. Cons. 423, 430, Middleton v. Janverin (1802) 161 Eng. Rep. 797,
799 & n.* (Arch.); 2 Hag. Cons. 437, 443-44, 444 n.*, and in Ruding v. Smith (1821), 161 Eng.
Rep. 774, 775-76 (Cons.); 2 Hag. Cons. 371, 374-77 (reporting arguments of counsel). There is
even some disagreement as to its date of decision. Compare BULL. N.P., supra, at 114 (reporting
Dec. 1, 1768), with, e.g., Middleton, 161 Eng. Rep. at 800 n.(a); 2 Hag. Cons. at 444 n.(a)
(reporting Feb. 4, 1769).
3 THE SPECIAL AND GENERAL REPORTS MADE TO His MAJESTY BY THE COMMISSIONERS
APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE PRACTICE AND JURISDICTION OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS OF
ENGLAND AND WALES 9 (1832) [hereinafter ECCLESIASTICAL REPORTS], http://goo.gl/QtTjXE.
365 Id.
366 Id. at 9-10. See, e.g., Harford, 161 Eng. Rep. at 797; 2 Hag. Cons. at 436 (enumerating all
twelve members of the court for that appeal). For some reason, the Compton court had only five
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sufficiently ascertained."367 Simple competence was another problem. Poor pay
meant being staffed by junior civilians, on whom the common law judges had
to rely.368
The court was abolished in 1832, but not before rendering the
definitive Mansfield-era judgment on marriage conflicts and doing it without
opinion. The full report of the decision was one complex sentence-"The
appellant and respondent, both English subjects, and the appellant being under
age, ran away without the consent of her guardian, and were married in
Scotland; and on a suit brought in the spiritual court to annul the marriage, it
was holden that the marriage was good."369 Deliberately evasive, underage
nuptials concluded informally by English connubiants in Scotland (or
elsewhere) were valid. There was no reported rationale as to why.
Maybe the rationale was the obvious one. Perhaps the Delegates simply
used the strong locus rule from Scrimshire to choose the marriage law of
Scotland and, as Scrimshire may have foreshadowed,370 refused in principle to
adopt the evasion exception, despite its implicit endorsement by Hardwicke and
Mansfield. That is precisely how Sanchez resolved the closely analogous
conflicts triggered by the Tridentine decree.7 His reasoning had even rested on
the decree's inclusion of an explicit geographical restriction that was
functionally identical to the one in Hardwicke's Act.372 Given the manifest
appeal of Sanchez to Simpson in Scrimshire, this theory seems like a strong
possibility, but it was not the only one. Alternative interpretations of Compton
appeared during the remainder of the Mansfield period and beyond. One case,
in which an alternative appeared, merits discussion for what it may help to
elucidate about Compton itself.
iii. The Domicile Theory
A significant alternative theory challenged even the supposition that
Compton rested on a locus rule. Although seemingly iconoclastic, the theory
must be taken seriously. It was put forward by Sir George Hay, counsel for the
petitioning bride in Scrimshire. Later, as an ecclesiastical judge, he had
rendered the very lower court decision that the Delegates affirmed, at least as to
its result, in Compton. His opinion articulating the domicile theory was also
intricately reasoned and quite impressive.
367 ECCLESIASTICAL REPORTS, supra note 364, at 10.
368 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 270, at 375.
369 Compton v. Bearcroft (1768) (Del.), reported in BULL. N.P., supra note 363, at 114.
370 See supra text accompanying note 314.
371 See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
372 See supra text accompanying note 179.
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It appeared in Harford v. Morris, 7  which he decided in 1776.374 The
case involved the 12-year-old, illegitimate daughter of Lord Baltimore.375 She
had been induced to accompany one of her guardians to conclude her nuptials
with him in the Austrian Netherlands and, again, in Denmark.7 Her other
guardians petitioned to have the nuptials voided on the alternative grounds that
the nuptials were (1) procured by force and fraud, (2) void under Hardwicke's
Act as evasive, and (3) void under the law of each locus. 37 7 Hay affirmed the
validity of the nuptials.378
In rejecting the first ground, he illustrated an understanding that
English ecclesiastical courts were bound, in addition to English law, by a
narrow, supranational body of substantive marriage law, which he called the
"general law."3 79 Force would void a marriage under this law, as would incest
or any other impediment under the "law of nations."3 80 Being extremely
underage would as well. 3 81 He found none of the restrictions applicable as a
factual matter. The reasoning clearly echoed Huber's understanding that
there exists a supranational "abhorrence" exception in the law of marriage
conflicts, whether characterized as natural law, customary international law, or
both.
In rejecting the other two grounds, Hay articulated a sophisticated
domicile principle. While acknowledging that courts could choose and apply
foreign law in an appropriate case, he did not deem this an appropriate case. In
his view, a mere transit through a foreign state was not enough to justify the
application of its marriage law, even to nuptials concluded there.383 For that law
to attach, the connubiant must intend to form a new domicile in the locus or, at
the very least, have some sort of established residence there.384 This theory
obviously required him to distinguish Scrimshire, which he did on the
unpersuasive ground that Simpson's opinion had rested on a finding that the
connubiants there had become French domiciliaries or established residents.3 85
3 161 Eng. Rep. 792 (Cons.); 2 Hag. Cons. 423, vacated, (1781) 161 Eng. Rep. at 797
(Del.); 2 Hag. Cons. at 436, rev'd(1784) 161 Eng. Rep. at 797 (Del.); 2 Hag. Cons. at 436.
374 Id
3 Id. at 792; 2 Hag. Cons. at 423.
376 Id at 793; 2 Hag. Cons. at 424.
3 Id.; 2 Hag. Cons. at 424-25.
378 Id. at 797; 2 Hag. Cons. at 435-36.
3 Id. at 793; 2 Hag. Cons. at 425.
380 Id.
381 Id. at 794; 2 Hag. Cons. at 428.
382 Id at 793-94; 2 Hag. Cons. at 426-28.
383 Id. at 795; 2 Hag. Cons. at 431.
384 Id
3 Id.; 2 Hag. Cons. at 431-32.
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Simpson had done no such thing.386 It is more likely that Hay was rhetorically
revising Scrimshire, in which he himself had promoted the domicile theory as
an advocate.
Finally, Hay contended that under the law of the domicile (England)
the nuptials were valid.387 Evasion of Hardwicke's Act was not a problem.
Although he was skeptical of the very concept of an evasion exception,3 8 he
rejected its application on the basis of the Act's express geographical
389restriction. Yet if Hardwicke's Act did not apply, but the nuptials were
governed by the law of the English domicile, what English law applied? Hay's
answer was the English law that underlay Hardwicke's Act and that had been
overridden by it in relation to nuptials taking place in England itself.390 In other
words, the underlying body of pre-amended English ecclesiastical law still
governed nuptials concluded abroad by English domiciliaries.391 Under that
prior law, clandestine marriages were irregular but valid. This theory,
moreover, is what he claimed was the basis of the Delegates' decision in
Compton.392
Reading Hay's opinion in the context of Dutch conflicts theory, one
might fairly wonder if he were some sort of crackpot. Actually, it is true that
two years after rendering this decision, Hay became mentally ill and committed
suicide.393 But this opinion was not the work of a madman; it was the work of
an Italian statutist. His principles were not Dutch-derived but were right out of
Bartolus and Sanchez, though without attribution to either. Sanchez's first
general principle was that the law of the locus does not bind an outsider unless
the outsider intends to establish a new domicile at the locus. 3 94 Hay agreed.
Sanchez followed Bartolus, however, in recognizing an exception to that rule
for locus laws regulating formalities.3 95 Avoiding that exception, Hay
apparently did not characterize the issue in Harford as one of formalities, for he
did not even mention the longstanding locus regit actum rule. Under the Italian
approach, a material condition might not be subject to locus regulation, which
is consistent with Hay's conclusion in Harford.396 Even Hay's technique of
386 See supra text accompanying notes 297-300.
387 Harford, 161 Eng. Rep. at 796; 2 Hag. Cons. at 434.
388 Id. at 793; 2 Hag. Cons. at 425.
389 Id. at 794-95; 2 Hag. Cons. at 429-30.
390 Id. at 795; 2 Hag. Cons, at 430.
391 Id.
392 Id.
393 Hay, George (1715-78), THE HIST. OF PARLIAMENT, http://www.histparl.ac.uk/volume/
1754-1790/member/hay-george-i 715-78 (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).
394 See supra text accompanying notes 154-57.
3 See supra text accompanying notes 154-57.
396 See supra text accompanying notes 166-67.
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resorting to the underlying body of English ecclesiastical law to fill the lacuna
created by the inapplicability of locus law and by the declared inapplicability of
Hardwicke's Act was exactly how Bartolus filled a statutory lacuna.397
Bartolus's underlying body of law just happened to be Roman law instead of
English ecclesiastical law. Hay's opinion makes perfect sense as an 18th-
century use of the Italian approach to conflicts, transposed onto the English
legal system. In that deeper sense, Hay was methodologically consistent with
Scrimshire, disagreeing only with how Simpson had applied the Italian
approach.
The implications of Hay's opinion on the interpretation of Compton are
not entirely clear. Although the Delegates had apparently affirmed a decision
by Hay in Compton, the Delegates reversed his decision in Harford and voided
the marriage.39 8 Again, there was no opinion, but there are some intriguing
hints. The government, which was litigating the petition on behalf of the girl,
appears not to have contested Hay's conclusion that the underlying
ecclesiastical law applied if the validity of the nuptials were to be determined
by domus law.3 99 The government did challenge Hay's rejection of both the
force-and-fraud and locus theories.40 0 The Delegates vacated Hay's opinion
several years before rendering their own decision, suggesting that his reasoning
struck them as incorrect even before they had figured out their theory of the
case. The strong implication is that the Delegates found Hay's rejection of the
locus rule manifestly incorrect, even if they were not yet sure how to apply it
themselves. A final clue comes from the resolution that the Delegates
ultimately adopted. They reputedly invalidated the Harford nuptials solely on
the force-and-fraud ground and deliberately avoided the choice-of-law issue.4 01
The lone holdout on the latter ground was said to be Sir James Eyre,402 which
may actually be quite significant.
It is important to understand who Eyre was. At the time of his service
as a delegate for this appeal, he was a judge of the Exchequer court and later
became Chief Justice of Common Pleas.4 03 He was not an English civilian 404
397 See supra text accompanying note 103.
398 Harford v. Morris, 161 Eng. Rep. 792 (Cons.); 2 Hag. Cons. 423, vacated, (1781) 161






403 HAYDN, supra note 279, at 376, 382, 385.
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and was appointed as a delegate in this matter as a common-law judge.40 5 It is
exceedingly unlikely that, as the lone holdout on the choice-of-law issue,
Eyre-a non-civilian among civilians-thought that the Delegates should
embrace Hay's Italian statutism. Vastly more likely is that Eyre was the lone
holdout on the choice-of-law issue because-as a common-law judge-he
thought the Delegates should adopt Huber's regime, including the evasion
exception, as promoted by England's then-top common-law judge, Lord
Mansfield. Indeed, apropos of nothing, the evasion exception coincidentally
received a random notation a few years later as a footnote to a report of one of
Eyre's own opinions.406 If Eyre was the lone holdout because he wanted to
invoke the evasion exception, as seems probable, it would mean that the rest of
the Delegates-and there were 11 others in that case-did not. They may have
entirely rejected it in principle, or they may have rejected its application
because of the statutory geographical restriction in Hardwicke's Act. Either
way, it would mean, at the very least, that all the Delegates, including Eyre,
accepted the application of the locus rule as a prima facie matter. Extrapolating,
the same may have been true in Compton as well.
Anticlimactically, one final source indicates that the better view of
Compton is the most obvious one: that the Delegates applied a locus rule and
repudiated the very concept of an evasion exception.4 07 The source is again Sir
James Eyre. In 1795, Eyre decided Phillips v. Hunter.4 0 8 There, an English
domiciliary went to Pennsylvania and recovered a debt from an English
bankrupt without complying with English bankruptcy laws.40 9 In rejecting the
evasion exception, Eyre penned this lament:
Lord Mansfield tried what he could make of this proposition,
that a British subject should not be allowed to contravene the
statute law of the land, in one of the strongest cases that can be
imagined of wilful contravention, the case of marriage
contracted abroad, by English subjects withdrawing themselves
from England, for the express purpose of contravening the
statute law respecting marriages, and he failed altogether. o
Nearly a decade after participating as a Delegate in the Harford appeal, Eyre
apparently gave up on the evasion exception. There is no hint in this lament
that the problem was with a specific geographical restriction in Hardwicke's
405 Harford, 161 Eng. Rep. at 797; 2 Hag. Cons. at 436.
406 Ilderton v. Ilderton (1793) 126 Eng. Rep. 476, 477 n.(a) (C.P.); 2 H. Bl. 145, 147 n.(a).
407 But see Middleton v. Janverin (1802) 161 Eng. Rep. 797, 799 n.* (Arch.); 2 Hag. Cons.
437, 444 n.* (proposing a highly formalist interpretation of Compton).
408 (1795) 126 Eng. Rep. 618 (C.P.); 2 H. Bl. 402.
409 Id. at 618; 2 H. Bl. at 402.
410 Id. at 623; 2 H. Bl. at 412 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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Act. The great Mansfield himself had tried to establish the exception as part of
English conflicts law in the most compelling of circumstances, yet even he
"failed altogether." The better view of Compton and Harford is that the
Delegates accepted the locus rule but repudiated the very concept of an evasion
exception. Indeed, like Sanchez, they may well have done it with a substantive
eye toward affirming the validity of nuptials whenever feasible, or they may
have been motivated by a desire to avoid the systemic dysfunction of the
limping marriage, the same policy objective emphasized earlier in
Scrimshire.411
B. United States
American reception of the Old World learning completes the story that
yields the original content of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Only a
fragmentary understanding crossed the Atlantic, but it was enough. Gretna
Green marriages hung over the limited debate, which was framed as a choice
between Mansfield's perceived acceptance of the evasion exception and the
Delegates' presumed rejection of it. The exception itself became the site of
tension between singular respect for Huber's conflicts regime, which included
the exception, and discomfort at the prospect of the limping marriages that the
exception would create. But American judges were not mere transcribers; they
brought their own insights and creativity to the endeavor.
1. The Locus-Validation Rule
Huber's locus-validation rule was accepted without question by the
American bench and bar throughout the early national period.412 In contrast to
the experience in both the Netherlands and England, there was no suggestion
that material conditions for the validity of a marriage might be determined
generally by domus law. As in England, the earliest acknowledgements of the
rule came not in actual marriage cases but in cases where the marriage rule was
used as an analogy. That acknowledgement of the rule was telling. It indicated,
as it had in England, that the American bench and bar regarded the rule as
sufficiently incontrovertible for use as an analogy.
411 English courts eventually adopted a domus rule for resolving conflicts as to the material
conditions for a valid marriage, but that development did not occur until the time of the
American Civil War. See Brook v. Brook (1861) 11 Eng. Rep. 703; 9 H.L.C. 193; Mette v. Mette
(1859) 164 Eng. Rep. 792 (Prob.); 1 Sw. & Tr. 416; DICEY'S CONFLICT OF LAWS 759-61 (J.H.C.
Morris ed., 6th ed. 1949).
412 There is also some American authority in the early national period for recognizing the
validity of a marriage based on a prior out-of-state judgment holding it valid. Wray v. Reily, 30
F. Cas. 652, 652 (C.C.D.C. 1808) (No. 18,059).
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The first of these analogical uses of the rule appeared while ratification
of the Constitution itself was underway. In Millar v. Hall,413 the Pennsylvania
high court cited the recognition of out-of-state marriages as an analogy in its
decision to recognize a discharge of debt under another state's insolvency act.
Pennsylvania's noted Chief Justice, Thomas McKean, proceeded from the
premises of the Dutch school. He explained that although "the laws of a
particular country, have in themselves no extra-territorial force, no coercive
operation," it was nevertheless true that, "by the consent of nations, they
acquire an influence and obligation, and, in many instances, become conclusive
throughout the world."414 McKean then explained that "[a]cts of pardon,
marriage, and divorce, made in one country, are received and binding in all
countries."415 Although he did not attribute these ideas to a source, it was
obviously Huber, probably by way of Mansfield.4 16 McKean's views lacked the
reserve of Voet, the statutory insularity of Sanchez and Kames, or the domicile
preference of Hay.
Another significant use of the marriage rule as an analogy came in
1810 and bore the same import. In Greenwood v. Curtis,417 the Massachusetts
high court used the locus-validation rule as an analogy in accepting the validity
of foreign agreements for the delivery of slaves. As with McKean, Chief Justice
Theophilus Parsons also proceeded from the premises of the Dutch school. It
was "upon principles of national comity," he explained, that foreign contracts
that were contrary to forum law might nevertheless be enforced.418 It would be
like recognizing marriages. Parsons observed that "marriages .. . prohibited by
the law of one state, and not of another, if celebrated where they are not
prohibited, would be holden valid in a state where they are not allowed."4 19 As
in Millar, this statement specifically reflected Huber's locus-validation rule,420
not entirely consistent with the more qualified views of Voet. Parsons even
offered a locally relevant example: "As, in this state, a marriage between a man
and his deceased wife's sister is lawful, but it is not so in some states, such a
marriage celebrated here would be held valid in any other state, and the parties
413 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 229 (Pa. 1788).
414 Id. at 232; see also id. at 232-33 ("[M]utual conveniency policy, the consent of nations,
and the general principles of justice form a code which pervades all nations, and must be every
where [sic] acknowledged and pursued.").
415 Id. at 232.
416 Id. at 230 (noting citation of Robinson v. Bland (1790) 96 Eng. Rep. 141 (K.B.); 1 Black
W. 256, by counsel).
417 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 358 (1810).
418 Id. at 377.
419 Id. at 379.
420 See supra text accompanying note 232.
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entitled to the benefits of the matrimonial contract."4 2 1 Parsons obviously had
great confidence in the rule, using it here to justify the controversial
enforcement of slavery contracts two years after Congress had banned such
foreign commerce.
Later, when actual marriage conflicts began arising, resort to the rule
seemed almost reflexive. In Inhabitants of Dalton v. Inhabitants of
Bernardston,4 22 the Massachusetts high court dispensed with an unidentified
objection to recognizing a Vermont marriage for purposes of forum law: "It can
make no difference where the marriage was solemnized, whether within or
without the commonwealth, provided it be such a marriage as our laws will
recognize . . . .,423 In Le Breton v. Nouchet,424 the Louisiana high court
accepted the validity of a marriage celebrated by its domiciliaries in Mississippi
Territory to evade a requirement of parental consent. Tellingly, no one even
contested its validity,425 and the court proceeded to use Huber's principles to
decide that the marriage acquired the matrimonial property regime of the
domicile.426 Given Louisiana's civilian and non-English background, the
court's reception of Huber's principles was notable.42 7
The sense of reflexive acceptance was the same in the first major
marriage-conflicts case. In Inhabitants of Medway v. Inhabitants of
Needham,428 the Massachusetts high court affirmed the validity of an interracial
marriage that domiciliaries of Massachusetts Bay had celebrated evasively in
Rhode Island before 1770.429 The party challenging the validity of the marriage,
solely on evasion grounds, did not contest the locus rule itself.430 Likewise,
Chief Justice Isaac Parker devoted exactly one sentence to applying the rule:
"[I]t is a principle adopted for general convenience and security, that a
marriage, which is good according to the laws of the country where it is entered
into, shall be valid in any other country."43 1 Significantly, the case concerned a
material condition for validity-race-but nothing indicated any consideration
421 Greenwood, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) at 379.
422 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 201 (1812).
423 Id. at 203.
424 3 Mart. (o.s.) 60 (La. 1813).
425 Id. at 73.
426 Id. at 66-71; accord Decouche v. Savetier, 3 Johns. Ch. 190, 211 (N.Y. Ch. 1817) (per
Kent, Ch.) (applying Huber's principles to conflict as to matrimonial property regimes); see
HUBER, in Davies, supra note 183, §§ 9-10, at 72-73.
427 The decision anticipated Soul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (n.s.) 569 (La. 1827) (definitively
rejecting civilian statutism as basis of conflicts law).
428 16 Mass. (15 Tyng) 157 (1819).
429 Id. at 158, 159.
430 Id. at 158.
431 Id. at 159.
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of a domicile rule or even addressed Voet's hesitancy as to so-called personal
statutes. Parker apparently regarded the locus-validation rule as incontestable,
for he provided no discussion or authority to support it. 432
Marriage decisions in the 1820s followed the same pattern. In
Dumaresly v. Fishly,433 the Kentucky high court stated without elaboration or
authority that the validity of a marriage "must, no doubt, be decided by the laws
of' the place of celebration.434 In Inhabitants of West Cambridge v. Inhabitants
of Lexington435 and Putnam v. Putnam,436 the Massachusetts high court again
confronted marriage conflicts involving a material condition for validity-in
these cases, post-divorce remarriage. In both, the court focused exclusively on
the evasion exception and presumed without comment that the locus-validation
rule was the law.4 37 In Fornshill v. Murray,438 Chancellor Theoderick Bland of
Maryland similarly devoted one sentence to applying the locus rule in the face
of a conflict as to formal validity. "[A]ccording to the law of nations," he
explained, the marriage, which had been validly celebrated without a religious
ceremony in Ireland, "must be held to be a valid marriage here; for otherwise
the rights of mankind would, in this respect, be in a most precarious and
uncertain condition."439 Straying slightly from the pattern, Bland did at least
cite a mixture of English and Scottish precedents in support of the rule." 0
Lack of access to source material would seem to explain American
reception of the locus rule without even considering a domus alternative.
Although Americans had access to some English, Scottish, and Continental
sources, there were serious gaps and limitations. Nor were the constraints on
access random. The gaps and limitations would have tended to mask the debate
between choosing locus or domus law.
Although it is apparent that the American bench and bar had access the
ideas of Huber in the early national period, the same was not true of the works
of other Continental jurists."' As late as 1836, their works, though generally
432 Id. His discussion focused exclusively on exceptions to the rule.
433 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 368 (1820).
434 Id. at 369. The case did not involve an actual conflict of laws.
435 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 506 (1823).
436 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 433 (1829).
437 Id. at 434-35; West Cambridge, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) at 510-12.
438 1 Bland 479 (Md. Ch. 1828).
439 Id. at 485.
440 Id. at 485 n.(v).
441 Even in the case of Huber, access was apparently limited. Reflecting a perception of keen
interest among the bench and bar, A.J. Dallas included a rudimentary English translation of
Huber's conflicts essay in the third volume of the United States Reports, published in 1799.
Emory v. Grenough, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 369, 370 n.* (1797).
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available in Edinburgh, were still not readily available even in London.2
Much less were they likely available in Boston, New York, or Philadelphia in
the early national period. In preparing his 1834 treatise on the conflict of laws,
Justice Story gained access to many of these Continental works only because of
a recent bequest to Harvard by Samuel Livermore, a prominent New Orleans
attorney who had written his own tract on conflicts a few years earlier.
In addition to the Continental works, the output of English
ecclesiastical courts was another major American blind spot during this period.
Although this material was apparently circulating informally among London
civilians, reports of such key cases as Scrimshire and Harford were not
generally published in England until 1822,4" let alone accessible across the
Atlantic. An American review of that first compilation of ecclesiastical reports
noted in 1827 that
[u]ntil very recently, there have been no regular reports of the
adjudications of the English ecclesiastical courts. Hence our
common law courts, though possessing a great part of their
jurisdiction, have not been able to acquire much knowledge of
their practice or to derive much assistance from their learning
and wisdom.
An exception was the publication of a book-length report of the decision in
Dalrymple v. Dalrymple,46 but that case was not decided until 1811."' By the
time these ecclesiastical materials became more widely available in the 1820s,
courts had already begun laying down basic principles.
The American bench and bar did have two sources to which they
consistently recurred. One was the skeletal summary of Compton v.
442 Anton, supra note 52, at 536.
443 Rodolfo De Nova, The First American Book on Conflict of Laws, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
136, 136 n.1 (1964); see 1 SAMUEL LIVERMORE, DISSERTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE
FROM THE CONTRARIETY OF THE POSITIVE LAWS OF DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS (1828).
44 2 JOHN HAGGARD, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE CONSISTORY
COURT OF LONDON iii (1822). Scrimshire and Harford do not appear to have been cited in
America before 1827. 2 KENT, supra note 57, at 79 (citing both Scrimshire and Harford); see
also United States v. Jennegen, 26 F. Cas. 606 (C.C.D.C. 1830) (No. 15,474) (citing Scrimshire
for the first time); Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 466 (1873) (citing Harford for the
first time).
44 Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Consistory Court of London, 2 AM. Q.
REv. 70, 71 (1827) (book review).
446 Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (1811) 161 Eng. Rep. 665; 2 Hag. Cons. 54 (recognizing
informal marriage of English officer while stationed in Scotland).
" JOHN DODSON, A REPORT OF THE JUDGMENT, DELIVERED IN THE CONSISTORIAL COURT OF
LONDON, ON THE SIXTEENTH DAY OF JULY, 1811, BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR WILLIAM
ScoTT, CHANCELLOR OF THE DIOCESE, IN THE CAUSE OF DALRYMPLE THE WIFE, AGAINST
DALRYMPLE THE HUSBAND (1811).
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Bearcroft,44 lacking any indication of the debate as to the undisclosed ground
of decision. This source simply reported the barest of facts and concluded, "[I]t
was holden that the marriage was good.""9
The other source did not go much further. Citing Mansfield's opinion
in Robinson v. Bland,450 the source noted that "the validity of such marriages
was once questioned."'4" It continued, by explaining that although "in general
marriages are governed by the law of the country in which they are celebrated,"
it was nevertheless "doubted, whether the lex loci ought to be applied to a case
accompanied with circumstances so strongly marking the intent to evade the
law of England."45 2 The source concluded, however, that "this point seems now
fully settled in favour of the Scotch marriages, by a late decision of the court of
arches, which was afterwards confirmed in the court of delegates."453 The
source then proceeded to express mild disapproval of that outcome and offered
a vigorous defense of Huber's essay as a practical guide for resolving conflicts
problems.454
One can see how American courts could have assumed that the locus
rule was incontrovertible-and the evasion exception all but rejected. Only in
1827 did Kent's Commentaries begin to reveal the greater complexity to a wide
American audience.4 55 By then, however, the development of the American law
456of marriage conflicts was already underway.
2. Exceptions to the Rule
The real debate in American courts in the early national period focused
not on the locus-validation rule, which was unquestionably accepted, but on the
potential exceptions to it. Typically working within Huber's framework,
American courts generally accepted his prejudice limitation on comity and, in
44 Compton v. Bearcroft (1768) (Del.), reported in BULL. N.P., supra note 363, at 114.
449 Id. at 114.
450 (1760) 96 Eng. Rep. 141 (K.B.); I Black. W. 256.




455 A note published in 1817 by a South Carolina reporter of decisions cited the 1811
Dalrymple decision for the proposition that "the law of the country, where the marriage was
contracted, must govern, though one of the contracting parties may have been domiciled in
another country." Vaigneur v. Kirk, 2 S.C. Eq. (2 Des. Eq.) 640, 644 n.* (1808).
456 New York Justice Esek Cowen endorsed the locus-validation rule with a natural law
exception in his 1825 digest of conflicts principles and cases. See Andrews v. Herriot, 4 Cow.
508, 512 n.(a) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825) ("[A] contract of marriage, though it would be invalid by our
law, will yet be held valid here, if so by the law of the country where celebrated, unless indeed it
be incestuous by the law of nature.").
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particular, his evasion exception to the general lex loci actus principle. In the
marriage context, however, reluctance became apparent. American courts
foresaw the problems associated with limping marriages, problems that the
evasion exception would create. Aware of the debate over the exception in
England, they resisted adopting it. The strength of Huber was nevertheless
apparently such that American courts needed a way to resist the evasion
exception without contradicting Huber. The Massachusetts high court
ultimately fashioned a revealing synthesis.
The early decisions in which courts used marriage conflicts as an
analogy endorsed some version of Huber's limitation on comity without
question. In Millar, Chief Justice McKean paused before recognizing the out-
of-state discharge of debt to observe that it had not been received in evasion of
forum law.457 He also added that recognizing the discharge of debt would not
prejudice the "independence and sovereignty" of the forum.458 Although he did
not specifically link the exception back to marriage, his reasoning had
proceeded from the assumption that recognition of the discharge was analogous
to recognition of a marriage.4 59 Certainly, nothing indicated that marriage was
immune from this limitation on comity.
The Greenwood decision,460 involving slavery contracts, went further
toward recognizing Huber's specific exceptions to his marriage rule. One was
the evasion exception. Chief Justice Parsons implicitly acknowledged that
exception in noting that each of the slavery contracts at issue "was made
abroad, by persons not citizens of the commonwealth.'4 6' The only theory
under which their domicile in the forum would have been relevant was an
evasion theory. In addition to evasion, Parsons even more clearly accepted
Huber's other exception, the exception for marriages whose example would be
"pernicious and detestable."462 Analogizing to marriage, Parsons explained that
a forum would not enforce a foreign contract if it "would exhibit to the citizens
of the state an example pernicious and detestable."46 3 The language clearly
echoed Huber. So did additional language, as Parsons went on to use Huber's
own example of a marriage that should be denied recognition everywhere under
this "abhorrence" exception: "[I]f a foreign state allows of marriages incestuous
by the law of nature, as between parent and child, such marriage could not be
457 Millar v. Hall, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 229, 233 (Pa. 1788) (stating it did not "arise in fraudem
legis").
458 Id.
459 Id. at 232.
460 Greenwood v. Curtis, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 358 (1810).
461 Id. at 380.
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allowed to have any validity here."464 The one evident divergence was that
Huber had grounded this exception in the "law of nations," not the "law of
nature."4 65 Otherwise, Parsons endorsed both the evasion and "abhorrence"
exceptions.466
At roughly the same time, however, a previously unmentioned decision
began to show the competing concern about limping marriages. In Jackson v.
Jackson,4 67 Judge Ambrose Spencer of the New York Supreme Court
confronted not an actual marriage conflict but a near proxy for it: a question of
divorce recognition. In an opinion that was as significant for what it left
undecided as for what it decided, Spencer adopted Huber's evasion exception,
but he showed notable circumspection about using it in the marriage context.
Presaging a two-century saga over New York's restrictive divorce
laws,468 Jackson involved a New York woman who went to Vermont for about
six months in an effort to secure a divorce and who then sought to enforce the
out-of-state alimony decree back in New York. 469 Although her ostensibly
former husband had fully participated in the Vermont proceedings, his attorney
leveled a sweeping attack against any recognition of the divorce. Citing Huber,
Kames, Mansfield, and others, he urged Spencer to deny recognition to the
divorce itself on grounds of evasion, public policy, inherent lack of sovereignty
to grant the divorce, and the asserted narrowness of the true comity doctrine.470
In a particularly notable passage, the putative ex-husband's attorney
challenged the validation of Gretna Green marriages in Compton. "[W]e shall
probably be told of the Scotch marriages," he interjected, "and the decisions
which have taken place in relation to them."471 Tellingly, he went on to say that
"the court will recollect the history of those marriages, and the diversity of
opinions which have been entertained as to their effect."4 72 Notwithstanding the
general unavailability of ecclesiastical reports in the United States, this passage
makes clear that American lawyers were sufficiently familiar with the
464 Id.; see also id. at 379 ("naturally unlawful").
465 HUBER, in Davies, supra note 183, § 8, at 82.
466 See also Inhabitants of Dalton v. Inhabitants of Bernardston, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 201, 203
(1812) (noting that state would recognize marriage celebrated elsewhere "provided it be such a
marriage as our laws will recognize").
467 1 Johns. 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806).
468 See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 170(7) (2015) (adopting no-fault divorce); Rosenstiel v.
Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64 (1965) (recognizing transient Mexican divorce of New Yorkers); Van
Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18, 25 (1881) (recognizing evasive post-divorce remarriage of New
Yorkers).
469 Jackson, I Johns. at 424-25.
470 Id. at 426-29.
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controversial validation of Gretna Green marriages to make passing reference
to it in argument.
Significantly, Spencer spurned the invitation to rule broadly. He held
narrowly that the woman could not seek to recover in New York based on an
alimony judgment that she had evaded the state's divorce laws to obtain.4 73
Citing English decisions building upon Mansfield's conflicts opinions in
Robinson and Holman, Spencer held that "[i]t may be laid down as a general
principle, that when ever an act is done infraudem legis, it cannot be the basis
of a suit in the courts of the country whose laws are attempted to be
infringed."474 In going to Vermont for a divorce, the ex-wife had "acted with a
view of evading our laws," so "it would be attended with pernicious
consequences, to aid this attempt to elude them," he ruled.7 There was no
monetary recovery for the ex-wife, and the case was dismissed.
Spencer deliberately avoided the more fundamental question whether
the divorce itself was valid. "We are not called on, in the present case," he said,
"to pronounce on the legal effect of the divorce granted by the Supreme Court
of Vermont."4 76 The English decisions were adequate to support the proposition
that a New York court would not aid the enforcement of the evasive alimony
decree, "without going beyond the point now submitted."4 7 7 Although Huber
had not discussed divorce, he had shown little reluctance to apply his evasion
exception to either a foreign marriage478 or a foreign criminal acquittal resulting
from "an escape into a neighbouring country and feigned proceedings."4 79 In
the case of an evasive marriage, he had even said that the locus was itself to
blame for abetting the evasive nuptials,480 much as Vermont had done by
entertaining the divorce action in this case. But Spencer no doubt confronted
the same "mischiefs" as Simpson had in Scrimshire if people were deemed
husband and wife in one state while being legal strangers elsewhere.4 81 Huber's
473 He held that she had not formed a new domicile in Vermont. Id. at 432.
474 Id. at 433 (citing Clugas v. Penaluna (1791) 100 Eng. Rep. 1122 (C.P.); 4 T.R. 466; Briggs
v. Lawrence (1789) 100 Eng. Rep. 673 (C.P.); 3 T.R. 454). Those English decisions were not
about either marriage or divorce. They were suits by English domiciliaries to recover on foreign
contracts that facilitated the smuggling of illegal goods into England. The opinions turned on the
status of the plaintiffs as English domiciliaries, who were aiding in the evasion of English law.
475 Id. at 432.
476 Id. (emphasis omitted).
477 Id. at 433.
478 HUBER, in Davies, supra note 183, § 8, at 72.
479 Id. §6, at 69.
480 Id. §8,at71.
481 Under Huber's approach, the evasion rationale for denying recognition to the Vermont
divorce would not be available to other states, whose laws the ex-wife had not evaded. Id. § 13,
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evasion exception prevailed in general, but the sobering specter of limping
marriages exerted real countervailing force.
The specter of limping marriages may also have played a role in Le
Breton v. Nouchet,482 the 1813 Louisiana decision involving a conflict as to the
applicable matrimonial property regime. Litigation of the case proceeded on the
assumption that the marriage-an underage evasive marriage without parental
consent-was valid. The court made a point of noting that "[n]o question has
been made, as to the validity of this marriage."4 83 The party who would have
benefited from challenging the validity of the marriage was the mother of the
deceased thirteen-year-old girl who had eloped. The mother apparently avoided
challenging the validity of the marriage,484 and the court itself was willing to
oblige in deciding the matrimonial property issue without questioning the
validity of the marriage. What made that willingness notable was that, in
deciding the property issue, the court was already required to find-and did
find-the very facts that also would have justified rejecting the marriage itself
as evasive. The court was fully aware that the marriage was evasive but
indulged the parties in tacitly recognizing it as valid. One suspects that the
court was content to avoid grappling with the evasion exception and its
prospect of creating limping marriages.
The tension between Huber's evasion exception and the problems
associated with limping marriages came to a head in a trio of Massachusetts
decisions beginning in 1819. All three were written by Chief Justice Isaac
Parker, who worked through the tension. Apparently unable to resist the weight
of Huber as the exponent of conflicts principles, Parker ultimately fashioned a
synthesis. He both accepted Huber's evasion exception as a correct statement of
comity principles and avoided the problems with limping marriages by
validating evasive marriages anyway.
The trio of decisions all involved marriages celebrated by
Massachusetts domiciliaries outside the state in manifest evasion of
Massachusetts law. The first, Inhabitants of Medway v. Inhabitants of
Needham,485 involved a marriage between a white woman and a biracial man in
Rhode Island. The other two decisions, Inhabitants of West Cambridge v.
486 487Inhabitants of Lexington and Putnam v. Putnam, involved marriages in
New Hampshire and Connecticut, respectively, in evasion of a Massachusetts
ban on post-divorce remarriages by parties who were guilty of adultery in their
first marriages. In none of the cases did the party challenging the validity of the
482 3 Mart. (o.s.) 60 (La. 1813).
483 Id. at 73.
484 Id. at 63-66 (argument of counsel).
485 16 Mass. (15 Tyng) 157 (1819).
486 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 506 (1823).
487 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 433 (1829).
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marriage contest the general locus rule. The disputes centered exclusively on
the evasion exception.
Parker understood the problems resulting from limping marriages but
struggled to resist the pull of Huber's articulation of the evasion exception. At
first, in Medway, he did not hesitate to disregard the exception in order to
validate the evasive interracial marriage.488 His attitude changed markedly,
however, when the court confronted the post-divorce remarriage in West
Cambridge. In Medway, Parker had anticipated and addressed the prospect of
evasive marriages that were closely incestuous by acknowledging Huber's
"abhorrence" exception,48 9 but that alternative exception would not apply to
post-divorce remarriages. Instead, Parker initially avoided giving full effect to
one of those marriages by recognizing it only for the limited purpose of
establishing the legitimacy of the couple's children, the actual issue in the
case.4 90 Despite strongly suggesting that such a marriage would not be
recognized for the benefit of the spouses,491 Parker grudgingly relented when
that question subsequently arose in Putnam. Refusing to validate a post-divorce
remarriage celebrated in evasion of Massachusetts law, he reasoned, would
require the overruling of Medway, which Parker was not willing to do.492
Clearly displeased, he validated the post-divorce remarriage but invited the
legislature to regulate the matter.493
In addition to the wavering reaction to evasive marriages, Parker also
struggled to escape Huber's evasion exception in another respect. Parker
generally favored the exception outside the context of marriage. He was not
willing to enforce ordinary contracts that were made elsewhere in evasion of
domiciliary law. Applying the exception to evasive commercial contracts but
not to evasive marriages, however, would create a tension in the law because
Parker understood marriage as "assimilated" to contract.494 He felt compelled to
distinguish the validation of evasive marriages.495 He did so by emphasizing
that the validation of evasive marriages rested on unique policy considerations.
It protected children from the "bastardization" that would result from voiding
the marriages of their parents, and it avoided the "public mischief' that would
488 16 Mass. (15 Tyng) at 159.
489 Id. at 161.
490 West Cambridge, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) at 511-12.
491 Id. at 511.
492 Putnam, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) at 435.
493 Id. The legislature obliged, perhaps going farther than Parker intended. It banned evasive
marriages that were interracial as well as those that were post-divorce or consanguineous. MAss.
REv. STAT. ch. 75, § 6 (1836).
494 West Cambridge, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) at 509.
495 Putnam, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) at 435; Inhabitants of Medway v. Inhabitants of Needham, 16
Mass. (15 Tyng) 157, 160 (1819).
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arise from the "loose state" of people cohabitating under limping marriages.496
The fact nevertheless remained that Parker was departing from Huber in this
instance, despite generally adhering to the work of this "celebrated jurist and
civilian."4 97 He seemed to regard the isolated departure as appearing
unprincipled.
To some extent, he tried to justify the departure as a matter of adhering
to English precedent. Seemingly unaware of the English debate over the proper
interpretation of Compton, Parker rested the Medway opinion strongly on the
proposition that the High Court of Delegates had repudiated the evasion
exception.4 98 He even imputed his own policy rationales to the Delegates.499
Still, Parker seemed to be trying hard to justify the departure from Huber,
indicating the apparent weight of Huber's essay as a conflicts source.
The tension between Huber's articulation of the evasion exception and
the potential problems resulting from limping marriages ultimately impelled
Parker to attempt a synthesis. It was already implicit in Medway, where he
characterized the isolated departure from Huber's regime as "founded on
principles of policy."00 Denying validation to an evasive marriage, he
explained, "would produce greater inconveniences than those attempted to be
guarded against."01 But it was not until a decade later in Putnam that Parker
made the synthesis overt. The court would validate evasive marriages "not
merely on account of comity, for that would not be offended by declaring null a
contract made in violation of the laws of the State in which the parties lived, by
evasion, but from general policy."502 Parker accepted both Huber and evasive
marriages. Comity did not require validation of evasive marriages, but the
forum would choose to validate them anyway, as a matter of its own policy
beyond comity. Huber correctly stated the rule of international comity, but
Massachusetts would choose to go beyond it in validating evasive marriages.so3
Parker's synthesis was telling. Medway and Putnam went further than
any decisions during the early national period in actually validating evasive
marriages. If any decisions of the period were going to support an inference
that the American bench and bar thought comity required the validation of
evasive marriages, it was those decisions. Yet they expressly preclude any such
496 Putnam, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) at 435; Medway, 16 Mass. (15 Tyng) at 159-61.
497 Medway, 16 Mass. (15 Tyng) at 159.
498 Id. at 159-60. Parker's language manifestly echoed the note in Hargrave's Coke on
Littleton: "This, it seems, has been doubted in England [see the case of Robinson v. Bland]; but it
was settled in the Court of Delegates, in a question upon a Scotch marriage." Id. at 159.
499 Putnam, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) at 435.
Soo Medway, 16 Mass. (15 Tyng) at 160 (emphasis added).
501 Id. at 159.
502 Putnam, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) at 434-35 (emphases added).
503 See also Harding v. Alden, 9 Me. 140, 146 (1832) (adopting Massachusetts ynthesis).
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inference. Earlier decisions had accepted Huber's evasion exception in passing
or had disclosed a competing discomfort at the prospect of limping marriages.
Parker accommodated both ideas by accepting the evasion exception as part of
the comity doctrine and then finding an alternative basis-altruistic forum
policy-on which to validate evasive marriages in order to avoid the problem
of limping ones. His synthesis rendered even the strongest validation decisions
of the period consistent with the view that Huber's evasion exception was
accepted as part of the comity doctrine, notwithstanding the validation of
evasive marriages in Compton. Huber and Mansfield prevailed as to comity,
but Compton prevailed as to the locus-validating result on other grounds.
VI. THE ORIGINAL CONTENT AS TO MARRIAGE CONFLICTS
Having now surveyed the relevant historical sources, the question is
whether any conclusions may be drawn about the original content of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause as it applies to marriage conflicts. Any such
conclusions depend on the sufficiency of the evidence to provide the Court with
reliable guidance.
A. Preliminary Considerations
Before seeking to derive the original content of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause as it relates to state choice of law in marriage conflicts, a few
preliminary considerations are in order.
1. Function of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
First, it is important to keep in mind the appropriate function of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause as it relates to state choice of law. To the extent that
early modem sources permit the derivation of conflicts principles as part of the
original content of the Clause, the Clause does not affirmatively establish those
principles as a comprehensive choice of law scheme. Rather, the text of the
Clause makes clear that it is only a partial check on the permissibility of state
choice-of-law decisions. It sometimes obliges a forum state to choose and apply
the law of a sibling state, and the principles constituting the original content
prescribe situations to which the obligation attaches. A failure to apply the law
of a sibling state when it is constitutionally required would violate the Clause,
but applying sibling law when it is not constitutionally required does not appear
to violate it. The Clause is simply not written in terms of mandating a forum
state to disregard sibling law and apply its own law in an appropriate case. It
guards against disregard of sibling states, but does not appear to prohibit
altruistic subordination of a forum's own law and policy in voluntarily
choosing to go beyond the requirements of the Clause in applying sibling law.
While a failure to apply sibling law may violate the Clause, a choice to apply
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sibling law cannot, except perhaps where the forum has chosen to apply the
wrong sibling state's law.
2. Weight of Sources
A second threshold consideration is how much weight to give the
various early modem sources in seeking to derive the original content of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. This consideration is particularly important to the
extent that the early modem sources conflict as to a particular rule or exception.
From the Spanish canonists to the English courts, it is worth determining at the
outset how much weight each source should generally receive.
The canonists who preceded Sanchez, such as Ledesma, should receive
little to no consideration. They made no effort to ground their reasoning in
general conflicts principles. Rather, their trite analyses rested on the peculiar
text of the Tridentine decree, vacuous analogies to fasting on holy days, and
other trivial considerations. To the extent that they agree with other sources,
they provide little additional force, and to the extent that they disagree with
other sources, their limited analyses should preclude their views from
prevailing.
Sanchez, in contrast, merits significant weight. Although he was not a
conflicts thinker, he did endeavor to ground his analysis in the prevailing
conflicts principles of Bartolus and the Italian approach. His analysis was
lengthy and thorough, even though it was not comprehensive. As a subject
matter specialist on marriage, his tract on marriage conflicts proved highly
influential for more than a century. Indeed, it manifestly influenced English
ecclesiastical courts in the 18th century. Because Sanchez's analysis rested on
the Italian approach to conflicts, however, it merits somewhat less weight than
later sources that are grounded in approaches more compatible with the
American legal system. Sanchez's analysis was also less than comprehensive,
obscurely nuanced at points, and, to some extent, dependent on the text of the
Tridentine decree. These factors also reduce its relevance or usefulness.
The Dutch thinkers, Voet and Huber, are clearly entitled to great
weight. They were primary influences on both English and American conflicts
law. Story himself regarded them as the ablest of the foreign conflicts jurists.
As between the two, Huber seems clearly to have commanded greater respect
in the early Anglo-American conflicts law, and his approach was freer than
other approaches from the previous regime of resolving conflicts by classifying
statues as real, personal, or mixed.
English sources are obviously a weighty source as the most immediate
progenitor of American law, but they present something of a dilemma in this
particular context. Mansfield and Hardwicke were clearly the leading lights of
the era on conflicts matters, but neither had primary jurisdiction over marriage
conflicts. On the other hand, the ecclesiastical courts had primary jurisdiction
over those conflicts, but the quality-and even coherence-of their decisions is
more limited. Any real divergence among these sources, however, concerned
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the evasion exception, and the law courts seemed to have accepted defeat on
that issue by the time the Constitution was adopted, so it should be possible to
sidestep the tradeoff between authority and quality.
The derivation of originalist conflicts principles, then, should focus
centrally on English sources as well as Huber and, to a somewhat lesser extent,
Voet, with Sanchez providing significant but secondary supplemental authority.
Lastly, of course, American sources provide confirmatory evidence of what the
American bench and bar understood in the years after the adoption of the
Constitution.
3. Leniency of Construction
The extent to which these sources can provide a basis for deriving an
original content of the Full Faith and Credit Clause depends, in part, on how
strictly or liberally the Clause's mandate should be construed. How much
evidence in support of an early modem conflicts principle should be sufficient
to justify adoption of a constitutional constraint on state choice of law?
Arguments cut either way. On the one hand, enforcement of the
command curtails the sovereign prerogative of a state to decide for itself which
law to apply in its own courts in multistate cases. Deference to state
prerogatives would support strict construction and thus greater historical
certainty before imposing a full-faith-and-credit mandate. On the other hand,
the very purpose of the Clause was to "alter[] the status of the several states as
independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations
created under the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others,
by making each an integral part of a single nation."5 04 The Court enforces the
Clause very vigorously in the parallel context of judgment-recognition,
notwithstanding the significant curtailment of state prerogatives. The Court's
reluctance to enforce the Clause in the choice-of-law context has had less to do
with deference to state prerogatives than with the perceived absence of
judicially manageable standards and a reluctance to engage in a subjective
balancing of state interests. Grounding the derivation of limitations in historical
sources should, in theory, provide the Court with the more objective "rudder"
or "compass" that makes the exceedingly strict construction that now prevails
less necessary.
B. Derivation of the "Original Content"
The central inquiry is whether these historical sources, properly
weighted, provide sufficient guidance as to the original content of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause to give the Court a sufficient "rudder" or "compass" to place
any constitutional constraints on state resolutions of marriage conflicts. It is
5 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 n.9 (1951).
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helpful to consider general choice-of-law rules and any exceptions to those
rules separately.
1. General Rules
Because some of the sources distinguished between situations in which
the application of locus law would result in validating a marriage from those in
which it would result in invalidating a marriage, separate consideration of those
issues is warranted. In fact, the historical sources support different conclusions
as to these two issues.
i. Locus- Validation
The early modem sources provide a sound foundation for concluding
that the original content of the Full Faith and Credit Clause included a locus-
validation rule for resolving marriage conflicts. Whatever exceptions the
various sources endorsed, they converged on the affirmative general rule of
recognition: that a marriage valid under the law of the locus where celebrated
should be regarded as valid everywhere. There was only isolated support for a
competing domus rule at the time the Constitution was adopted. While the
support for a locus-validation rule was overwhelming in the case of formalities,
there was sufficient support even in the case of material conditions to conclude
that this rule should be applied, as a matter of original content, in the latter
context as well as the former.
Formalities. Every early modem source worthy of serious weight
clearly endorsed the choice of a validating locus law in conflicts involving
marital formalities. Sanchez adapted Bartolus's view that the sufficiency of
legal formalities should be determined by locus law, and that was true
regardless whether the formalities were valid or invalid under the locus law.sos
Voet reached a similar conclusion,506 categorizing regulations of marital
formalities as "mixed statutes" and explicitly endorsing a locus-validation rule
for resolving conflicts involving them. 7 Huber adopted the same view without
even singling out formalities for separate analysis.0 s English sources
seemingly took the same view,509 as did American courts.510 The only notable
dissenter was Hay," whose effort to adopt a domicile rule in the English
sos See supra text accompanying notes 155, 161, 168.
506 See supra text accompanying notes 202-03.
507 See supra text accompanying note 206.
5os See supra text accompanying note 232.
509 See supra text accompanying notes 293, 358.
510 See supra text accompanying notes 413-56.
511 See supra text accompanying note 384.
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ecclesiastical courts seems to have gained no traction. The major early modem
sources clearly converged on the locus-validation rule in conflicts involving
marital formalities. Even were the Full Faith and Credit Clause's original
content to be strictly construed, this rule should prevail as a constraint on state
choice of law.
Material Conditions. The case is somewhat less clear with respect to
conflicts involving material conditions on the validity of a marriage, but the
significant weight of authority favors acceptance of the locus-validation rule in
this context too.
Huber explicitly endorsed that rule and drew no distinction between
formalities and material conditions in terms of its applicability, at least as a
prima facie matter.512 Mansfield expressly followed Huber,"' and Hardwicke5 14
seemed to do so at least implicitly.
Quite arguably, the Court of Delegates reached the same conclusion.5 5
Although it did not provide an explicit rationale for affirming the validity of
Gretna Green marriages, one of the key conflicts involving them was the lack
of parental consent. That issue is best characterized as a material condition. It is
true that English courts later characterized it as a matter of formalities, but the
basis seems merely to have been as a way to distinguish Compton and allow for
adoption of a domus rule for material conditions in the middle of the 19th
century. Still, it is hard to be entirely certain what general rule the Delegates
adopted.
Crucially, American courts uniformly accepted the locus-validation
rule as a given, without any evidence of second-guessing. 16 They may have
been over-reading Compton, but they also were clearly influenced by Huber,
Mansfield, and Hardwicke. They regarded the rule as so established that they
used it as the basis for analogies for justifying similar conclusions in more
controversial settings. It seemed beyond serious contention.
Against this endorsement of the rule are a few silent or dissenting
sources. Voet fits the first category. He declined to articulate any general
principle for resolving conflicts involving "personal statutes," did not explicitly
classify regulations of the material conditions necessary for a valid marriage as
"personal statutes,"" and avoided articulating any rule for resolving marriage
conflicts other than those involving formalities.1 s Drawing a defensible
512 See supra text accompanying notes 232, 236.
513 See supra text accompanying note 358.
514 See supra text accompanying note 293.
515 See supra text accompanying note 406.
516 See supra text accompanying notes 413-56.
517 See supra text accompanying note 200.
518 See supra text accompanying notes 209-11.
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inference from his silence or from what he said about other kinds of conflicts is
not realistically possible.
Sanchez is best regarded as a dissenting source, but even that
interpretation is contestable. In articulating general principles for resolving
conflicts, he viewed formalities as a Bartolus-inspired exception to a general
rule against applying locus law,5 19 but he also rejected the application of domus
law in any instance, leaving a probable lacuna.52 0 As an alternative, he insisted
upon characterizing the Tridentine restrictions as formalities, despite the
language of the decree, in order to resolve conflicts involving them under locus
law, using the formalities exception.5 2 1 Sanchez seemed to sense that resolving
conflicts involving material conditions was challenging and recognized that
some might argue for the application of domus law in at least some situations,
as Bartolus had with respect to benevolent restrictions on testamentary
capacity.522 Sanchez's primary conclusion, as drawn from his general
principles, was that neither locus law nor domus law applied.52 3 His view
obviously would not support reading either a locus or domus rule into the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. It is possible that the Delegates followed him and
resolved the Gretna Green conflicts on some technical ground that avoided the
question.
A fair construction of the Full Faith and Credit Clause would accept
the locus-validation rule in the case of material conditions based on the weight
of the authorities. The paramount influence of Huber on American courts,
either indirectly or by way of Mansfield, as well as the locus rule that American
courts attributed to Compton, however accurately, provide a quite strong
foundation for accepting the rule as part of the original content of the Clause
even with respect to material conditions. American courts were so confident in
it as a rule of law that they repeatedly resorted to it as an analogy for supporting
their resolution of conflicts in other contexts, including contexts equivalent to
issues of material conditions, such as the validity of slaving contracts. A strict
constructionist could decline to accept the locus-validation rule as part of the
original content on the basis of the silence of Voet, the dissent of Sanchez, and
the indeterminacy of the Delegates. But it pretty clearly contradicts how early
American courts perceived the law. Even a strict constructionist could conclude
that Voet's silence and Sanchez's uncertainty are not significant enough to
overcome Huber, Mansfield, Hardwicke, and the manifest certainty of early
American courts on this point.
519 See supra text accompanying note 155.
520 See supra text accompanying note 157.
521 See supra text accompanying note 505.
522 See supra text accompanying notes 166-67.
523 See supra text accompanying notes 154-58.
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The better view is that the original content of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause included the locus-validation rule for resolving marriage conflicts,
whether the conflicts involve mere formalities or material conditions. That
general rule might have exceptions, but its status as a general rule seems to
have a firm foundation in early modem sources.
ii. Locus-Invalidation
The same is not true of the locus-invalidation rule: the rule that locus
law should be applied even if it leads to invalidation of a marriage in the
outrange scenario. Although English ecclesiastical courts524 and Sanchez5 25
clearly supported a locus-invalidation rule, the other sources did not. Huber
was ambiguously silent,526 and early American courts had little to say about it.
Voet explicitly opposed such a rule, at least in the case of formalities.52 7 Given
the manifest significance of Huber as an influence and the relative silence of
early American courts, it would probably be best not to regard the support for a
locus-invalidation rule as sufficient to establish it as part of the original content
of the Clause notwithstanding Sanchez and Scrimshire. The Clause thus
probably does not embody the principle that a locus is constitutionally required
to apply the law of a sibling locus if doing so would result in the invalidation of
a marriage. The Clause does not mandate the negative principle that, in the
outrange scenario, a marriage void where celebrated is void everywhere.
2. Exceptions
As important as identifying general rules is identifying any exceptions
to them. In contrast to the analysis of general rules, however, the question is not
whether there is sufficient affirmative support for reading an exception into the
original content. The ultimate constitutional question is whether the Clause
mandates the choice of a sibling state's law. Where there is sufficient
uncertainty whether an exception has been rejected by the early modem
sources, the better approach is to leave roomfor the exception and to decline to
impose a choice of law mandate in the face of one of these potential exceptions.
An exception is not itself the choice-of-law rule; rather, it goes toward
establishing the limits of any mandated choice-of-law rule. Based on the
sources, the original content of the Clause should not be read to mandate choice
of a sibling state's marriage law in situations in which the exceptions
articulated by Huber would apply.
524 See supra text accompanying notes 300, 341.
525 See supra text accompanying note 161.
526 See supra text accompanying note 233.
527 See supra text accompanying note 205.
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i. Evasion
The first of these exceptions was the one most discussed in the early
modem sources: the evasion exception. There was enough support for it to
avoid interpreting the Full Faith and Credit Clause as mandating the locus-
validation rule in situations in which the evasion exception would apply. But
there is at least one significant limit to the scope of that exception.
Support for the evasion exception was mixed but significant. The
preeminent authority, Huber, clearly endorsed it,5 2 8 as did Voet.12 In addition,
Hardwicke,5 30 Mansfield,5 31 and the English temporal courts preferred it.5 32
Early American courts, crucially, agonized over whether to recognize it.533
Only Sanchez clearly rejected the evasion exception,5 34 and English
ecclesiastical courts probably did as well.5 35 There is simply too much genuine
lack of consensus and even ambivalence about the issue to construe the Full
Faith and Credit Clause as mandating a locus-validation rule in cases of
evasion. Limiting the locus-validation rule in that context is obviously a
significant limitation on the mandate, as many marriage conflicts cases involve
evasion.
There is nevertheless a significant limitation on the scope of the
evasion exception itself. The issue is which state is entitled to invoke it. The
preeminent Dutch thinkers agreed that only the victim of the evasion-the
domus whose law was evaded by one of its people-could invoke the exception
when the state also happened to be the forum. Voet made the point explicit in
describing the exception in the case of formalities. Huber did so in contexts
other than marriage,36 but his discussion of marriage conflicts also implicitly
presumed it. The most Huber said to the contrary was that a locus perhaps
should not permit connubiants to celebrate their nuptials evasively in its
territory,53 7 but he did not say that those nuptials would be void everywhere or
even in the locus. All he clearly said was that the domus was entitled to
disregard them. He made explicit in other legal contexts that states other than
the domus were not permitted to invoke the evasion exception.3 s Mansfield
528 See supra text accompanying note 221.
529 See supra text accompanying note 207.
530 See supra text accompanying note 346.
s31 See supra text accompanying note 359.
532 See supra text accompanying note 410.
5 See supra text accompanying notes 457-503.
534 See supra text accompanying note 173.
535 See supra text accompanying note 407.
536 See supra text accompanying notes 226-29.
s3 See supra text accompanying note 230.
538 See supra text accompanying note 229.
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hewed closely to the Dutch thinkers, so he presumably would have articulated
the evasion exception in the same way.
To find support for a broader application of the evasion exception, one
has to go all the way back to Ledesma,539 who is not a significant source in any
event. In his view, evasive nuptials would not give rise to a valid marriage
anywhere. Every forum, in other words, could invoke the evasion exception on
behalf of a third state that is the domus. This conclusion followed from
Ledesma's notion that evasion was deceitful,540 so connubiants should not gain
any benefit from their immoral act anywhere. But Ledesma's support for his
regime was flimsy, reflecting little or no engagement with even
contemporaneous conflicts thought. The Dutch theory, moreover, rested on the
very different rationale that giving effect to an evasive act would prejudice the
forum whose law was evaded,541 not that there was some universal ethic against
giving effect to evasive acts based on some sort of moral objection. The
exception was merely about allowing the evaded state to protect itself.
Consistent with the Dutch formulation, any evasion exception that
limits the locus-validation rule as part of the original content of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause should not be deemed to extend to any forum that was not
also the domus of at least one of the connubiants at the time of the nuptials.
While the original content would not preclude the domus from invoking the
evasion exception, it would require any other state to abide by the locus-
validation rule notwithstanding the evasion of some other state's law.
ii. Abhorrence
Support for some sort of abhorrence exception seemed uniform. Huber
clearly endorsed it,5 42 and there was good evidence that Voet 43 and Sanchez544
would have as well. English ecclesiastical courts endorsed it in Harforf4 5 as
did the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in more than one opinion.54 6 It
seems plain that no locus rule should be made mandatory in the case of a
marriage deemed abhorrent, but again, the scope of the exception is significant.
In contrast to the evasion exception, the abhorrence one seemed available to
any forum, without regard to the forum's other contacts with the connubiants or
the nuptials. But the exception was sharply limited to those types of marriages
539 See supra text accompanying note 145.
540 See supra text accompanying note 149.
541 See supra text accompanying notes 204, 226.
542 See supra text accompanying note 251.
543 See supra text accompanying note 212.
s" See supra text accompanying note 178.
545 See supra text accompanying note 380.
546 See supra text accompanying notes 463, 489.
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that were universally or nearly universally forbidden, at least among some
relevant universe of states-such as "civilized" nations, in the old language.54 7
Parent-child marriages and sibling marriages are two explicit examples in the
sources. Huber demonstrated that he would not have applied the exception to
avuncular marriages, as they were not universally prohibited.548 If the set of
relevant states were limited to Western nations or, in the full-faith-and-credit
context, to the states of the Union, one could include polygamy in this
exception. Perhaps a marriage involving an extremely young child might also
fit the exception. That suggestion appeared in Harford. 49 It is hard to think of
another example that would fit.550
3. Resulting Principle
The historical evidence seems sufficient to support the following
principle as part of the original content of the Full Faith and Credit Clause: A
forum state must apply the marriage-validating law of the sibling state where
the nuptials were celebrated, unless (1) the marriage is nearly universally
prohibited or (2) the forum is a domus whose law was evaded by at least one of
the connubiants. The sources that culminate in this principle give the Court a
sufficient "rudder" or "compass" for construing the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to impose a choice-of-law mandate to the extent of this principle.
C. Import in Specific Cases
If the Full Faith and Credit Clause were construed to embody the
foregoing principle as a constitutional constraint on state choice of law in the
context of marriage conflicts, the effect would not be revolutionary, but it
would alter the outcome of some cases. Considering the effects in a few
situations will illustrate the impact.
547 See supra text accompanying note 255.
548 See supra text accompanying note 251.
549 See supra text accompanying note 381.
550 Although same-sex marriages might once have qualified, the Supreme Court's decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), by invalidating state bans on same-sex marriages,
eliminated interstate conflicts with respect to these marriages. Even before Obergefell, more than
a dozen states and similar number of Western nations had already authorized same-sex
marriages, a number which would have weighed strongly against subjecting these marriages to
the abhorrence exception under the test of near-universal prohibition.
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Perhaps the most well-known case in all of marriage recognition is In
re May 's Estate,"' in which the New York Court of Appeals famously
recognized an evasive avuncular marriage celebrated by two of its residents in
Rhode Island under a special statutory exemption for Jewish connubiants.
Because the nuptials were clearly evasive, the originalist full-faith-and-credit
mandate would not have applied in that case. New York voluntarily recognized
the marriage by choosing to apply locus law, but the Full Faith and Credit
Clause would not have mandated that result in the face of the clear evasion.
New York could have chosen to apply its own law and treat the Rhode Island
nuptials as void had it chosen to do so.
More interesting, however, is what the originalist full-faith-and-credit
mandate would require of other states. The May's Estate rule is one of the most
liberal recognition rules in the country. Other states have sometimes invoked
public policy exceptions to refuse to recognize avuncular marriages. When they
are the domus of at least one of the connubiants, there would be nothing
unconstitutional in doing so. When they are not a domus, however, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause would mandate interstate recognition. If any other state
but a domus were the forum, the general locus-validation rule would be
constitutionally mandatory, as the marriage was valid under the law of the
Rhode Island locus. The evasion exception would not be available, even though
the connubiants evaded New York law, because they did not evade the law of
the other state now hypothetically tasked with making the choice of law. The
abhorrence exception would also be unavailable, as the rejection of avuncular
marriages is not nearly universal. The result would be national uniformity in
the recognition of the marriage with the lone exception of the domus potentially
withholding recognition, although New York did not choose to do so in May 's
Estate.5 52 If the domus chose to disregard the nuptials and treat the marriage as
void, a significant problem of "limping" would exist, but the problem would at
least be contained to the domus. The couple would not face a checkerboard of
recognition and denial of recognition around the country.
2. Formal Evasion
An evasion scenario can also involve the mere formalities of marriage.
Many marriage conflicts, in fact, involve claims that connubiants have
concluded an informal, "common-law" marriage while visiting a state that
ss1 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953).
552 Technically, the Clause would not require a Rhode Island court to make any particular
choice of law either. The Clause speaks only to the situation in which a forum has declined to
apply the law of a sibling state. It does not speak to instances in which a forum should apply its
own law or should be forbidden to choose the law of a state other than itself.
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allows such marriages. States typically apply the law of the locus and recognize
the marriage if it met the requirements for a valid "common law" marriage
under the law of the locus, although often the claimed nuptials do not meet
those criteria. Illinois, however, has adopted a particularly aggressive stance
toward "common law" marriages concluded by its own citizens in other states.
Its aggressive rejection of these marriages would be unconstitutional in most
situations under an originalist interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Lynch v. Bowen5 3 is perhaps the clearest example. There, a couple
from Illinois never formally celebrated their nuptials anywhere, even though
there was no apparent material impediment to their marrying. They
nevertheless had lived together for 40 years and had three children together.
When the male partner died, his 65-year-old surviving partner sought a
widow's benefit from Social Security. The connubiants had once spent ten days
visiting Pennsylvania, where, it was assumed for argument's sake, they had
informally exchanged marital vows without a license or solemnization.554 The
informal nuptials were consistent with Pennsylvania law, which then allowed
common-law marriages,ss but they were inconsistent with Illinois law, which
had banned such marriages.556 Moreover, under Illinois' version of the
Marriage Evasion Act, which the courts had construed strictly, the
Pennsylvania nuptials, even if they happened and even if they were valid under
locus law, were deemed void by the Illinois domicile.
Assuming the nuptials ever actually happened, which is a serious
factual question, that refusal to choose Pennsylvania law would be
unconstitutional under the originalist mandate proposed here. The general rule
would be constitutionally obligatory, so an Illinois court would be required to
choose and apply Pennsylvania's permissive law because Pennsylvania was the
locus. The evasion exception could apply in theory because the connubiants
553 681 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Ill. 1988). The case was before a federal court, but in deciding a
state-law question, a federal court must apply the conflicts law of the state in which it sits.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
554 Lynch, 681 F. Supp. at 507. The couple also took brief trips to other jurisdictions that
authorized common law marriage, but the couple made two trips to Pennsylvania, including the
longest one. I have focused exclusively on Pennsylvania in order to simplify discussion of the
case as an illustration.
Buradus v. Gen. Cement Prods. Co., 52 A.2d 205, 207-08 (Pa. 1947). Later, in 1957,
informal marriages arguably gained some statutory standing in Pennsylvania. In re Miller, 448
A.2d 25, 32-33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). In 2005, however, Pennsylvania prospectively abolished
the common law marriage, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1103 (2015), after a lower court purported to
abolish the doctrine by way of judicial reform of the common law. PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers'
Comp. Appeal Bd. (Stamos), 831 A.2d 1269 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003); see also Stackhouse v.
Stackhouse, 862 A.2d 102 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (acquiescing in judicial abolition but barring
retroactive application).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/214 (2015) ("Common law marriages contracted in this State after
June 30, 1905 are invalid.").
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were residents of the Illinois forum, but there was no indication anywhere in
the fact pattern that the connubiants had deliberately gone to Pennsylvania in
order to conclude their nuptials without having to conform to the ceremonial
requirements of Illinois law. As the early modern sources discussed the evasion
exception, it required deliberate evasion of domus law, not the mere
happenstance of getting married under the conflicting law of another state.
Absent evidence of deliberate evasion, the extension of the marriage evasion
act to this marriage would unconstitutionally deny full faith and credit to
Pennsylvania law. As in the case of May's Estate, moreover, other states would
be constitutionally required to choose Pennsylvania law in any event without
any possibility of an evasion exception.
3. Chauvinism Scenarios
In addition to cases of evasion, marriage conflicts also arise, though
less commonly, in what I have termed the chauvinism scenarios, in which a
forum state that was neither the domus nor the locus nevertheless invokes some
"public policy exception" and refuses to recognize a marriage that was valid
under the law of the locus. These denials of recognition would be
unconstitutional under the proposed mandate in the absence of abhorrence.
The less controversial of these scenarios would involve visitor or
extraterritorial marriages. In these situations, connubiants become embroiled in
litigation in a forum state as a result of either temporarily passing through the
state or somehow acquiring an interest, such as a land interest, that is connected
with the forum. Under the proposed mandate, the general locus-validation rule
would apply. The forum would be constitutionally obliged to recognize the out-
of-state marriage. Because the forum is not the domus, its law was not evaded
in the formation of the marriage, so the evasion exception is unavailable.
Unless the marriage is of a type that is nearly universally banned, the
abhorrence exception would not be available either. This solution would
achieve complete interstate uniformity in the recognition of such marriages.
The tougher chauvinism scenario would involve migratory marriages.
This scenario arises when a marriage was valid according to the locus and
domus of the connubiants at the time the nuptials took place, but the
connubiants later permanently relocate to a state that does not itself allow the
type of marriage and that attempts to withhold recognition. The conflicts
question is basically a choice-of-time issue. Should the post-nuptial change of
domus alter the validity of the nuptials? The early modern sources almost never
discuss this scenario, but there is one significant exception. Huber explicitly
reasoned that the new domus should recognize the migratory marriage that was
valid where the connubiants originally lived and celebrated their nuptials. The
post-marital change of residence, in other words, should have no effect on the
validity of the marriage. While that lone source may not be definitive, even
though Huber was the preeminent source for early American courts, the
principle still might merit constitutionalization. The Supreme Court itself has
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been skeptical of the power of a forum state to use a post-event change of
residence as the basis for invalidating a transaction that had no connection to
the state at the time the transaction was concluded.557 Although the transaction
at issue was not a marriage, the forum's lack of any contemporaneous contact
with the transaction made the choice of forum law unconstitutional even
without the adoption of an originalist full-faith-and-credit mandate. Strictly
speaking, however, it would be hard to rest the constitutionalization of a
marriage-specific principle on Huber alone, even in the face of silence among
all the other early modem sources. What may be possible, however, is to
determine whether early modem conflicts thinkers generally repudiated the
idea of using post-event contacts to reassess the validity of concluded
transactions.
D. Policy Assessment
Although deriving the original content of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause as it applies to the resolution of marriage conflicts does not necessarily
depend on any assessment of the resulting conflicts policy, the acceptability of
the proposal, realistically, will depend on some assessment of the resulting
conflicts policy.558 The conflicts principles that may be derived as the original
content of the Clause do not differ enormously from the principles articulated
by the Second Restatement of Conflicts. The most significant difference
between the two sets of principles involves a relatively minor difference in the
necessary trade-offs between competing policy considerations.
The general rule derived as the original content is the same as the
general rule adopted in the Second Restatement.559 Both endorse the locus-
validation rule, so the same policy considerations identified in the Second
Restatement as supporting the general rule articulated there will equally support
the same general rule as a full-faith-and-credit command. The general rule
serves a systemic interest in preventing limping marriages by furthering the
uniform resolution of marriage conflicts in whatever forum they arise.560 It
accommodates the probable expectation of the connubiants that the legal effect
of their nuptials would be determined by the law of the locus where they took
place as well as the expectation that the nuptials resulted in a valid marriage.
The general rule also serves the goal of administrability, as the locus where
nuptials took place is, in the run of cases, likely to be an easier contact to
ss7 John Hancock Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182-83 (1936).
558 But see supra text accompanying note 49 (noting that Justice Story viewed himself as
discovering, not formulating, conflicts law in accepting a rule with which he explicitly disagreed
as a matter of policy).
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
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identify than the domus of each connubiant.5 62 Because the locus-validation
rule results in a choice of law that affirms the validity of the nuptials, the
general rule also advances the basic, substantive policy of marriage law, which
is to endeavor to affirm the validity of a marriage if possible. 563 In the case of
formalities, the rule also likely calls for selection of the law of the state having
the greatest interest in having its law applied to issues of form: the locus.56
What the general rule sacrifices in the case of either the Second Restatment or
the original content is the superior interest of the domus in controlling the
material conditions under which its people may marry,565 an interest
accommodated to some extent by exceptions to the general rule.
The most significant difference between the principles derived as the
original content of the Clause and the principles articulated in the Second
Restatement concerns the exceptions to the general rule. The Second
Restatement articulates a public policy exception that counsels a forum state to
override the locus-validation rule if the domus would refuse to validate the
nuptials in question under the law of the locus. 66 This exception
accommodates the general rule's disregard of the governmental interest of the
domus.567
The exceptions derived as the original content of the Clause are similar
to the public policy exception but not coextensive. The abhorrence exception
would function similarly to the public policy exception. In extreme cases, such
as polygamy and nuclear kinship, both exceptions would permit every forum in
the country to override the law of any locus state that might ever permit such a
marriage, as long as a trend in favor of authorizing such marriages does not
arise in too many states to justify application of the abhorrence exception. In
these extreme cases, either exception accommodates the interest of not only the
domus but of every state in withholding validity from these extreme nuptials.
In less extreme cases, where the abhorrence exception would not be
available, the Second Restatement's public policy exception would diverge
significantly from the original content's remaining exception: the evasion
exception. Whereas the public policy exception would counsel every state to
override the validating law of the locus if the domus would do so, the evasion
exception would permit only the domus itself to override locus law when the
domus happened also to be the forum. No other state would be permitted to
invoke the evasion exception, so all of them would be constitutionally
compelled to recognize the validity of a marriage that the domus refuses to
562 Id. § 283(2) cmt. h.
563 Id. § 283(1) cmt. b.
5 Id. § 283(2) cmt. f.
565 Id. cmt. h.
566 Id. § 283(2).
567 Id. cmt. j.
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accept. The evasion exception, then, does not accommodate any governmental
interest that the domus may have in having its law applied to invalidate the
nuptials outside its borders. The evasion exception also indulges greater
incidence of limping marriages by forbidding disinterested third states from
following the domus in overriding locus law and denying validity to a marriage
deemed invalid at the domus. This problem is somewhat more limited than it
might first appear because the domus would be constitutionally permitted to
invoke the evasion exception only in cases of actual, deliberate evasion, not by
the domus's mere disdain for locus law. Still, the original content would leave
greater room for limping marriages than would the principles of the Second
Restatement if applied uniformly.
There are, however, countervailing considerations that favor the
original content's restriction of the availability of the exception to only the
domus and only in cases of deliberate evasion. While the limited availability of
the evasion override sacrifices uniformity and thus the systemic interest in
avoiding limping marriages in a way that the public policy exception of the
Second Restatement does not, it simultaneously advances other conflicts
policies better than the Second Restatement principles do. Specifically, it more
strongly favors the interest of the connubiants in the validation of their
marriage.56 8 By forbidding other states from invoking a public policy override,
the original content's narrow exception for evasion induces the application of
locus law to recognize marriages as valid in every state but the domus.
Connubiants gain broader mandatory validation of their nuptials than under the
public policy exception of the Second Restatement, even though the ability of
the domus to disregard their nuptials means, with respect to that one state, their
marriage will be a limping one. For similar reasons, the evasion exception
advances more strongly than the Second Restatement's the basic, substantive
policy of seeking to affirm the validity of a marriage by limiting the ability to
override locus law to only the domus. The net result is that under the original
content's evasion exception, connubiants gain greater interstate validation of
their nuptials at the cost of enduring marriages that limp unrecognized in their
home state. The recent experience with same-sex marriages, however, indicates
that this is a tradeoff that many connubiants find acceptable. "Protecting" a
couple from the burden of a limping marriage by, instead, allowing their
marriage to be disregarded everywhere is a backhanded benefit at best. What
really gets sacrificed under the original content is the governmental interest of
the domus in having its invalidating law follow its connubiants and invalidate
their marriage everywhere. To that extent, the evasion exception of the original
content privileges the interest of the connubiants in validation over the interest
of their domus in having their nuptials disregarded outside its borders. The
public policy exception of the Second Restatement establishes the opposite
568 Id. (noting the tradeoff between connubiant and domus interests).
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hierarchy,6 one privileging the domus interest in invalidation over the
connubiants interest in validation. To say the least, it is difficult to conclude
that the Second Restatement has clearly made the superior tradeoff in this
regard.
To the extent that the principles derived as the original content of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause are comparable or superior to those of the Second
Restatement in advancing and balancing established conflicts policies, they are
superior to the Second Restatement principles in another respect. If entrenched
as the original content of the Clause and enforceable against forum states, the
principles are more resistant to poorly conceived, parochial subversion than is
true of the forum self-policing of the Second Restatement. Again, the recent
experience with same-sex marriage is instructive. In a reactionary wave of
lawmaking, the vast majority of states adopted blanket policies of non-
recognition of same-sex marriages. But this reaction was extreme.5 70 It ignored
the various conflict patterns in which marriage conflicts arise71 and paid no
attention to the weight of the forum's stake in imposing its invalidating rule
onto an out-of-state marriage. The blanket rule of nonrecognition was far more
parochial than even the position that segregationist states adopted toward out-
of-state interracial marriages. 5172 If entrenched as a constitutional mandate,
however, the cosmopolitan, validation-favoring principles of the original
content would forestall such reactionary extremism, even as it would still
permit the domus to adhere to its invalidating policy with respect to its own
resident connubiants within its own borders. The principles of the original
content would dramatically contain the severe problem of limping marriages
that existed in the case of the extreme reaction against any recognition of same-
sex marriages by many chauvinistic states having little or no contact with the
connubiants or their nuptials.
In the final analysis, then, not only can originalist principles for
resolving marriage conflicts be derived from historical sources but those
principles seem at least as viable, if not superior to, the principles articulated in
the Second Restatement. They are more connubiant-favoring and validation-
favoring, and, as constitutional commands, would be far less vulnerable to
reactionary and dysfunctional override than the principles of the Second
Restatement.
VII. CONCLUSION
"If there is one thing that the people are entitled to expect from their
lawmakers," Justice Jackson once observed, "it is rules of law that will enable
569 Id.
570 Koppelman, supra note 94, at 2143-44.
571 See supra Part III.C.
572 See Koppehnann, supra note 94, at 2150-51.
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individuals to tell whether they are married and, if so, to whom."573 One might
have thought that the Framers would have expected the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to provide some assurance on that point. In fact, they may well have.
They expected the Clause to impose meaningful constraints on state choice of
law, and they expected those constraints to derive from then-existing conflicts
principles. The Supreme Court agrees with both of those propositions. The
historical evidence indicates rather clearly that those conflicts principles
included, at the very least, the rule that a forum should apply the marriage-
validating law of the locus where a marriage was celebrated, as long as the
marriage is not abhorrent or evasive. That is what the Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires. Enforcing that mandate can go far toward addressing the
problem of the limping marriage.
m Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 553 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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